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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I explore how power and governance in Nashville is related to 
economic and institutional change on a national and global scale-the transition from 
Fordism to post-Fordism. By investigating the political and social institutions of the city, 
it is my objective to understand how the elites are operating to control and direct 
development. The study is an in-depth look at the activities of local business and how 
they decide to respond in a situation of change and uncertainty. Here I stress the 
importance of collective action among the business elite, which is equally meaningful to 
explore as the notion of capitalism driven by competition. The period of analysis 
stretches from the 1980s to the late 1990s: but the early 1990s was a particularly crucial 
time period in Nashville when a new local regime emerged as a catalyst for the local 
post-Fordist mode of regulation. New forms of governance, which reached maturation 
stage during the 1990s, have evolved in Nashville affecting both political and business 
institutions. Governance is increasingly based on power diffusion, transparency and 
inclusiveness in decision-making, yet dominated by business-friendly policies, which 
should be viewed in the context of urban competition and the need to position the city to 
take advantage of economic restructuring. To comprehend the interaction between local 
development and the national regime, I have studied three relevant policy areas that can 
exemplify the nature of competitive governance: image and city promotion� airport 
development� and emerging engagement of business interests in social policy as 
exemplified by education. The first two areas conform to the idea of the city driven by 
entrepreneurial considerations, while the latter concerns social reproduction. All cases, 
however, depend on the capacity of business to pursue its goals through collective action. 
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t. INTRODUCTION
t. t Statement of the problem
Most everyone in Nashville agrees that the city today is a very different place than it was 
just 10 to 15 years ago. There are some directly observable signs of this change: a reborn 
downtown, increased economic and spatial growth, the presence of major league sports, 
and demographic changes. A dynamic mayor has played a vital role, but on a more 
fundamental level, a transformation of local governance has allowed these changes to 
take place. My aim is to explore how this new configuration of power and governance in 
Nashville is related to paradigmatic changes in the economic and institutional 
organization of the United States, and even globally. Some of the interrelated local trends 
include the organization and activities of business interests, the nature of city politics and 
power distribution, the changing economic character and industrial base, demographic 
trends, and the influx of new people in an increasingly integrated economy. These trends 
are reflective of the city's efforts to take advantage of Sunbelt growth and the 
opportunities of a post-industrial economy. The goal is to investigate how economic 
development strategies are formed in this context. The remaking of Nashville as a 
business-friendly, nationally competitive location has been initiated and led by a local 
business elite, although this elite by no means holds absolute power. Therefore, its 
activities and influence in the policy-making process receive the most attention in my 
analysis. Some have even praised these changes in Nashville as a model development of 
sorts and a microcosm of contemporary urban America. Recently, the neo-conservative 
The American f,'nterprise (1998, March/April) dedicated an entire issue to Nashville as a 
successful city of the 1990s that embodied many of the values they touted: an 
entrepreneurial spirit, a business approach to government, and, ostensibly, family and 
religion-oriented. Regardless of whether the report entirely reflected local realities, the 
central ideological message in this portrayal of Nashville is that local communities are 
better off guiding their own fates rather than following centralized edicts from the federal 
government (Casse, 1998, March 19). 
This local independence occurs at a time when, most observers concede, the 
world economy has entered a new era in which service production is increasingly 
dominant in the developed world, while manufacturing has been reorganized along the 
lines of flexible specialization, producing new economic spaces. Economic integration is 
taking place on a global scale, and many cities are shedding their old function while 
searching for a new role, regionally as well as globally. New economic trends will 
inevitably affect the path of localities and there is a necessary dynamic between 
economic and political restructuring on a local and a global scale. Clearly, non-local 
events have a profound impact on urban change. Even if much has been said about the 
diminishing importance-the ''hollowing out"-of the nation-state, it should be noted 
that local development in the U.S. is still strongly affected by federal policy. 
On a theoretical level, my understanding of local change is inspired by the 
regulation school's conceptualization of societal change-the transition from Fordism to 
post-Fordism. In an effort to comprehend the dynamic relationship between the two 
geographic scales, several writers have investigated the commensurability of regulation 
theory and various approaches grounded in local experiences, especially urban regime 
theory. Urban regime theory describes political coalition-building in the local arena, 
while regulation theory outlines ways of organizing the economy on the national level 
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and the supportive institutional framework that must be in place for a successful 
macroeconomic performance (see Chapters 2 and 3 for an in-depth discussion of the 
theories). Some suggestions on this theoretical merger have been made, especially in 
Lauria's Reco11structi11g urban regime theory (1997), but the empirical work to support it 
is still accumulating, and far from all aspects of the theories' interrelatedness have been 
empirically investigated. In this study I will focus on the idea that regulation plays out 
differently at different geographical levels, and to what extent local strategies are 
complementary to those enacted on the federal level (rather than simply being followers 
of decisions taken on a higher level). Essentially, the dismantling of the activist liberal 
state model that was triggered by globalization and the hyperaccumulation needs of U.S. 
corporations has left cities in a situation where they must form an appropriate response. 
This response may include not only policies that directly promote economic growth, but 
also encourage the investment of social capital; and even, to some extent, social stability­
enhancing redistributive policies. 
The Nashville economy has been a success story in the 1990s as the city joined 
the ranks of rapidly growing Sunbelt cities. Economic growth has been accompanied by 
population increase, and the Nashville metropolitan area now has over 1.2 million 
inhabitants. As Figure 1.1 indicates, Nashville is among the top 15 growing major cities 
in the country, all located in the South and the West. Important growth industries of the 
new Nashville economy include health care, music and tourism, as well as traditional 
sectors of the local economy such as finance and higher education. The service sector is 
now the dominant part of the local economy, employing over 40 percent of the workforce 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996). 
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1. Las Vegas
2. Austin
3. Phoenix
4. Atlanta
5. Raleigh-Durham
6. Orlando 11. Portland
7. West Palm Beach 12. Houston
8. Denver 13. Nash ville
9. Dallas 14. Salt Lake City
10. Charlotte 15. Miami
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001 ). *MSAs over 1 million. 
Figure 1.1 Top 15 fastest growing (by percentage) large* MSAs in the U.S. 1990-2000. 
Nashville follows urbanization patterns observed in other places with a renewed 
vitality of the central city, as well as continued and even accelerating urban sprawl. 
Accompanying spatial changes include a newly dynamic downtown and rapid peripheral 
growth in the metropolitan area, especially in the suburbs to the south and the east where 
both population and employment have boomed. The 2000 Census data indicate a 
population growth of 11.6 percent in Nashville-Davidson County to approximately 
570,000. As expected, the suburban ring counties surpass Nashville in growth, ranging 
from 23 to 56 percent, with the most rapid pace to the south in Williamson and 
Rutherford counties. Most new development in Williamson County is contiguous with 
Nashville's urbanized area, and the county's residents depend to a great extent on 
employment in Nashville. Urban development is not limited to these counties; a growing 
ring of small cities and exurbanization in middle Tennessee has created an increasingly 
dispersed urban region (Figure 1.2). Nashville knows it cannot compete with suburban 
counties for population growth, but it has been able to maintain and strengthen the city's 
role as a dynamic employment center. 
4 
Kentucky 
• Tennessee 
Figure 1.2 Growth patterns in the eight-county Nashville metropolitan area. 
Demographically, the city is increasingly diverse. The white population dropped 
from 75 to 67 percent in the 1990s. Not only has the black population increased, but a 
wide range of ethnicities and immigrant groups are now represented. The Hispanic 
population, for example, is officially 26,000 in the 2000 census, but may actually be 50 
percent higher than that (Moody, 2001 ). 
Even if Nashville is more ethnically diverse than ever, it has not developed as a 
poverty-afflicted core surrounded by affluent suburbs. Nashville has grown more affluent 
in both absolute and relative terms. Compared to several peer cities 1, the Nashville MSA 
1 Throughout the study, I will compare the socio-economic development of Nashville with ten "peer 
cities"-Binningham, Charlotte, Columbus (OH), Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Louisville, Memphis, New 
Orleans, Oklahoma City, and Raleigh-Durham. They have been selected on basis of proximity (mostly in 
the Southeast) and size (MSAs of similar size to Nashville). 
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is relatively affluent. Figure 1.3 indicates that Nashville is currently second to high-tech 
Raleigh-Durham in personal income among the peer group. Income in Nashville did not 
compare favorably in the 1970s, improved considerably in the 1980s, and after a slump in 
the late 1980s, the 1990s were an outstanding period of rapid growth for Nashville. In 
fact, during the 1 990s the city's boosters reached the goal of increasing personal income 
by $1,200-1,300 annually (Harris, 2000). This growth in affluence is especially 
noticeable compared to the national average income. Also when adjusted for geographic 
differences in cost of living, Nashville retains its position as one of the most affluent 
cities in the region (Partnership 2000, 1996)2. 
There are several reasons why I will use Nashville as the case study to investigate 
the impact of broad economic change as outlined by the regulation theory on the local 
political economy. The current growth in Nashville has resulted in changes, not only in 
the city's economy and spatial structure, but also its political decision-making process, 
which makes Nashville a good research object using the regime/regulationist perspective. 
Unlike many cities studied in the literature, Nashville is not the prototypical industrial 
city transforming itself into a service economy. Industrial data reveal, however, that 
Nashville also has experienced a significant shift from 33 percent of the workforce 
employed in manufacturing in 1966 to only 11 percent in 1996 (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1966; 1996). Quantitative decline is also accompanied with qualitative change: 
apparel and shoe manufacturing are declining in favor of high-tech employment, as 
2 As measured by Effective Buying Income (EBI). Using a different, but similar, pool of cities, the 
Nashville Chamber of Commerce reports that Nashville's EBI is second in a group of 12, only surpassed by 
Dallas. 
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Figure 1.3 Per capita income in Nashville and peer cities 1969-1998. (Adjusted for 
inflation in 1998 dollars. In the legend, cities are listed in order of affluence, from the top, 
in 1998. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, various years.) 
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exemplified by Dell Computer's new manufacturing plant in Nashville. However, with a 
history of a diverse manufacturing sector with only some locally headquartered 
corporations, the post-industrial shift in Nashville is distinctly different than industrial 
cities in the Northeast. Nashville is also relatively unstudied, and the city's recent urban 
change has so far attracted scant attention from researchers. But, as a growing Southern 
city, I believe its changes are not entirely unique, and the conclusions of this work are, it 
is hoped, valid beyond the immediate case study. 
Before elaborating on the major theories in the next chapters, a few comments on 
the philosophical basis of the dissertation are in order. Throughout the dissertation, urban 
politics will be emphasized as the arena where urban space is shaped. Using a dichotomy 
from political science, I will employ an elite perspective rather than a pluralistic 
perspective on urban politics3• A local elite, by definition, is a powerful minority group 
whose control predominantly emanates from financial, corporate or private resources, and 
is generally accompanied by a group-consciousness of social superiority. If cities are 
shaped by powerful groups of people operating in a capitalist economy, political action 
and its outcome in the urban environment can benefit from an analysis using a political 
economy perspective4 • Politics and economy cannot be treated as belonging to separate 
spheres; rather, the two are inextricably linked. The economy is not a neutral system for
the allocation of resources; conversely, political decisions and their consequences are not
3 My view of the American city as elite-dominated has undoubtedly emerged from my experience with 
Scandinavian cities and their strong party-system, corporatist local state organization, and financial 
dependency on the central government. 4 In contemporary human geography, political economy often denotes a neo-Marxist approach; however, I
use the term in a more general sense. On the other hand, that does not mean that I reject Marxian ideas 
outright, but rather aim to incorporate some of their insights into a broader theoretical framework. 
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simply direct outcomes of majority votes in popular elections and city councils. Instead, a 
small group of people can muster a disproportional amount of influence on decision­
making. Particularly business interests hold extraordinary powers over public policy 
simply because any city's dependency on private capital for its economic well-being is 
strong and the rational self-interest of the local state is, therefore, likely to result in policy 
concessions to business interests (Lindblom, 1977). The acknowledgment of power 
outside traditional political institutions has led to the broad concept of governance 
replacing the narrower focus on government in urban studies. By exploring the political 
and social institutions of the city, it is my objective to understand how the elites are 
operating to control and direct development. The interest of business is often construed as 
homogenous and conforming to the "logic of capitalism," or simple agents of capitalism. 
While not dismissive of the power of economic structures on societal development, my 
contribution is an in-depth look at the behavior of local business, individually and 
collectively, and how they decide to respond in situations of change and uncertainty. 
Here I stress the importance of collective action among the business elite, which is 
equally meaningful to explore as the standard conceptualization of capitalism as driven 
by competition. For example, the loosening of ties of corporations to local places is now 
almost taken for granted. General assumptions of what this means are usually embedded 
in the idea of global power holding authority over local places. I will look into the 
mechanics of this process, the changing relationship of corporations and industries with 
places, even if the dependency of capital mobility on most U.S. cities and their economic 
development strategies might be limited to national flows rather than international. 
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The emphasis on Nashville's business elite in the dissertation is taking place at 
the expense of other social groups, such as the working class and minorities. This is 
indeed a limitation, but perhaps a necessary one to keep the scope of the study reasonably 
narrow. But the research cannot be said to capture all aspects of Nashville, and it is very 
possible that important social and economic trends have eluded me given these 
parameters. On the other hand, the elite emphasis does not imply that other groups are 
powerless or that their impact will be omitted completely. As will be evident later, 
working class neighborhoods have played important roles in Nashville's local politics, 
and, as in virtually all Souhern cities, the precence of a substantial African-American 
population has influenced the development process in several important ways. Especially 
the politics of education will receive substantial treatment. 
How then exactly is Nashville affected by the ongoing national and global 
reorganization of the economy? What institutions and decision-makers constitute the new 
Nashville regime, making the city distinctly post-Fordist? Building on earlier theoretical 
and empirical work, Figure I .4 shows how I envision the interaction between the abstract, 
general level and how it takes specific shape in Nashville. The most important connection 
in my analysis is the intensification of urban competition, which has initiated a local 
process of change resulting in new policies, institutions, and strategies. The period of 
analysis stretches from the I 980s to the late 1990s5, but I hypothesize that particularly the 
early 1990s was a crucial time period in Nashville when a new local regime emerged as a 
5 A logical endpoint is the conclusion of Phil Bredesen 's mayoral tenure in 1999, although relevant 
developments beyond that point will he discussed. 
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An era of indeterminacy 
Competition as an ideological imperative 
Taking advantage of restructuring 
Geogra hical interdependence 
,--______ l_ _____ New poHcies ________ _ 
Local politics 
Real estate crisi 
Banking 
------------------------, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
: Regulating and improving the work force 
I 
I 
I 
Changing political culture-----;•-: The politics of image creation 
Changing business elite 
Chamber of Commerce 
Partnership 2000 Theoretical connections 
Empirical connections 
Figure 1.4 A theoretical framework developed for Nashville to show local/non-local 
interaction. 
catalyst for the local post-Fordist mode of regulation. The central issues that must be 
addressed are summarized in the following hypothesis: 
•A new form of governance has evolved in Nashville, affecting both political and
business institutions, which reached matura�ion stage during the 1990s. Governance is 
increasingly based on power diffusion, transparency and inclusiveness in decision­
making, yet systematically biased towards business-friendly policies, which should be 
viewed in the context of urban competition and increased awareness, positioning the city 
to take advantage of economic restructuring. 
• This shift is strongly influenced by outside political and economic forces­
"post-Fordism." Analytically, I distinguish between catalytic factors and underlying, 
structural factors. The former includes the economic recession around 1990 and the 
11 
mayoral period of Bill Boner, which discredited old-style machine politics. These 
catalytic factors can be unique events resulting from local particularities, but are usually 
embedded in non-local trends. The blend between catalytic and structural factors 
produces a path of development that is both place-based and universal. The latter include: 
1. A decline of dominant industries in Nashville; 2. New geographic organization and
integration of the economy, in part triggered by deregulation; 3. Migration of people and 
capital to the Sunbelt, which together with the increasingly interconnected economy, 
rendered the old local power structure obsolete; and 4. State devolution. These issues, 
outlined as the "new governance" box in Figure 1.4, are discussed in Chapter 4, a review 
of some of the implications of post-Fordism on cities; Chapter 5, a history of Nashville, 
as any recent changes must be understood as a response, not only to external forces, but 
also to local historically contingent structures; Chapter 6, a focus on the business cycle 
and economic recession circa 1990 as catalytic factors triggering changes in local 
governance; and Chapter 7, the cultural and institutional transformation of the business 
elite. 
• The strategies that have emerged can be situated in an intra-urban competitive
context. To fully comprehend the outcome of the interaction between local development 
and national regimes is a formidable task that requires in-depth knowledge not only of a 
particular city, but also exhaustive comprehension of U.S. urban development over a long 
time period. I will therefore limit myself to study only a few relevant examples (the "new 
policies" box in Figure 1.4). Three areas can exemplify the nature of competitive 
governance: image and city promotion (Chapter 8); airport development as a competitive 
tool (Chapter 9); and a new type of engagement of business interests in social policy as 
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exemplified by education (Chapter I 0). The first two areas conform to the idea of the city 
as driven by entrepreneurial considerations, while the latter concerns social reproduction. 
All cases, however, depend on the capacity of business to pursue its goals through 
collective action, and I will try to resolve the fundamental question of how these 
divergent strategies relate to each other. 
t .2 A note on research methods 
The methodological approach of this study corresponds to what textbooks call a 
historical/comparative analysis (Babbie, 1995). As the unit of analysis is the city, the 
research is context-based and must acknowledge that a particular city's development is 
path dependent. The events influencing the new local regime of the 1990s are described 
using a narrative structure, but more theoretically focused, where the strategies and 
policies are treated in an analytical fashion, and less idiographically than traditional 
historical research. 
My research was conducted in two distinct phases: the exploratory phase and the 
field phase. The exploratory phase involved a close reading of written sources. 
Newspapers and local periodicals are invaluable for recapturing the pattern of events that 
shaped the city's political and urban discourse over the last decade. The goal is to identify 
key events and developments that are relevant to my arguments. The role of the theories 
underpinning the research is to guide my interpretation of local events and make sense of 
innumerable occurrences, distilling a complex process to a few manageable ideas. This 
procedure is necessary as the theories can only suggest some areas of research, and a 
specific set of research objectives must be developed for each case study. The exploratory 
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research will build a framework of knowledge that is not comprehensive, but will provide 
a foundation from which it is possible to continue. The goal of the subsequent field phase 
is to add data to the constructed framework and to corroborate and expand on the general 
ideas that have emerged during the exploratory phase-to fill in missing facts. Two 
research activities are dominant here: collecting and analyzing secondary data (including 
policy documents, statistical material, and news articles) and conducting interviews with 
key actors, an essential research tool to interpret the factual events. 
There are certain problems to be aware of when conducting predominantly 
interview-based qualitative research. Each informant will provide a personal 
interpretation of historical or ongoing events and processes. Assuming that the informants 
are truthful, statements are still limited by memory. An answer should also be interpreted 
based on the question asked and the context in which it was presented. While a question 
is often posed so the answer will illuminate the validity of the researcher's hypothesis, it 
must be remembered that the person interviewed is not necessary familiar with these 
assumptions. Therefore, as a researcher I must be wary of assigning a meaning beyond 
the immediate, concrete event discussed. When logical deductions from the material are 
made, they should be identifiable as the researcher's own. Moreover, interview material 
does not only constitute a personal response. In most cases, the individual interviewed 
also represents a particular group or interest in society. Thus, interviewees' answers 
naturally conform to a certain viewpoint or to a more-or-less identifiable agenda. The 
goal has been to accumulate enough information, qualitative or quantitative, that can 
contextualize and balance the offered viewpoint, so that all accumulated statements can 
be adequately analyzed within the theoretical framework that is used. 
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2. THE POST-FORDIST SOCIETY
2.1 Introduction to the theory 
Current societal trends, although confusing and contradictory at times, can be interpreted 
as following a particular model. Government policy and decision-making finnly embrace 
a handful of broad propositions: national and urban policy operate under the axiom that 
the era of big government is over, decentralization brings responsive government closer 
to the people, and competition and free market principles should be applied as often as 
possible. At the same time, it is sometimes assumed that policy formation on the local 
level is guided by practical concerns far removed from ideological considerations. While 
it is certainly true that many mundane activities of governing a city have no broader 
implications, the strategies and decision-making arrangements that guide the path of 
individual cities are not conceived in a vacuum, but are indeed influenced by non-local 
forces. The term post-Fordism is often used to describe the current urban condition, as 
well as society in general. Although the term originated as a label of industrial 
organization, it is now widely used in a variety of contexts and each author appears to 
ascribe his or her own meaning to the term. Therefore, it would then be wise to retreat for 
a minute and reflect on the intellectual roots of the post-Fordist idea, in order to 
comprehend its broad contemporary framing and geographical implications. 
The French regulation school of the 1970s grew out of a critique of orthodox 
Marxist political economy and is based on ideas developed in Michel Aglietta's seminal 
book, A Theory qf Capitalist Regulation ( 1979). Regulation theory also differs from 
neoclassical equilibrium models in its interest to understand fundamental economic 
changes in a proper historical context (Jessop, 1995). After the tumultuous end of the 
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1960s with social upheaval and growing economic uncertainties, the capitalist economy 
appeared weaker than at any point since the Great Depression. Corporate productivity 
and profitability had eroded� unemployment skyrocketed in the core industries of the 
Western economies, which were facing stiffer global competition than before. However, 
a decade later it was clear that capitalism would not disintegrate due to its inherent 
contradictions as Marxist dogma insisted; in fact, it proved to be quite resilient. Facing an 
economic and political crisis, capitalism was capable of "reinventing" itself relying on 
new industrial organization, new global strategies and a rethinking of state economic 
policies. This reinvention process involved a change in the regime of accumulation-the 
transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. A regime of accumulation represents a stable 
relationship between consumption and production. It outlines the basic economic 
relationships in society, such as the conditions of production, private and public 
consumption, savings and investment, and the general scope and proper role of 
government. The regime is then "materialized in the shape of norms, habits, laws and 
regulating networks ... which guarantee that its agents conform more or less to the schema 
of reproduction in their day-to-day behavior" (Lipietz, 1987, p. 14). These social and 
economic institutions, cultural norms, and major government policies that must be in 
place and work together in a coherent fashion to support the regime are collectively 
referred to as a mode of regulation (Lauria, 1997). The mode of regulation "establishes a 
set of procedures and individual and collective behaviour patterns which must 
simultaneously reproduce social relations" (Boyer & Saillard, 2002, p. 41) within a 
particular regime and its institutional forms. These ideas in regulation theory draw, at 
least implicitly, on the concept of a social contract that emphasizes the idea of underlying 
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informal agreements in society, providing common rules for cooperative behavior 
between groups and individuals. As a mode of regulation is an outcome of collective 
action, political decisions, and various semi-independent variables, such as technological 
change, it therefore involves constant adjustment of the procedures and institutions. 
Regulation theory thus allows for individual action and the uncertainty of history to 
influence societal development, making it, in a broad epistemological sense, compatible 
with a variety of approaches that aim at integrating and overcoming the division of 
structure and agency (Giddens, 1984; Collier, 1994). With that said, one must also be 
wary of attempts to seek full explanatory power of all events in one grand theory. 
2.2 Fordism and its demise 
Regulation theory developed from an understanding of how capitalism was organized 
after World War II and how large societal institutions were crucial for the particular. 
regime of accumulation called Fordism. On the production side, the Fordist regime was 
associated with assembly-line style mass production. During the early 20th century, the 
increasing output of productive forces was not matched by a corresponding rise in 
consumptive capacity. This imbalance is generally considered one of the causes for the 
Great Depression. Just as Henry Ford's story tells us that his company paid his workers 
above the industrial wage at the time so that they could purchase the automobiles they 
produced, it became the goal of the state to institute a consumption norm for the good of 
the overall economy. Raising the wages and living standard for the working classes 
became not only a moral, but also an economic, imperative. The consumption nonn that 
developed during the Fordist regime was mainly a demand-led approach to generate a 
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market for new products and services. During Fordism, consumption was underpinned by 
a mode of regulation that included high union-negotiated wages, the welfare state, Social 
Security, and government loan guarantees, all ensuring high levels of consumption 
(Lipietz, 1992). 
The intellectual basis for these policies was Keynesian economic theory, which 
allowed for increasing government activities to intervene and stabilize the economy. Not 
only did it preach demand-side management through minimum wages and the welfare 
programs of the redistributive state, which supported the mass consumption imperative, 
but also controlled the cyclical swings endemic to capitalism, a goal that could not be 
over-emphasized in the post-Depression economy. The government, it was felt, must 
spend during downturns in order to balance the opposing forces of unemployment and 
inflation. Spending was enhanced by progressive taxation, which was not only defended 
by the equity argument, but also as rational as low-income individuals have a higher level 
of marginal consumption of income. Moreover, in a system where stable and predictable 
growth was the goal, competition had to take a step back in favor of planned management 
of the economy. The profit level was a function of wage increases and inflation, which 
led to an important role for the predictive capacities of economic experts. Keynesian 
stabilization policy was merely fine-tuning of economic growth, amounting to little more 
that a technical problem of how to manipulate demand to smooth out business cycles and 
achieve predicable, stable growth. Productivity increases, consumption, and corporate 
profits were, if not determined a priori, at least planned, by institutions such as the wage 
negotiation system. Even if disagreements between management and labor occurred 
frequently, a relatively peaceful labor market translated into stable profits and growth. 
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This economic system elevated labor unions to an unprecedented role in society. A grand 
compromise existed in a tripartite power structure: business, labor, and the government. 
These tendencies of the Fordist regime did, to some extent, depoliticize society. 
The prevailing belief at the time was that ideology was a concept of the past and did not 
play a role in modern society. The continuous prosperity of working-class Americans 
through "comfortable proletarianization" would in itself defeat communism, the only 
ideologically-based model of society still remaining. The United States had become a 
society of jobholders (Bazel on, 1969). The mysteries of economic progress had more or 
less been solved and the "tweaking" was to be left in the hands of experts. This optimism 
and predictability of the economy resulted in a forward-looking society with a modernist 
mindset. Similar trends emerged in the private sector. Corporate managerialism where the 
notions of classic capitalism-free enterprise, ownership and private property-had to be 
rethought. The goal of corporation was to grow bigger as much as maximizing profits. 
Business planning emphasized long-term stability and growth (Schonfield, 1965). 
Extending the reasoning from macroeconomic stability to social stability, Galbraith 
(1976) argued that individuals tend to undervalue public goods; and if society fails to 
supply public services at the same rate as private production capacity grows, the result is 
social disorder. Such arguments provided the necessary intellectual support for an 
expansive state in the social sector. 
The model and its ideological underpinnings as described here were, of course, 
not identical in all countries or even regions. The mass consumption model was best 
developed in the United States, while the labor relations model was taken further in 
Western Europe. The Fordist social contact in most European countries was deeper and 
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more comprehensive than in the United States. The role of labor unions was more 
institutionalized into a corporative political system where wages were determined by 
negotiations on a national level. Even the political decision-making system integrated the 
different participants of the labor market. Although under pressure, the model remains 
important in much of Western Europe today. In the United States, the right to unionize 
was established by federal law in the 1930s, but the U.S. labor movement was content 
with acquiring purchasing power increases. rather than amassing political power. By 
moving labor negotiations up the geographical scale to the national level, labor gained 
negotiating power, while capital gained a higher degree of labor market tranquility. While 
these relations were formalized with the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act in the 
193 Os and 1940s, it al so al 1 owed for the development of "peripheral F ordi sm" through 
right-to-work provisions adopted by some. mostly Southern, states. The term peripheral 
Fordism originally referred to the labor intensive economies of southern Europe, but has 
similarly been used to describe the American South as a region not quite ready, 
politically and economically, to fully embrace the emerging mass consumption model 
and accompanying social relations. The institutions of Fordism were national in scope. 
which increased the role of the federal government and its involvement in shaping local 
development. This created not only a new relationship between cities and the federal state 
(see Chapter 3), but also had implications for regional development. Regional policy in 
the United States is in the strict sense of the term almost non-existent. Instead, allocations 
are made to regions through the political system where, for example, military spending 
has become important (Markusen et al., 1999). Logically, government programs had the 
greatest relative impact in poor regions. Infrastructure development such as the interstate 
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system and military expenditure, which brought a federal wage norm to new places, 
attracted investment and increased living standards in many places. The income level in 
the South moved closer to the national average during this period (Figure 2.1 ). The 
expanding Fordist government became a geographic equalizer. 
In the late 1960s, the economies of the W estem world suffered a slowdown. The 
profit margin for the large corporations was rapidly shrinking, and the system suddenly 
no longer seemed effective. Productivity was a problem as corporations faced dynamic 
competition in the emerging world economy. Compared to the onset of the Great 
Depression, which was a crisis of over-production, this was a crisis of profitability 
(Lipietz, 1987). It was not a simple economic crisis caused by the latest business cycle or 
other dynamics solely within the economic realm. The relationship between political 
regulation and accumulation was out of sync, leading to a more fundamental, or "secular" 
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Figure 2.1 Per capita income convergence of U.S. regions. 
Note: Measured as median income until 1960, and mean income from 1970. Midwest 
region called North Central until 1990. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
Characteristics of the population (various years), except 2000 data taken from Summary 
File 3 from Census online FactFinder. 
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in the words of Esser and Hirsch ( 1989), crisis. The contradictions of the Fordist model 
became more and more evident. The rigidly negotiated wages accepted in the name of 
expanded consumption became counterproductive, creating a major rift in the labor­
management compromise. As gains in wages and influence are not easily surrendered, 
labor conflicts compounded existing problems. Stagflation triggered economic 
rethinking, as did the external shock of the oil crisis. Economic decline created a search 
for new forms of institutions and policies best exemplified by the conservative 
revolutions of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. 
2.3 The nature of post-Fordism 
Fordism is generally considered to have been replaced by a new emerging regime most 
commonly referred to as post-Fordism, which was set in place to create and sustain 
increasing profits. Its nature is not fully realized and researchers often stress the 
unpredictability of regime formation. Some prefer not to proclaim it a regime, only 
"disorganized capitalism" that has emerged after Fordism and is guided by few principles 
other than the market-led development of neo-liberalism (Peck & Tickell, 1994). 
Nevertheless, some common threads can be identified that are relevant to the discussion 
of post-Fordism in the context of urban development. 
Although fundamental changes in the way production is organized have occurred, 
one single coherent system has not emerged in the industrial sector. Flexible 
specialization provides a clear alternative to Fordism with its craft style, small batch 
production localized in certain industrial districts; northern Italy is a ubiquitous example 
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in the literature (Sabel, 1994). However, it has not become the all-encompassing principle 
of industrial organization. Neither has the Japanese system of just-in-time lean 
production, nor European industrial organization, which has retained much of its 
character with strong collective agreements. The European system has instead moved 
towards workgroups and reskilling of workers, which represents a move away from 
Taylorism more than Fordism. No single trend has emerged, which has led to valid 
concerns about the viability of post-Fordism as a concept in industrial geography. Large 
companies remain important, albeit in a new form; they are more flexible and 
decentralized with a renewed focus on their core business (Belussi & Garibaldo, 1996). 
With the fast pace of change in technology and new products, producers have moved to a 
network system where larger companies remain in the center, while smaller companies 
supply cutting-edge technology and know-how in a system of vertical disintegration and 
subcontractor-based production networks. Production is emphasizing product 
differentiation and price competition, while economies of scale play a lesser role than in 
the past. Demand is more unstable in a differentiated, fluid market. There is, therefore, a 
need for production to be more flexible and responsive to those changes. 
Where innovation thrives, new industrial districts emerge, placing an emphasis on 
regional economies (Storper, 1997). If competitiveness is based on local or regional 
conditions, economic regulation must also be local. From this dynamic perspective on 
spatial development under capitalism, Post-Fordism brings good times to some regions, 
possibly leading to new types of geographic unevenness. In any case, if a process of 
economic nationalization took place under Fordism, the reemergence of regional 
economies is now underway, leaving more power in the hands of local or regional actors. 
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On the other hand, equilibrium models of mainstream economics logically assume 
diminishing regional differences in a market-based, open economy with powerful global 
forces, which may diminish the capacity for local action. 
Economic globalization is that force which undermines the de facto sovereignty 
and regulating power of states. Production is more oriented towards worldwide demand. 
This integration has been enabled by advances in technology, of both the production­
oriented and communication type, and by expanding free trade governed and enforced by 
global institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary 
Fund. The new international division of labor leaves routinized, labor-intensive 
production to developing countries, while advanced capitalist countries must shift their 
emphasis to R&D and knowledge-based production and services. In an era of global, 
dynamic capitalism, the old national Fordist institutions are less appropriate. It is instead 
in the interest of capital to promote the virtues of neo-liberal free trade, thus reinforcing 
the idea of flexibility to discipline workers with the relocation threat. State and local· 
action is restricted as globalization functions as a giant prisoner's dilemma: if you do not 
know how others will act regarding wages, work rules, and other regulatory mechanisms, 
implementing change is difficult. But the caricature of globalization as a process that 
allows capital to locate anywhere does not provide a comprehensive picture. Producer 
networks, just-in-time, and local skills are precisely the factors that make capital less
footloose and responsive to more than the lowest bidder of labor cost. For example, a 
significant share of U.S. foreign investment is directed at Europe with its high wages, 
strong unions, long vacations, and "cumbersome" labor regulations (Dicken, 2003). In 
the United States, spatial differences in labor relations have influenced the post-Fordist 
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geography, e.g. the Sunbelt shift. Overall, the demise of unionism is both a product of 
economic restructuring and public and corporate policy. Industrial decline, capital 
mobility and globalization, and reorganization of work places with increasing flexibility 
and instability have chipped away the ability of unions to maintain power. At the same 
time, unions have failed to make significant inroads in the growing service-economy. 
The role of unions has weakened along with the shift in the role of government to 
encourage supply rather than demand. This includes less provision of welfare services, as 
the ideal of universal rights is less widely held. On the supply side, the state has 
responded with economic policies that include the retraction of the public sector through 
privatization and deregulation. The result is a "Schumpeterian6 workfare state" where 
social policy is subordinated to economic growth incentives based on competitiveness 
and innovation that requires a flexible workforce (Jessop, 1994). The transition to post­
Fordism has found support in monetarist/supply-side policies in the wake of an economic 
crisis that the old macro-economic model-Keynesianism--could not predict, explain, or 
cope with. The new economic thinking stated that increasing demand will only create 
inflation. The role of fiscal policy is solely to combat inflation by limiting money supply. 
High levels of wealth accumulation (savings) instead of consumption lead to investment 
and growth in the economy. Adjusting the deficiencies of the market should be done by 
encouraging supply instead of demand by lowering taxes, decreasing regulation, reducing 
inflation, and curbing government spending. These things combined also encouraged 
globalization of the economy. A tight monetary policy led to fluctuating interest rates, 
6 From the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, who viewed the economy driven hy technological 
paradigms that occasionally arc transfonned by periods of "creative destruction ... 
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volatility in exchange rates and investment flows between countries. The tax cut, on the 
other hand, induced a deficit that necessitated borrowing and drove up interest rates, 
which in tum attracted foreign capital to the United States. Economic policy thus became 
increasingly aligned with the new emerging logic of capitalism. 
The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act played an especially important part of the 
shift towards stimulating supply and investment as opposed to Keynesian taxation 
encouraging consumption. It was nothing less than a paradigmatic change in the 
accumulation strategy of the state, a drastic shift in the burden of taxation away from 
corporate taxes. Earlier tax structures had benefited capital-intensive production, but 
taxation policy now also turned towards encouragement of human resource development. 
Hence, with capital mobility increasing, taxation was shifted towards less mobile factors, 
such as labor and fixed assets (Martin, 1991 ). 
Economic policies had the intended effect of increasing profits. Corporate 
management views it as their overwhelming responsibility to accumulate profit for their 
shareholders, and not necessarily to adhere to a pattern of sustainable growth. The new 
capitalism of hyper-accumulation may then, at first glance, be less concerned with long­
term goals, and more interested in instant monetary gratification. Moderating effects 
must, however, exist to soi:ne extent (some that I will investigate further in the Nashville 
case study). Boyer (2000) suggests that new financial norms-especially the preeminence 
of shareholder value--may be the most important mechanism to influence trends in 
corporate strategies, labor markets, and government policy. As rates of return converge 
and competition shifts from production to finance markets, similar management 
techniques and labor arrangements are adopted. While the short-term drive for profit 
26 
must be accompanied by labor market flexibility at the expense of workers, Boyer argues 
that as households gain influence as pension fund investors/stock-owners, their objectives 
are more long-term, and some regime-like stability may be achieved. 
Not all individuals are stockholders of course. One effect of the post-Fordist 
society, and maybe the most derided, is the drift towards social polarization, including the 
stagnation of wages and the retreat from poverty reduction. A clear shift from the income 
compression between rich and poor during the Fordist days has taken place in the post­
Fordist era. Since 1970, median family income has been stagnant, the gap between rich 
and poor has been growing, and those without a college education have an increasingly 
hard time finding good jobs (O'Loughlin, 1997). Adjusted for inflation, the average 
American household has only seen an income increase of five percent from 1973-1997, 
and the poor have seen even less (Henwood, 1999, March 29). The reasons are multiple 
and include: globalization, the decline of manufacturing, growth in low-end service jobs, 
immigration, low minimum wages, weak unions, strong gains in investment income 
(dividends, capital gains), changing family structure, deregulation, weakening social 
safety net, less progressive taxation. Public policy has played its role, shifting the tax 
burden towards lower corporate taxes to combat the profitability squeeze. Moreover, the 
real minimum wage is the same as 30 years ago, while virtually all wealth created in the 
post-Fordist era has accrued to the affiuent half of the population. To increase the 
consumption potential of the poor is no longer an objective; in fact, from a crude macro­
economic perspective of a predominantly affiuent society, it might not be strictly 
necessary, and perhaps even counterproductive. Rather than the economy at large 
following the lead of key industries, wages and consumption are more fragmented. The 
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conclusion is that working-class consumption does not have to be as actively supported 
as during Fordism. Despite the strong economy, income disparities continued to increase 
during the l 990s7 (Bernstein et al., 2000). Worker productivity is increasing, but it is not 
showing up in the wallets of a large segment of the population. Instead, post-Fordism has 
been successful in its main objective--to increase corporate profits. The informational 
economy rewards a new, well-educated workforce, while deindustrialization and 
deunionization under globalization apply wage pressure downward on manufacturing 
jobs. The income disparities also have a geographical dimension on the urban level. 
Nashville, for example, has experienced a post-Fordist income divergence between 
neighborhoods. The coefficient of variation that measures the inequality of income by 
census tract in Davidson County increased from 0.39 in 1970 to 0.47 in 2000 (based on 
my calculation of census data). 
The rethinking of the role of government also includes a change in the scope of 
the state. The so-called "hollowing out" of the state on the national level leaves, relatively 
speaking at least, more power in global, regional, and local hands, which are sometimes 
prone to find new territorial modes of regulation that may take a local, international, or 
interregional character (Church & Reid, 1995). The responsibility for accum�lation 
supporting functions (ideological, reproductive, or production-oriented) is particularly 
divested to the local level. The process of devolution tilts power, more often than not, 
7 Regionally, the South continues to be one of the most unequal areas in the country, although to a lesser 
degree than in the past. Tennessee, however, is in a slightly different position with average income 
inequalities, and only one of three states in the U.S.--the other two being oi) dependent Alaska and 
Louisiana-where income inequalities showed a statistically significant decrease during the 1990s 
(Bernstein ct al., 2()(X)). However, this pre-tax analysis does not incorporate Tennessee's regressive tax 
system. 
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toward business interests. Capital operates on a geographical scale that rarely can be 
matched by other local interests. Devolution is therefore a process that has the capacity to 
diminish other interests' use of the state as an instrument to increase their political 
leverage. If power devolves, the federal government has less capacity to implement the 
policies that characterized the Fordist regime. From an urban perspective, federal support 
to cities for social programs is not an imperative of the post-Fordist state, and 
consequently federal funds for urban problems have diminished. Instead, there is a role 
for the state in building new institutions to support education, infrastructure, and public­
private policy interaction that, perhaps, represent emerging local modes of regulation. 
With these socio-economic trends prevailing, will the regime be stable? Will not 
an unregulated economy lead to crisis due to the "inherent contradictions" of post­
Fordism? It appears, however, that macroeconomic policies, an accompanying mode of 
regulation, and an ideology to support it have been in place for a longer period of time, 
and the regime appears to be performing well in terms of overall growth rates and 
corporate profits during most of the 1990s. So far, social disorder has not been 
overwhelming or even increasing despite the documented tendencies toward polarization. 
National politics, and what has been seen as a Democratic adoption of many Republican 
positions, exemplifies possible long-term stability in the national regime. 
2.4 Critique of the theory 
Over time, empirical and theoretical work based on the regulation school has altered and 
extended the original propositions. Aglietta's hypothesis of what comes after Fordism 
was perhaps as good as anyone's at the time, but in retrospect, was not particularly 
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accurate. In the light of 25 years of economic change, a series of valid concerns regarding 
the approach has emerged. Many have rightfully pointed out that the theory was too 
focused on the manufacturing economy, and especially workplace relations. This is, of 
course, not peculiar considering the theory's intellectual and temporal origin. The 
emerging post-industrial economy makes it necessary to rethink the mode of regulation 
concept. The central tenants of the regime argument can be, and has been, detached from 
the manufacturing floor. 
One of the most important critiques highlights the tendency to compartmentalize 
economic development into discrete time periods. Regimes are processes constantly 
challenged and undergoing change, which means that they are not necessarily coherent 
with sharp, detectable breaks as regulation theory might imply. It has been suggested that 
a stable mode of regulation is the exception rather than the rule; and instead, regulatory 
failure and crisis is the norm (Goodwin & Painter, 1996). Moreover, assuming 
temporally distinct regimes may have a tendency to reify the theory. Should, then, recent 
developments perhaps be interpreted as an uncoordinated system, rather than as a new, 
stable regime of accumulation? Lake (1997) views restructuring and deregulation in favor 
of business interests as stopgap, short-term fixes that are contradictory and unsustainable. 
This interpretation touches on an important issue regarding periodization, but elicits some 
additional comments. First, it is doubtful whether the current and the old societal 
paradigms should be judged by the same yardstick. It might be irrelevant that post­
Fordism does not conform to the standards handed down by the earlier regime (if, indeed, 
Fordism was, in hindsight, as monolithic and stable as a societal paradigm as portrayed). 
As Martin ( 1991, p. 17) states, regimes should "be considered ideal types rather than 
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empirical absolutes" as policy is always complex, incoherent, and fragmented. If more 
power is placed in the "invisible hand" of the market, the same level of coordination is 
simply not possible. In fact, change itself is a fundamental part in contemporary society. 
Society has embraced, even institutionalized perpetual change, which is fundamentally 
different that the Fordist preoccupation with stability (Rubin, 1996). Moreover, the neo­
Marxist perspective has a natural tendency to over-emphasize crisis, and to stress the 
problems and contradictions of any capitalist regime. Even if the critique on the sharp 
periodization of economic history is relevant, I am inclined to view current society as 
distinctly different from the past to render post-Fordism a useful concept. 
An additional critical comment issued by geographers is that the spatial scale of 
analysis is neglected. This criticism is pertinent to the original proposition, but much 
work has emerged recently. Whereas the nation-state was originally stressed as the locus 
for formation of various modes of regulation, place-sensitive analysis has been growing. 
Lipietz's (1987) notion of peripheral Fordism added a necessary international dimension 
to the theory, but for the purpose of this research, the most important debate concerns the 
effect on localities after deindustrialization and inter-regional shifts within United States. 
It has been acknowledged that each region has its own regime that is based on particular 
conflicts and compromises (Boyer & Saillard, 2002). While orthodox regulation theory 
has begun to incorporate a local dimension, it remains a production-oriented 
macroeconomic theory where the actor perspective, so fundamental in understanding 
localities and even geographic differences in regulation, is still subordinate (Gilly & 
Pecqueur, 2002). On the other hand, scholars from disciplines other than economics, as 
we will see in Chapter 3, have been more active in exploring local implications of the 
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theory. Here, geography has a lot to offer as the problems of post-Fordist development, 
such as social polarization tendencies, are increasingly mediated on the local level. 
Therefore, these criticisms point out opportunities in furthering the research agenda. 
Applying the theory on the local level can tie my research to current endeavors of 
broadening the work influenced by regulation theory. 
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3. URBAN POLITICS: FROM MACHINE TO REG'IME (AND BEYOND)
In order to understand the implications. of the current societal regime on the local level, it 
is first necessary to discuss urban political dynamics. Strategies of urban development are 
affected by the local context; every city is a unique place, and forces operate in the local 
environment that must be accounted for and they do not immediately correspond to an 
evolving national regime. Scholars of urban politics have created several concepts that 
aim to explain how cities are governed. In this chapter, I will discuss the findings in the 
literature and connect local politics to the changing imperative of the national political 
economy. 
The origin of modem city politics can be traced back to the emergence of an 
active and service-providing city from 1870-1920 (Monkkonen, 1988). In the progressive 
spirit, the city began to provide services beyond the absolute minimum, resulting in 
investment in infrastructure, schools and beautification projects both to support and to 
counteract the haphazard urban development of laissez-faire industrialism. This business 
activism was tied to the emergence of a corporate class that exercised direct personal 
control and ownership of its companies and civic power through its own fraternal clubs 
(e.g., the country club, Freemasons, Rotary), which emerged as vehicles for social, 
political, and economic control. The corporate leaders also developed strong ties to 
commercial and banking interests locally (Roy, 1991 ). Cities also adopted ideas from the 
business world. Debt financing became a necessary tool for financing expanded 
government services for growing cities. The nature of local politics has in many ways 
been determined by progressivism, and on the other hand, coalitions and power 
arrangements such as urban machines. Although usually understood as opposing forces, 
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Monkkonen stresses the similarities between machines and the progressives. In his view, 
machine politics expanded the role of government and were a necessity for the new active 
city that professionalized local politics. Although mostly associated with large urban 
centers in the Northeast, machine politics thrived in the stable environment of small and 
medium-sized cities elsewhere as well, Nashville included. 
At the center of the political struggle between these two forces was the structure 
of local government. The non-partisan, at-large elections and the council-manager 
government generally encourage a political process supportive of the growth agenda of 
the business elite. It does not foster a strong political leadership that can present 
alternative visions to the elite's agenda. It is often idealized as a "clean" machine; an 
efficient, non-corrupt government that is attractive for new investment. The existence of 
at-large systems in cities today is often a remnant from the progressive era. Dallas is 
generally regarded as an archetype of a city with such a system (Elkin, 1987b ). The 
power of business-led progressivism, as well as machines, depends to no small extent on 
voter apathy and dismal voter turnout often characteristic oflocal elections. The spatial 
expansion of cities has historically been another strategy for progressive business 
interests to dilute the power of other groups, for example ward-based politicians whose 
natural constituency was race- or class-based. Unified government between city and 
county is the ultimate strategy of this kind. While it provides efficiency gains and 
equitable distribution of resources, it can have adverse effects on the political process. 
This can make it possible to build a more top-down style of government where public­
private coalitions actively manage its growth agenda (see for example McNulty [1996] on 
Indianapolis). 
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In the South, conventional wisdom suggests that commercial-civic elites 
established hegemony during the progressive era and have dominated since. The local 
electoral structure tends to be based on non-partisan elections, at-large districts, and city 
manager form of government. Often smaller in size than their Northern counterparts, 
Southern cities were easier to assert control over. Moreover, the lack of the ethnic 
diversity and labor unions provided for few other alternative power arrangements. The 
disenfranchisement of the black population resulted in a fragmented working-class 
population, further solidifying business dominance. The traditional culture in social as 
well as economic relations promoted business relations based on personal and family 
connections. This social structure coexisted uneasily with entrepreneurial capitalism, 
which in its ideal form is transparent, merit-based, and inclusive. A restrictive vision of 
the government's role in society has led to a limited commitment to expenditure on social 
programs, and an individualistic philosophy has led to a lower level of citizen activism 
and organization to push for such measures. Taxation per capital in Southern cities also 
tends to be among the lowest in the nation. In part, the low level of public spending is a 
remnant of segregation, race relations, and unwillingness to support services for the 
African-American population. Although this rationale may be gone, low funding levels, 
for example for public schools, still persists in many places. Although probably a 
reasonable generalization, some scholars object to this description of Sunbelt urban 
politics and contend that it was always more conflictual and pluralistic that the 
characterization above would lead us to believe (Kerstein, I 995). Furthermore, post­
WWII regional convergence with entrepreneurial governance and increasing minority 
and neighborhood participation in the political system where political and economic 
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elites must take more time to build coalitions has further eroded Southern exceptionalism 
in city politics. 
3.1 Urban regime theory 
The dominant current approach to local politics stresses the durability of governing 
coalitions on the local level. It also emphasizes governance, i.e. the inclusion of various 
civic groups, especially business elites, in these governing coalitions. Governance is the 
coordinated effort, situated between the state and the market, to manage political and 
economic issues. 
The concept of urban regimes postulates that certain goals and policies dominate 
in a city over a long period of time. At this point, it should be stressed that urban regimes 
are not directly related to either regulation theory or regimes of accumulation. Some 
commonalties will be discussed later in this chapter, however. The urban regime idea was 
proposed by political scientist Clarence Stone and developed in his 1989 book Regime 
Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988. Regimes can remain in place largely unaffected 
by changes in the local political administration and go beyond mere ad hoc coalition 
formation. A power balance between major actors, such as business interests, politicians, 
labor representatives, public authorities, planning commissions, and grassroots and 
neighborhood interests, can be maintained over time. Summarized by Dowding et al. 
( 1999), a regime's core characteristics are: 1. The existence of a distinctive policy 
agenda, 2. Longevity, 3. A coalition of interests not specified in formal institutional 
structures, 4. Broad-based and boundary crossing between sectors or institutions. In 
addition, the policies of a regime generally: I. Transcend changes in leadership make-up 
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and political successions, reflecting an ideological agreement over fundamental values of 
regime members 2. Involve mobilization of external resources with synergistic effects 3. 
Is led by strong, entrepreneurial leadership with a singular political vision 4. Operate 
through public-private partnerships, which may bridge diverse local institutions and 
community interests. To this, I would also add that the motivations of the actors involved 
lies in the fact that they are tied to place through fixed assets and unique local social 
relations. 
In the tradition of political science, several efforts have been made to create urban 
regime typologies. Feinstein and Feinstein (1983) see three general urban regimes in the 
post-war United States. The directive regime involves a coalition focused on government­
sponsored large-scale development. The concessionary regime was extended to 
participants stressing social justice. The third, and currently predominant, conserving 
regime is again focused on business interests, but without large-scale direct involvement 
of the government. Elkin (1987a) also identifies three similar regimes: federal, pluralist 
and entrepreneurial. Elkin's types are not only temporal but also geographical. The 
currently dominating regime-the entrepreneurial-is highly associated with the South 
and the West, but has also penetrated most regions of the United States. Some critics 
have seen the division of regimes into discrete time periods as an oversimplification. For 
example, Stone ( I 987) prefers three non-temporal regimes: the corporate, the 
progressive, and the caretaker regime. However, typological distinctions like temporal 
urban regimes can be useful generalizations. In the context of the post-Fordist 
transfonnation, the evolution from a federal to an entrepreneurial-using Elkin's 
labels-regime situates urban change in a wider context, which makes temporal regimes 
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a relevant concept. The conserving or entrepreneurial urban regimes with their public­
private partnerships, pro-business policies, and reliance on local resources are a logical 
response to broader post-Fordist developments. 
A smoothly running political regime, such as Stone observed in Atlanta, is far 
from always the case. Regime theory is less equipped to deal with unstable and changing 
conditions (DiGaetano, 1997). There are several studies showing cities with fragmented 
elites (Perry, 1990), or elites unable to create a regime (Keil, 1988). Common interests 
may not always exist, and protecting the interests of its members and attempts to create a 
local economy with higher paying jobs may at times be contradictory. Cities with a low 
skilled manufacturing base may struggle whether to take the factor cost-driven or 
innovation-driven approach to local competitiveness (Wu, 1996). The fonner contains 
relatively crude strategies that can easily be copied, such as tax breaks, while the latter 
involves the establishment of creative environments, a process that is harder to achieve. 
Innovation relies on social mobilization and local productive environments-the opposite 
of Fordist scale economics (Jessop, 1998). Stress from outside forces related to the global 
economy can also be detrimental to stable regime fonnation. A declining local economy 
and corporate exodus can lead to increased dependency of outside forces, or conversely, 
trigger an economic restructuring process paving the way for a "rebirth" of an old, 
declining city. Perry (1990) asserts that elites are more visible and organized today, while 
Kantor ( 1995) and Ross and Levine (1996) conclude that there is a trend toward 
pluralism in American cities, thus implying decreasing elite power. Even if those 
conclusions appear to be contradictory, what we might see today can be a struggle over 
regime fonnation where business elites have to be more active to ensure their dominance, 
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even by mobilizing other sectors of local society for their own agenda. The generalization 
of local politics as moving from elite domination to pluralism, I believe, is missing some 
subtle points about the transformation of power. A power shift is not a transfer of a set 
number of capacities. The devolutionary trend allows for local power as a reaction 
against the diffusion of the global marketplace. At the same time, this diffusion enhances 
the position of business elites without them controlling power nominally. 
Recent paths of urban regime work have attempted to connect the politics of 
urban regimes with the sweeping changes of the economy. DiGaetano (1997) and Leo 
(1995) explore the global-local connection in different urban settings from an urban 
regime perspective, but they do not directly address the theoretical connection between 
general economic restructuring and local change where the regulationist framework can 
offer some insight. In a more comprehensive manner, DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999) 
add the restructuring of the state and post-industrial economy to an analytical framework 
that allows for coalitions and strategies not as strong as the regime model. The city's 
position in the larger political economy, the local political culture, and individual 
leadership are three levels that together form what they dub a local mode of governance. 
But even if they tie urban regime theory closer to non-local matters, Di Gaetano and 
Klemanski's emphasis is still on local politics, and their connection between the two 
geographical levels is not theoretically deep; instead, they treat outside forces as a 
background to city affairs. 
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3.2 The position of business and the imperative of growth 
There are good reasons why the role oflocal capital remains strong in U.S. cities. The 
cooperation between business and government exists because government cannot 
accumulate capital on its own, and business needs public goods that only a government 
can provide. Despite pluralist tendencies, business interests often maintain a privileged 
position in their relationship with governments, whether on national or local levels 
(Lindblom, 1977). Several features of the political economy explain the dominance of 
business in local politics. First, most of the population is dependent on private industry 
for its income and prosperity, which gives business a certain clout in local affairs. The 
city also relies on private investment for its financial well-being. Revenues for most cities 
are financed by property taxes, so the city is dependent on local sources for their revenue 
and local economic growth, as increasing property values follow economic growth. Local 
government is therefore eager to cooperate with business interests and promote policies 
beneficial for growth. In the U.S. system, the separation between business and 
government on the local leve_l is not always distinct. In many cities there is a flow of 
individuals between the political realm and the local business elite, which reinforces the 
idea that city affairs are most efficiently handled as a business enterprise. 
The imperative for economic growth has led some scholars to talk about cities as 
"growth machines" where local government and business are the two main allies 
(Molotch, l 976� Logan & Molotch, 1987). It should be noted, however, that the pressure 
from a "growth machine" is not a universal phenomenon. In states where land use is 
regulated nationally and local economic dependency on the national government is 
stronger, the necessary political structure for growth machine development does not exist. 
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Vicari and Molotch (1990) found scant evidence of a local growth machine in Italy, 
which probably holds true for the rest of Europe as well. Moreover, major institutions in 
American cities, such as banks and utilities, have been dependent on the local markets 
instead of being publicly owned or part of a national network with less dependency on 
their local base. In Europe, local government is perceived more as an independent and 
powerful actor embodying the public interest. Capital often forges relationships at a 
higher geographical level, and provincial elites are less important. The planning 
framework is tighter and allows local planners less control, which can reduce the 
influence of local capital. 
Returning to the U.S. city, it is in the interest of place-based capital to make 
substantial investments in the human and physical infrastructure of the locality. Place­
based capital includes traditional elements identified as the growth machine: any activity 
associated with real estate or capital that is dependent on local markets, but also interests 
that have forged complex cultural and personal connections to localities which may be 
less obvious from rational self-interest perspective. They often support subsidies like 
relocation tax breaks that are positive for the "business climate," and public investment in 
professional sports to enhance the local image, while for example welfare payments are 
perceived as an additional tax burden without public benefits. However, business 
interests may at times promote socially responsible policies. The reproduction of the local 
labor force is often a main concern and the importance of education can serve as a useful 
example here. Leading business groups, such as the local Chamber of Commerce, are 
often ardent supporters of public education. Sometimes their willingness to be taxed for 
the common good of education is greater than the general electorate's. Similarly, this is 
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often true concerning other taxes designed to improve a community's livability, such as 
those levied to support parks and recreation. These leading business groups can even be 
in the forefront as policymakers and legislative supporters for an increase in the local tax 
rate. This is especially true if a strong institutional structure is in place to promote a 
general business agenda. As individuals, the members of the elite may have their children 
in private schools and oppose such tax increases, while their collective behavior can 
result in another outcome if sufficient structures permit it. 
3.3 Local dependency or local autonomy: The city's place in the economy 
As discussed earlier, there are different perspectives on the degree of independence for 
cities in the post-Fordist era. At one end of the opinion scale there is the notion of the 
autonomous city, and at the other there is the dependent city. In the dichotomy of the 
global and the local, it is implicit that the researcher stresses one explanation over another 
to understand urban processes when choosing one of the two levels of analysis. If the 
global level is stressed, macroeconomic or macrocultural forces are assigned the most 
explanatory power. Peterson (19_81) argues that the economic realities of a globalized 
economy determine local political action regardless of ideological convictions of the 
city's decision-makers. Esser and Hirsch (1989) doubt that an independent local 
economic policy can emerge under post-Fordism, as cities must passively adapt 
themselves to world market conditions. Of importance locally, they predict, is an increase 
in political conflict and social movements, especially the reproductive sphere. After 
globalization accelerated during the 1980s, the tendency was to assume helplessness on 
the part of localities. Now a local response has emerged, and from a theoretical 
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perspective, a more balanced picture on the autonomy of cities where the power over 
development has been localized, but mediated by a national context (Ettlinger, 1994). In 
contrast to the dependency argument, localists stress structures internal to the city as the 
major determinants of urban change. The urban regime approach has in the past been 
overwhelmingly concerned with local politics. Both views, which are not really 
contradictory but rather two opinions at different sides of a spectrum, have their strengths 
and drawbacks. Staking out a middle ground, it is often the interplay between 
macroeconomic developments and local decision-making that shapes the urban 
environment. We cannot a priori make the assumption that one scale dominates over the 
other, and sometimes even the two levels can not be adequately distinguished from each 
other. Capital is dependent on local social relations such as knowledge, labor skills, and 
proximity to supplier and markets. These factors (which can be influenced by local 
policy) are "spatially nonsubstitutable" for many, maybe a majority, of corporations 
(Cox, 1993). The question of mobility versus immobility is reformulated by Cox as one 
in which dependency is occurring at a certain scale that may be local, regional, or 
national for different companies or industries. Local actors in a city can have economic 
interests and connection on levels above the city, and they can also have non-local 
ideological reference points that influence their behavior locally. This dependency can be 
changed, and change scale, if the regulatory environment changes. 
Not only are there problems and possibilities of combining approaches of 
different philosophical origin, but also spatial scale interaction must be taken into 
account. Some considerations must be addressed when an attempt is made to work 
simultaneously with dual or even multiple geographical levels. Beauregard (1995) 
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challenges the assumption that the global and the local are two separate spheres, and that 
local outcome is only a matter of different degrees of resistance towards more powerful 
global actors. Instead, he proposes a theory where actors on the local level have different 
geographical reach, thus blurring the rigid distinction between the global and the local. 
Not only is there a mix of spatial levels operating in the same place where actors have 
multi-leveled interests, but a constant flux of the actors in place gives us a dynamic 
picture of the global-local relationship. In essence, Beauregard challenges the "purity" of 
global and local forces and points out that "after mediation the local is no longer purely 
local" ( 1995, p. 241 ). Beauregard's insights are important to keep in mind when 
conducting locality studies and can fill an important function bridging regulation and 
urban regime theory. 
If we assume that cities have some autonomy, "it is by securing its institutional 
base that the city gains power and control over its own destiny" (Knight, 1989, p. 328). 
Or expressed slightly differently, the local capacity to develop within the global economy 
is linked to its institutional "thickness" (Amin & Thrift, 1995). Institutional capacity 
takes time to build and may lag behind rapid economic shifts and tendencies toward new 
national regime formation. Nevertheless, institutional reform is important to the survival 
of a regime. The necessity for this reform is often economic restructuring on a scale that 
is beyond the scope of local institutions. With fewer cities tied to their natural resource 
base and constricted by their relative geographical location, it has been argued that cities 
have a greater chance of controlling their own destiny. Naturally, in a post-industrial 
economy, it is human skills, and therefore the social structures that promote them, that 
override the importance of natural resource endowments of places. Cities have a chance 
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to affect emerging locational factors such as amenities, information flows, and education 
level to improve the city's position in the urban system. Many of these factors are labeled 
quality of life issues and of growing importance in local economic development (Segedy, 
1997). 
But the global economy can also leave cities with a fractured economy. If less 
local linkage exists, local power might be less coherent, which leaves the city in a 
position as described by the dependency hypothesis. The dependence on global capital 
and less on local resources has shattered the urban system and the traditional core and 
peripheries within it (Kantor, 1995). However, as I use urban regime theory as an integral 
part of my theoretical base, the assumption is that local politics and their capacity to 
influence local development indeed matters. Conversely, by applying the post-Fordist 
term to the urban condition, I also set the limits for local autonomy. Here it should be 
noted that American cities may be less integrated in the global economy than their 
European counterparts, or most large cities around the world for that matter. The 
increasingly important service economy has less global linkages in U.S. cities, which 
may be related to concentration in New York and a handful of other large U.S. cities, and 
the large domestic market, which discourages global strategies (Taylor, 2003, March). 
Stone's work, as well as most urban regime theories originating in political 
science, is heavily focused on the internal dynamics of regime construction. Some of the 
factors not accounted for in regime theory are technological changes, ideology, local 
industrial history, and the locality's place in the spatial division oflabor (Feldman, 1997). 
Today there is a growing body of research that accentuates the influence of non-local 
forces on regime formation. The appeal of regulation theory lies in its conceptual overlap 
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with urban regimes; both use institutionally oriented politico-economic systems as 
models of societal progress. The scope of the regulation approach is broad, as it examines 
not only traditional economic, but also extra-economic mechanisms, including a variety 
of institutional factors and social forces (Jessop, 1997). A major difference is that urban 
regime theory is rational choice-based (Lauria & Whelan, 1995), while regulationists 
reject a narrow focus on individual action governed by self-interest, which it deems 
inadequate to explain complex socio-economic relations. There is also the difference in 
geographic emphasis. Feldman ( 1997) points out that "regime theory inadequately 
theorizes connections between local agents and their wider institutional context, whereas 
regulation theory underestimates the importance of local actors and institutions" (p. 31 ). 
Regulation theory originally neglected agency, but a concern with local regulation has 
necessitated connections with other theories, such as Bourdieu's habitus and Stone's 
regimes (Painter, 1997). As a classic structure-agency problem, these differences can be 
bridged by treating urban regimes as socially created entities that amount to more than 
the sum of their parts. 
A spatially infonned regulation theory could then be the complementary theory 
that holds the capacity to not only contextualize local politics within a larger political­
economic framework, but also aid in the development of a theory that treats local 
development as an integral part of a national, albeit increasingly decentralized, regulatory 
system. The post-Fordist shift has only been contextualized on a local level; so far, no 
explanations of the development of the local state have been offered, says Jessop (1995), 
who calls for investigations into how governance failures are perceived by local actors 
and how those perceptions are translated into new policies and regulation. It is therefore 
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important to investigate how local governance and regulation interplay, and how they 
become coupled and intertwined. From this perspective, public-private partnerships, 
institutional changes, and entrepreneurial governance are expressions of a re-regulation in 
a period of crisis. Some argue that even if institutional innovation takes place locally, the 
power of the local is seriously circumscribed in a globalizing world, making an emerging 
local mode of regulation toothless (Peck & Tickell, 1994), while others see a coherent 
framework of urban governance as an integral part of a new societal model (Mayer, 
1994). In the local post-Fordist economy, there is still a role for government to play, as 
well as other types of private or non-profit institutions beyond the market itself. Cities 
"are more significant as nodes and vectors in organizing economic, political and social 
life than they were during the period of Atlantic Fordism" (Jessop, 1998, p. 79). 
However, Jessop also adds that no particular spatial scale is favored in the current regime 
as the nation-state was during Fordism. 
3.4 The Fordist urban experience 
In order to comprehend the impact of the current national regime on cities, it can be 
valuable to first revisit Fordist urban development as a geographic expression of a 
societal paradigm. During that period, the dominant and interrelated spatial trends were 
suburbanization and urban renewal. Suburbanization and housing were closely connected 
to Fordism as a new form of mass consumption that could absorb the productivity 
increases in industry (Walker, 1981). The spatial expansion of suburbs was facilitated by 
housing and road construction and extended consumption opportunities (Florida & 
Feldman, 1988). Initially, consumption was held back by the lack of credit availability for 
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the consumers due to prohibitive interest rates in a high-risk environment. One of the 
most important innovations in the credit system was insurance for lending institutions in 
the housing markets. With federal home mortgage insurance in 1934, the government 
created conditions for a credit market that enabled large segments of the population to 
obtain home mortgages. The "GI Bill" created demand by putting enough purchasing 
power in the hands of new households so they could buy new, inexpensive homes in 
mass-produced Levittowns across America. Federal funding for the interstate system also 
spurred suburbanization. Transportation became financially favored with gasoline taxes 
earmarked for highway construction and improvement (Ibid.). 
The reverse side of suburbanization was of course the deterioration of the central 
city. Urban policy became more and more important as a response to some of the 
weaknesses of this particular path of urban development. Urban revitalization attempts 
started in the 1940s when cities attempted to be more like suburbs through accessibility 
(interstates) and physical modernization (urban renewal) (Teaford, 1990). A fundamental 
part of urban renewal was public housing, which intervened in an area where private 
investment had failed. It co-existed somewhat uneasily with the suburbanization push 
created by the mortgage availability and found only limited political support. The Public 
Housing Act passed in 193 7, but only a portion of housing demolished during urban 
renewal was replaced with new units. Instead, more emphasis was placed on the necessity 
of redeveloping centrally located business property, which was achieved by the Urban 
Renewal Acts of 1949 and 1954 (Bauman, 1988). In both cases, city building was one 
component of Keynesian consumption (Justement, 1946). The economic paradigm 
supported the planning ideas of the time: to impose rational order on the urban landscape 
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that speculative capitalism was incapable of through rational planning, regulation, social 
engineering, and even to control the entire urban hierarchy by creating new cities and 
regional development. The old laissez-faire city was viewed as inappropriate for modem 
needs. These ideas underpinned the positions of utopians (Gutkind, 1962) as well as 
political pragmatists (Udall, 1962). 
One question that emerged was who should be in charge of urban development. 
Intervention from the federal government posed a great challenge to the local power elite. 
This challenge came in various ways: federal New Deal work programs diminished the 
role of existing local modes of regulation, disrupted local hiring practices, usurped city 
and state authority, and drove wage standards higher than the old system was willing to 
pay. At the same time, federal credits challenged the role of local financial capital. On the 
other hand, when faced with resistance by local political and economic elites, federal 
agencies often adjusted their practices, and compromised and incorporated the entrenched 
local system so as not to upset the status quo. Nevertheless, it was the beginning of a new 
role for the federal government and local institutions eventually had to adjust to be 
economically successful. During the 1950s and 1960s, urban political machines 
incorporated federal financial aid to gain support from a variety of local interests 
(Wilson, 2000b ). 
Persistently favorable economic conditions in the nation during the 1950s and 
1960s did not eliminate poverty. This realization created an incentive to direct funds to 
the most needy, triggering a shift away from the comprehensive "social democratic" 
tendencies in the New Deal, to targeted programs such as the Community Action 
Programs and the Model Cities program (Florida & Jonas, 1991). Federal aid empowered 
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marginalized groups, while sometimes alienating other constituents and political players. 
As an example, early federal anti-poverty support was designed to bypass Southern urban 
leadership that would actively work against black empowennent. However, the federal 
government also accommodated critique from local leaders, and Jess power was left in 
the hands of neighborhood groups and more at the mayor's office in later programs. 
Even if compromises were reached and regimes were formed on the national 
1eve1, 1oca1 adoption was not automatic. Not everybody embraced the new social 
paradigm in the early post-war period at the same rate. Here, a brief case study can be 
i1lustrative. Beauregard ( 1997) shows that in Philadelphia, it was not until financial 
problems and an image of incompetence, corruption and outdated machine politics 
plagued the old system that change occurred. Instrumental in the eventual victory of the 
progressive reformers were the local institutions, especially the planning commission 
with the power to propose and regulate, and the redevelopment authority in charge of 
implementation. With the operation of these agencies, "a new mode of social regulation 
was solidified locally" (Beauregard, 1997, p. 172). The regime was not formed as a 
governing strategy per se, but to eradicate corruption and urban decline. The logic behind 
this goal was economic� to compete for prosperity with the suburbs, the city center must 
be rejuvenated. Not surprisingly, the system declined in the 1970s with less federal 
support, opposition to large-scale urban renewal, and a new mayor supporting "law and 
order" in the increasingly racially polarized city. With the system's demise, the local 
regime in Philadelphia also declined. Urban regimes follow in the footsteps of the 
national regulatory system, and Beauregard also suggests that this local solidification 
around the country was necessary for the existence of the national regime. 
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4. IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIES: NEW STRATEGIES, NEW GOVERNANCE
A wide range of researchers who are not necessarily associated directly with regulation 
theory have also used the notion of a post-Fordist city to situate economic change, urban 
exclusion, and new socio-spatial patterns (e.g. Marcuse, 1997); however, it is not always 
clear how these urban trends are associated with a new post-Fordist regime. The 
segmentation and polarization in the city-gated communities, homelessness, and so 
on-may be interpreted as a spatial expression of fragmentation beyond mass 
consumption, but I believe it is important to distinguish between, on one hand, 
implications for cities that are spatial expressions of post-Fordism, and the mechanisms 
and structures that are regime-supporting in a more fundamental way. 
Urban patterns of growth and decline can be sorted in the spatial patterns 
category. During an era of economic reconstruction, such as the transition of Fordism to 
post-Fordism, it is logical that also the urban hierarchy would be in flux. The emergence 
of new industries is a spatially uneven process. The consequence for cities is also uneven� 
some experience rapid population growth, while others find themselves in decline. 
Currently, a set of second-tier cities are the most expansive growth poles at the moment, 
resulting in a "flattening" of the U.S. urban system (Markusen et al., 1999). Successful 
cities usually have one or more of the following economic characteristics: a cluster of 
innovative industries ( especially high-tech); strong government investments; an 
abundance of headquarters and control centers; strong educational institutions ( especially 
with a research focus); a favorable position in the spatial division of labor; or a 
diversified economy with a favorable mix of growth industries. 
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Cities successfully following the transition pattern from an industrial to a post­
industrial economy often have a non-industrial base to build on. Perhaps the best example 
is Pittsburgh, where non-profit sectors such as health care and higher education have been 
the growth industries and bridge builders to a post-industrial economy together with 
emerging high-tech industries (Sbragia, 1990). The ability to draw research grants, 
government contracts, patients and students has become a "city forming" activity for the 
city's economic base. Pittsburgh also had the institutional thickness that could shape its 
successful economic development strategy (Lubove, 1996). 
Flourishing cities are also attracting people, not just industries (Wolf, 1999). 
Growing urban regions are often perceived as having a good quality of life. 
Contemporary urban development, therefore, emphasizes a range of improvements aimed 
at enhancing the livability of cities. Major components include pedestrianism, new 
urbanist-inspired planning, historic preservation, museums and the arts, waterfront 
development, festival marketplaces, sport stadiums, and entertainment districts 
(Robertson, 1995; Miranda & Rosdil, 1995; Frieden & Sagalyn, 1989). The 
contemporary style of urban redevelopment is a spatial expression of post-Fordism, not 
only via middle and upper-class consumption (although consumption not being 
fundamentally regime-defining as under Fordism), but also through the changing 
economy. With deindustrialization and increasing mobility, urban redevelopment is 
supporting a more flexible economic system with livability and quality of life, which is 
crucial in both attracting business and a well-educated workforce. 
It is in this context that the post-Fordist paradigm must be understood on the 
urban level. Basically, all cities and local governments respond to similar forces� they 
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operate in the same economy, experience the same need to be perceived as livable, and 
obey the rules of the same national state. As a new set of policies, institutions and 
conventions should be at the core of the study of a post-Fordist city. In this chapter, I will 
outline several interrelated elements of urban governance that are of particular 
significance for the following empirical study and also crucial elements of a local mode 
of regulation. 
4.1 Competition, entrepreneurialism, and selling the city 
The booster spirit has always been a defining attribute of the American city. Since the 
frontier days, luring investors and residents through image-making or substantial 
incentives has been the imperative of local independence. Likewise, the incentive for 
growth has existed since the formation of the earliest American cities. For example, the 
westward expansion was largely a real estate venture promoted by land speculators with 
local interests aided by embryonic local governments. The urban system of the 19th
century, developed in conjunction with the westward movement of people and the 
railroads, was inherently speculative� growth was a leitmotif among the local boosters at 
least as much as today. Einhorn (1991) argues that city interests were unified in the early 
commercial city, but with continued growth and expansion, interests became increasingly 
fragmented and the "modem" conflicts arose. Today, a reaction against this 
fragmentation is evident among the elite, who operate as neo-boosters in a new era of 
indeterminacy. 
After a period of federal involvement in urban development, the tide has again 
shifted in favor of localism. It is embedded in the logic of post-Fordist ideology to let 
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cities compete, much like capitalist enterprises, for private as well as public funds. 
Competition is intensified by the growth of new industries that have not yet developed a 
strong attachment to the places in which they operate, and by the free flow of capital that 
makes them unable to do so. The inescapable outcome of urban competition is then to 
emulate corporate strategies and intensify marketing strategies of cities to attract capital 
and people (Gold & Ward, l 994� Philo & Kearns, 1993). Cities engage in urban 
marketing not only through direct advertising but a wide variety of image-making 
policies. Nevertheless, one should not view this as a wide-open field of competition. 
Cities progress differently based on historical circumstances; they are path-dependent, i.e. 
products of irreversible historical processes that make decisions at any point in time 
constrained by social and economic structures emerging from past decisions. Different 
places, despite similar educational and socio-economic characteristics, have specialized 
economies, and future trajectories must always be understood and observed from a 
particular point of departure. 
The increase in inter-urban competition affects cities' development strategies and 
even the nature of governance. This has forced cities into a new style of governance, 
which Harvey ( 1989b) recognizes as a shift from a managerial to an entrepreneurial form 
of urban governance. The tenn "New Urban Politics" has also been used to capture a 
local policy that is growth-oriented, business-friendly, and entrepreneurial in character 
and that tries to create an environment of local embeddedness. Although first noticeable 
in Rustbelt cities, there is now "an edgy insecurity at all levels of the urban hierarchy" 
(Hubbard & Hall, 1998, p. 6) that leads most cities into a similar policy path. This 
rapprochement of local government and business has often undermined the foundation 
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for working-class influence in local politics, through political machines or other means. 
Cities have to negotiate with controllers of capital and provide them with the best 
locational deal; at the same time, the money flow from the central government to the 
cities has largely disappeared. The resulting intra-urban competition is largely national in 
scope. Because of the enormous domestic U.S. market and the fact that global capital 
(omitting cost-sensitive manufacturing, which tends to be small-town and rural in its 
locational preference) is mainly investing in a few high-profile American cities, capital 
flows in the service industries of most U.S. cities is domestic in origin. Entrepreneurial 
cities, however, should not be viewed as passive players in the contemporary space 
economy, but the cogs that make it work (Wood, 1998). Urban entrepreneurialism has 
had a facilitative role in the transformation away from Fordism by making capital more 
mobile (Harvey, 1989b). 
The dictionary definition (The Oxford American college dictionary, 2002) of an 
entrepreneur is a person who assumes the financial risk of organizing and operating 
business or enterprise. If the enterprise is the city, the risk involved in urban development 
has shifted towards local government. Common development projects that have private 
benefits and public multiplier effects include stadiums and convention centers. Such 
projects become city forming; they attract visitors and act as image-makers. These 
undertakings are especially potent if they entail competing for a limited good due to 
regulation and monopolies; two relevant examples, as we will encounter later, are 
international flights and professional sports teams. 
The philosophy behind the logic of urban entrepreneurialism is the idea of 
market-like competition transposed onto the urban system. This approach has its 
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problems and limitations. Cities are not equivalent to firms, because resources, human 
and otherwise, are place-based. A city does not have shareholders with clearly defined, 
quantifiable stakes, but citizens engaged in a social process. Even if local government 
can, on rare occasions, go bankrupt, cities cannot cease to exist. What people can do, 
however, is to migrate. America is a country of movers as a result of the dynamic 
geographic patterns of growth and decline that are, in essence, encouraged by a laissez­
faire approach to urban and regional development. 
The emphasis on competition increases the flexibility of competitive places, while 
the opposite is true for the less competitive. The usual solution for the latter is to be more 
competitive, conform to market demands. Because of the strong bargaining position of 
business, cities are forced into a policy of appeasement when there is a widespread fear, 
justified or not, among the population that jobs are about to leave town. But cities have 
developed distinct local conditions that are not easily altered. When structures that fit the 
local social order also must be made compatible with the needs of global capital, it is not 
unusual that conflicts over development strategies occur. To further reinforce the idea 
that competition does not automatically lead to one policy, Painter (1998) argues that 
entrepreneurial governance is heterogeneous and complex in its nature. The resulting 
policy and development are not in the hands of single individuals or even institutions. 
Painter stresses the political socialization process in understanding regime formation. 
Entrepreneurial regimes do not arise spontaneously, but through an "active disciplinary 
process" ( 1998, p. 268). Participation in regimes is not simply rational self-interest as 
assumed in traditional urban regime theory because actors have complex, multiple 
rationalities for action. Some rationalities may be contradictory, and individuals are 
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affected by discourses and institutions promoting entrepreneurial governance; as Painter 
states-"entrepreneurs are made, not born." 
One major concern is that entrepreneurial development strategies run the risk of 
being a zero sum game if solely based on inter-city competition. One city's gain is 
another's loss, or even detrimental to all municipalities involved if the cost involved in 
attracting investment is draining city coffers and benefits are speculative at best. In the 
end, the taxpayers absorb a significant financial risk. Moreover, each city is dependent on 
other cities not to initiate the same strategy. When the practices of entrepreneurial polices 
diffuse and are adopted by most cities alike, the marginal benefit of such behavior is 
diminishing (Leitner & Sheppard, 1998). It is the leaders and not the followers of new 
urban policy that will reap the benefits. 
It has been argued that harmful inter-city competition should be discouraged 
because it drains local resources and systematically de-emphasizes social equity 
concerns. Even from a market-based perspective there are imperfections in the 
entrepreneurial model. Potential success of local growth machines and inter-urban 
competition leads to a distortion of the spatial economy with investment not being 
optimally located. Ways to diminish the competition incentive could include national 
standards on education and welfare spending combined with federal tax equalization. 
However, such policies would violate the growing localist agenda, which promotes self­
control, and implicitly, inter-urban competition. 
57 
4.2 State devolution 
With the national Fordist institutions less important, local institutions gain relative 
importance. A changing relationship between the national and local level of regulation is 
taking place through the processes of state devolution-the transfer of government 
functions and capacities from a higher to a lower geographical level (Kodras, 1997). An 
argument for devolution is that power should be located as close to the citizens as 
possible. Higher-level government functions are considered less responsive. 
There are several direct and indirect forms of devolution. First, the size of the 
federal government itself is reduced in relation to state and local government. Programs 
that target the local level are reduced or eliminated. The share of municipal revenue from 
federal sources has dropped from 15. 9 percent in 1977 to 4. 7 percent in 1992 (Eisinger, 
1998). Second, the powers of the federal government are also circumvented by the 
dismantling of regulations. Market-oriented policies enacted on the federal level can then 
heighten the tendency towards competition. For example, a little-explored connection 
exists between deregulation and local urban governance. Third, devolutionary trends 
between the national government and cities in practice include an emphasis on flexibility. 
The proper level of government control is increasingly on a lower level. Since the New 
Deal era, cities have received aid from the federal government, often in the form of 
grants, that come with various degree of strings attached to bypass state legislatures, 
which are perceived by cities as rural-biased and indifferent to urban problems. Earlier 
programs were redistributive in nature and supportive of an expanding consumption 
norm. Starting in the early 1970s under the Nixon administration, cities were to a greater 
extent free to use federal aid as they saw fit (DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1999). Community 
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Development Block Grants became a major instrument in this so-called New Federalism 
program allowing for more control by local political decision-makers, thus making the 
local regime more important. The New Federalism aimed at increasing local control with 
the intent that funds would be redirected from redistributive to economic development 
activities (Kantor, 1995). This policy was continued under the Reagan and George H. W. 
Bush administrations and coupled with less federal spending-the withdrawal period of 
federal government. If the initial trend under Nixon was devolutionary, later 
administrations, especially Reagan expanded the trend by decreasing funding levels. 
During the 1980s, federal grants as a share of GDP declined from 3.6 to 2.5 percent 
(Kantor, 1995). Eisinger (1998) sees a connection between fiscal devolution and the 
changing emphasis on urban politics away from social reform and redistribution and 
towards fiscal conservatism and privatization. 
Not all places have the financial resources to actively meet the challenge. The 
stress on low-income municipalities is obvious. Even relatively wealthy, low-tax 
localities could face fiscal problems and subsequent political turmoil as pressure to 
finance entrepreneurial development necessitates new regulation on the local level, along 
with a need to rethink taxation and spending priorities. Government programs are ideally 
complemented by efforts made by private or non-profit organizations, which are 
invariably less comprehensive than their government counterparts. As the state 
withdraws, civic resources should then emerge. Volunteerism is the favored redistributive 
mechanism and rests on the assumption that local community is real and substantive and 
adequate resources can be readily mobilized. In order for local institutions to be effective, 
they must have the capacity to mobilize monetary, political, infrastructural, and 
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knowledge-based resources. Non-profit organizations are especially important, but such 
groups are, taken together, rather fragmented and lack the capacity for planning that goes 
beyond their own institutions. Furthermore, they are non-comprehensive, susceptible to 
economic swings, geographically uneven, and financially limited (Wolpert, 1997). 
Beyond different devolutionary categories, Staehli et al. ( 1997) see three broader 
themes in state devolution. The first one related to the relationship between state, capital, 
and civil society. National policy is realigned with the ideologies of states' rights, 
government non-intervention, and the preeminence of private property over the public 
good. The second element is discursive. Lake ( I 997) contends that business interests 
have been particularly successful in imposing their policy agenda as the solution to 
economic problems and "discursively manipulate the meaning of structural crisis to their 
political advantage" (p. 5). Because the U.S. government only has a moderate influence 
on citizens' daily lives, its legitimacy is more easily challenged in a time of change. The 
political right has effectively portrayed the state as the root of societal problems to the 
extent that such a presumption is commonly accepted in public discourse. Crisis is a 
condition for debate and realignment, often creating the notion of interest convergence on 
the local level. Competition pits places against each other, and inevitably local interests 
will search for commonalties that persist beyond crises. A third and final theme is that the 
local context becomes paramount in policy formation. Devolving regulation enables 
policy to take shape on the local level, which has created a new type of high-profile 
mayor that operates under these circumstances, including Indianapolis' Stephen 
Goldsmith and Milwaukee's John Norquist. Ostensibly, they make decisions based on 
efficiency and not ideology with the rationalism of a municipal CEO. Nashville's Phil 
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Bredesen fits the mold very well-he was even a CEO before elected mayor. When The
Wall Street Journal (1995, December 8) editorialized on the advantages of devolution, 
Bredesen was its selection for quotation. Although noted, the impact of charismatic 
individuals on the development of entrepreneurial cities is, so far,_under-researched in 
scholarly studies (Hall, 1998). 
Policies shaped in individual cities can even affect national policy, albeit 
incrementally. Goldsmith ( 1999) developed policies as city mayor from a local level 
pragmatic-conservative perspective-"what works." His ideas were also shaped by 
interactions with other city leaders who were confronted with similar problems and 
developed similar solutions. Goldsmith is a good example of policy transmission between 
geographic scales: he has acted as an advisor to President George W. Bush on urban 
issues, particularly developing a national policy on so-called faith-based solutions to 
reform replace public welfare, which took shape from his local experience. 
Even if there is a need for new mayors and local government in general to 
develop closer ties with local business interests, grassroots initiatives become more 
important as a counterveiling force. Despite the tendency toward fragmentation and elite 
dominance, the American political system holds opportunities for grassroots political 
participation because it is less rigid than countries with strong central governments, 
which tend to discourage local citizen involvement (Leo, 1997). These groups are using 
place-based strategies to advance the interests of workers, neighborhoods, and other 
social movements. The new emphasis on locality and neighborhood power appeals to 
both the anti-statist right and postmodern left, each trying to fashion this local 
participation into their version of the post-Fordist city. Giving power to micro-local 
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interests is part of creating regime balance, much like the labor-business accord during 
the Fordist period. Localism and less government involvement serve the regime and the 
economic growth objective of the business elite, but at the same time, this philosophy 
gives rise to another source of power-the neighborhood movement. Political struggles 
are now taking place in new arenas and locations. While modernism relied on experts, i.e. 
the professionalization of planning, the trend today is to involve local residents and 
neighborhood organizations in the process. Process, dialogue, and action combined make 
up a new model for planning where planners interact with the public and interest groups 
and negotiate solutions, rather than implementing a traditional top-down approach 
(Wilson, 2000b). Citizen participation in local politics has expanded from a few cities, 
such as San Francisco (DeLeon, 1991) and Seattle (Gordon et al., 1991) to those 
classified as having an entrepreneurial regime. Grassroots groups are especially important 
political actors in cities that have experienced diminishing elite involvement, a 
corresponding presence of other types of community leadership, and favorable economic 
local conditions that have diminished the growth policy imperative but nevertheless result 
in uneven local development and social equity concerns. Nickel (1995), for example, 
views Minneapolis as such a city. 
4.3 The private-public partnership 
Even if citizen participation is increasing, the relationship between government and 
business is as intimate as ever. However, their interaction is taking new shapes, primarily 
through the public-private partnership. Partnerships emerged as early as the immediate 
post-World War II period, but at that time seeking federal money for redevelopment as a 
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response to urban disinvestment caused by suburbanization (Teaford, 1990). The post­
Fordist partnership is a more self-reliant coalition for economic growth or social reform. 
These partnerships address a wide spectrum of issues that to various degrees are part of a 
local growth agenda, including housing, neighborhood improvement, waterfront 
development, the construction of stadiums and arenas, and school reform. 
The mutual interest and interdependency between public institutions and other 
interests in local society must be strong for a partnership to be formed. Each participant 
must bring unique capacities to the new organization, which will create synergistic 
effects otherwise unobtainable. The institutional approach to urban development stresses 
that structural and organizatorial aspects of society are as least as influential over 
decision-making as individuals (Peters, 1998). Similarly, Stone (1989) was also 
rethinking power when he posed the question of who has the capacity to act, focusing on 
the structures that enable agents with the power to do something. 
Broadly, a partnership offers legitimacy for business actors and flexibility to the 
public. The local government can use its financial resources flexibly outside its normal 
obligations and professional expertise can more easily be sought outside the public 
sphere. Partnerships are less coercive, which is important in a place or time when 
government intervention is politically difficult. Also, it is in the interests of local 
governments to "localize" mobile capital by making it more place-bound through 
partnerships. Business, on the other hand, can benefit from the regulatory powers of 
government. In redevelopment partnerships, eminent domain is especially valuable. In a 
partnership, business can also more easily extract favorable treatment from local 
government in taxation or other policy fields. As a general rule, the business elite is more 
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often than not the initiator of a partnership in expanding cities, while government has to 
play a more active part in declining cities (Keating, 1998). As an example, Sbragia 
(1990) argues that part of Pittsburgh's success lies in its ability to build a strong public 
sector in its partnerships with private interests. 
As such, Pittsburgh might be an exception rather than the rule for development in 
American cities. Following the argument made earlier by Lindblom (1977), the 
partnership is part of the favoritism of business locally. The ideological underpinning is 
the belief that privatism, the preeminance of private capital accumulation, is central in 
urban development (Squires, 1991 ). This explains the junior status of the public 
component in the partnership and the continued ability of corporations to sustain public 
subsidies. It also suggests that public policy should serve private interests. This is 
justified with the assumption that cities are internally undifferentiated and everybody 
reaps the benefits of growth in a more or less equal manner. When the reality of 
fragmented interests is strong, the solution, from the perspective of the elite, to overcome 
fragmentation is to manipulate symbols to create cohesiveness among public and private 
actors as well as the electorate. Civic pride becomes a vehicle for consensus. 
Development is portrayed as a technical rather than a political issue and is therefore best 
handled by the private sector. Cox and Mair (1988) stress the discourse of economic 
development directed towards the local populace in order to entice favorable growth 
policies. This also moderates entrepreneurialism and opens up possibilities for local 
compromise between different interests. For growth advocates, a balance must be struck 
between pursuing the strongest possible entrepreneurial strategy or aiming for credible 
arguments that keep possible policy opponents inactive, which projects favorable local 
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relations to the outside world. This can be termed many things: civic pride, community 
spirit, local patriotism, but it is in essence an ideological device and can be situated as a 
part of a larger post-Fordist value system. 
There is an ongoing debate in the literature to what extent low-income people also 
benefit from contemporary urban redevelopment. Economic growth does not 
automatically mean increased welfare for a majority of the citizens (Logan & Molotch. 
1987). Some argue that downtown development has a positive impact on surrounding 
neighborhoods. Successful rebuilding of low-income neighborhoods in the public-private 
partnership mold in cities like Savannah, Chattanooga and Cleveland (Gratz, I 989� 
Johnson, 1995; Suchman et al. 1990) provides some positive examples. But despite some 
success with non-profit housing networks, a way out of inner-city poverty has not 
generally been forthcoming. The uneven development between downtown and urban 
neighborhoods puts the focus on the limited positive spread effects of downtown 
investment (Keating, 1997). Even if the causes of poverty many times are economic 
forces and policies beyond the control of individual cities, the role of local actors is 
increasingly to take some level of responsibility for them. As social policy is becoming 
localized. the question is what kind of capacities will emerge. Critical voices have 
suggested that serious social issues, such as democracy, linkage policies, housing for the 
poor, and neighborhood concerns, are too low on the partnership agendas. Nevertheless, 
post-Fordist devolution allows business elites to act collectively both out of benevolence 
and self-interest as they are dependent on social tranquility and reproduction. In 
conclusion, therefore, the partnership is both a vehicle for the post-Fordist local mode of 
regulation as well as a central part of many urban regimes. 
65 
4.4 Changing elites in the post-Fordist city 
So far I have largely treated local business interests as both homogenous and static. That 
is rarely the case. It is inevitable that leadership changes from time to time. For historic 
reasons, the members of a power elite are often part of the same generation. If nothing 
else, retirement and mortality will always take its toll. Such a shift may not, in itself, 
result in any fundamental changes·of the power structure, but simply an intergenerational 
transference of elite privilege and power that preserves the status quo. More drastic 
changes are likely if individual member changes are compounded by the rise and fall of 
industries, a change of the very economic base of a city that ultimately is inevitable in 
entrepreneurial capitalism. This may be especially dramatic when it happens in 
conjunction with a broader societal regime shift. The result is likely to be a struggle to 
reshape governance, rejuvenate the local economy, and a rethinking of the means and 
objectives of economic development and, from a larger philosophical perspective, the 
city's relationship with the world around it. New industries and new elites, or at least old 
elites reformulating their own role in the local economic-political structure, are key 
features in the local post-Fordist economy. 
What is the nature of contemporary elite involvement? A newly diversified 
economy could potentiaHy lead to segmentation of interests, supporting the argument that 
urban elite strategies are generally less coherent now. In Buffalo, a city plagued by 
industrial decline, a more coherent corporate effort to achieve redevelopment took place 
with the creation of the "Group of 18," which was informal. A vote was never taken, nor 
a political candidate endorsed (Koritz, 1991; Perry 1990). This was a response to a 
traditionally fragmented structure without clear corporate leadership, as the city only had 
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few corporate headquarters and relied on ties to outside instead of local financial capital. 
This type of business group-more or less official, but often with substantial local 
power--1s frequently cited in the literature. Such institutions include: the Citizen's 
Charter Association in Dallas, the Phoenix 40 in Phoenix, the Suite 8F crowd in Houston, 
and the Good Government League in San Antonio (Kantor, 1995; Parker & Feagin, 
1990). While these groups represent status quo, business agendas may also demand a top­
down approach with direct involvement on the top CEO level where resources can be 
committed directly. An example would be the 1980s Cleveland Tomorrow, which was 
made up of the city's top 50 CEOs and played a part in the city's revival (Magnet, 1989, 
March 27). 
In a comparative perspective, a highly concentrated elite group can more easily 
direct redevelopment efforts. This is one reason why Pittsburgh has been more successful 
than other old industrial cities with its Allegheny Conference, organized in 1943 under 
the leadership of Richard Mellon, which spearheaded Renaissance projects and 
neighborhood efforts (Lubove, 1996). A coherent development strategy can be tied to 
one-industry dependence, which ironically presents a formidable economic restructuring 
challenge, but at the same time might provide a solid institutional structure on which to 
build. The existence of corporate headquarters correlates with the possibilities of elite 
power over development issues. Industrial ownership regulations, especially important 
for headquarters development in the financial realm, placed limits on geographical 
expansion of many corporations, which forced Pittsburgh's Mellon empire, essentially a 
financial one, to stay in Pittsburgh and invest in the city's future (Koritz, 1991). While 
67 
historically important economic development institutions in Pittsburgh were dominated 
by a few industrialists, today's elite is more heterogeneous. 
This change is very much evident more recently in Philadelphia where a relatively 
small, homogenous clique constituted both the social and economic elite. The business of 
the city operated with personal ties, and the local financial institutions were squarely 
placed in the economic center and the elite neighborhoods, boards and institutions as 
social centers. In Lemann's (2000, June 5) view, it is not an economic bust forcing social 
change, but instead "the good times are killing off America's local elites" (p. 42). While 
still prosperous, the power of Philadelphia's elite is severely circumscribed in a time of 
mergers and diffusion of financial control. Lemann also suggests that coherent elites are 
only emerging in a few new centers-such as information technology-dense Austin and 
Seattle-but not in most places. Post-Fordist business leadership is culturally and 
ideologically different with less attachment to corporate liberalism, which has been 
reported in places like Boston and Silicon Valley (Jonas, 1996a). High-tech industries 
with many small firms may be less inclined to form participatory institutions, but that 
may change as those clusters mature over time. 
Finally, the internal spatial structure of cities must be taken into account in this 
context. Rapid expansion is taking place in the urban periphery, in edge cities and 
growing suburbs, where commercial development as well as new housing is constructed. 
Governance and coherent strategies are increasingly difficult in the multi-centered, multi­
powered metropolis (Lewis, 1996). In some cases, the region has supplanted the city as 
the main local territorial unit with expanding infrastructure, fast-paced suburbanization, 
and the relocation of some important economic activities, including manufacturing, to the 
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hinterland. Decision-making institutions, both in the political and business realm, are 
trying to adapt to this regionalization. Local governments are, however, reluctant to give 
up existing powers, while urban chambers of commerce are often suffering from a 
legitimacy problem in expansion efforts, as they traditionally represent downtown 
interests. Regional governance bodies are also hampered by resistance to new levels of 
government action. If no new, more geographically diverse institutions emerge, power 
will indeed be more diffuse than in the past. 
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5. A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN NASHVILLE
Post-Fordism is situated and understood in direct relation to the earlier.regime of 
accumulation, so as an introduction to the empirical study I will present a history of 
Nashville with a particular focus on its relationship with the national regime and 
development of local politics. As with all places, the city's political culture and economic 
development is a result of both socio-economic practices of the times and historical 
circumstances that are particular to Nashville. Here, I will cover events and trends that 
have bearing on the issues discussed in later chapters: the emergence of local institutions� 
political structures of the city, both formal and informal; and an overview of recent 
economic trends. The chapter ends with an analysis of a crucial period during the late 
1980s when Bill Boner was mayo�he "catalytic" factor of change in the analytical 
framework introduced in Chapter 1. As such it ties directly to Chapter 6, which expands 
on another similar element-the business cycle; and also to Chapter 7, which in more 
detail elaborates on the process of governance change in Nashville with a particular 
emphasis on the business elite. Figure 5.1 is a reference map of Nashville to which the 
reader is encouraged to refer during all the subsequent chapters. 
5. 1 The formative stage: Nashville's place in the South
Two hundred years ago Nashville was a small town, almost frontier-like in character. On 
the banks of the Cumberland River, it was an outpost economically dominated by land 
speculators and merchants, as in many other places in the westward expanding nation. 
The Nashville Basin was well situated with regards to water transportation, and the 
Cumberland was easily navigable to the Ohio-Mississippi system, which together with 
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Figure 5.1 Reference map of Davidson County and its surroundings. Basemap: Mapquest 
(http://www.mapquest.com ). 
the Natchez Trace and trading rights with New Orleans in 1795, established linkages 
southward (Corlew, 1990). Around 1800, the region was agricultural, with industry 
limited to products such as flour milling, lumber and other hardwood products. 
The good location made it the eighth largest city in the South by 1860, but the 
population was only 17,000, an indication of the underdeveloped urban system in the 
South; Nashville was not among the 50 largest cities in the country (Figure 5.2). The 
agricultural system of Tennessee and the South in the second half of the 19th century did 
not spur the development of industrial cities. The South was operating under a different 
regime than the national model (Wilson, 2000a, 2000b ). Wages were suppressed, in part 
because of the use of black labor, which made the regime less "intense" and 
mechanizedthan northern industrialization. The planters' support for industrialization was 
limited, yet overlapping interests in preserving the racially stratified society existed. In 
72 
Nashville's population rank in the U.S. urban system 1860-1999* 
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Figure 5.2 Nashville in the national urban system 1860-1999. * Measured by city size 
1860-1940 and metropolitan area 1950-1999. Sources: Gibson (1998) and U.S. Bureau of 
the Census (1950-2000). 
this system, consumption was low and sharecropping and yeoman farming were 
relatively self-sufficient. The result was a lack of a proper urban rank-size hierarchy; 
instead, many similarly sized cities emerged, each with its own hinterland. 
Nashville was such a regional center. New enterprises flourished that would later 
fonn the basis of local industry and society. The formation of the Bank of Nashville was 
the beginning of the city's financial importance in the late 19th century. The Southern 
Methodist Publishing House spurred an industry that became an important segment of the 
local economy. Nashville became a wholesale city serving an area from northern 
Alabama up to southern Kentucky, and early manufacturing produced various consumer 
goods that mostly served the population in the mid-South region. Agricultural and forest 
products were refined for local or regional consumption. 
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While the Nashville Basin originally encompassed both plantations and small 
fanning, after the Civil War the region was less attached to the cotton economy of the 
South. Pro-union sentiment was not uncommon among the elite in Nashville (Doyle, 
1990) and this relatively neutral attitude during the Civil War made contacts with 
Northern capital immediate and enthusiastic after the war. In the spirit of the New South, 
Nashville was eager to attract outside capital, industrial development and people. 
By 1880, the city was in a midst of a prosperous period and population had almost 
tripled in 20 years (Figure 5.2). One-fifth of the city's population was foreign-born, with 
Irish and German as the dominant ethnic minorities. Most of the Irish population worked 
as manual labor and remained an underclass for a long time, while the Germans were 
assimilated faster into the middle class, although they retained their separate institutions, 
such as churches and neighborhoods. Northern industrialists took advantage of cheap 
labor and a favorable location and established manufacturing plants, often in the textile 
and apparel business, and distribution facilities in the city. Even if textile production 
played an important role in the emerging branch plant economy, Nashville never became 
a one-industry town, and its role as an industrial center always remained moderate. 
Parallel with outside investment, a local elite emerged in control of the city's financial 
and political institutions. An investigation into the post-Civil War elite in Nashville 
(1860-1880) portrays it as more open to newcomers and made up of younger individuals 
whose residence in the city was of recent vintage compared to more traditional Southern 
cities, such as Charleston and Mobile. In that respect, Nashville was more similar to 
Atlanta. The Nashville elite boasted to be self-made men from humble origin. Pedigree 
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was not as highly valued as in Deep South cities, and business associations rather than 
exclusive social clubs were at the civic core of the city (Doyle, 1982). 
The growth of the city led to some problems. The public finances of the city were 
extraordinarily bad, both as a result of the Civil War and the issuing of railroad bonds. 
The city actually went bankrupt on one occasion. Stubbornly low taxes compounded the 
problem, and city services remained very rudimentary. First Avenue facing the river was 
dominated by cargo traffic and warehouses, while Second Avenue was commercial. 
Industrial, residential, and commercial development took place in a haphazard way 
around the civic core. Rings of slums emerged around downtown; the area south of 
downtown was known as Black Bottom, and Hell's Half Acre grew to the north, 
embarrassingly near the state capitol. Affiuent Nashvillians were suburbanizing already 
in the 1870s as a response to the squalid conditions in the center. Both political life and 
retail trade were originally focused around Public Square and Second Avenue, but with 
growing suburbanization. mainly westward, commerce was pulled in that direction. East­
west oriented Church Street eventually became the main commercial street (Marshall, 
1975). Westward expansion produced high-end residential areas centered along West End 
Avenue. 
Perhaps the first serious entrepreneurial effort on the part of the local government 
was to invest in a private railroad enterprise that connected the city with Chattanooga. It 
was clear that this new mode of transportation had the power to shape the emerging urban 
system in the United States, and Nashville was eventually well endowed with connecting 
railroads, including the Louisville and Nashville (L&N) railroad. The railroad 
connections helped develop Nashville as an expanding wholesale, distribution, and 
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manufacturing center. The city continued to grow with the railroad in the 1880s. The 
L&N, one the most important railroad companies in the South, held a commanding 
presence in Nashville, both as the monopoly operator of several railroad lines, but also as 
a political actor with significant clout in the era when railroads were a driving force of the 
economy (Carey, 2000). Although the L&N was originally a Louisville-owned company, 
control of the company dispersed after the economic crisis of 1873. By the 1880s, it was 
in the hands of Northern financiers, as investment capita) for railroad expansion was not 
available in the South. 
After a few decades of solid growth, Nashville was struggling to keep up. During 
the industrial expansion of the 1890s, Nashville's overall position was slipping (Figure 
5.2). Its early foundries were not in a position to expand because of the lack of raw 
materials. Other types of production, such as the hardwood lumber that dominated the 
east side waterfront, was not enough. Nashville's emphasis on publishing, education, 
government, food production and distribution was good, but not in sync with the main 
growth engine of the time. The city did not have natural resource-based heavy industry 
like Birmingham� neither did it have outstanding river and rail communication like 
Memphis and Louisville. As the Nashville elite focused on other endeavors-many of the 
city's banking and finance institutions were established then-heavy manufacturing was 
not pursued with full force. It has been suggested that the Nashville elite did not focus on 
industrialization as it was a threat to their hegemony (Hanson, 1960). 
When the industrial New South failed to live up to its promise, the city turned to 
self-promotion-the 1897 Tennessee centennial celebration. Successful expositions had 
been held in other cities, most notably Chicago, and Nashville was eager to show itself 
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off as an ambitious Southern city. The centennial exposition was largely an attempt to 
keep up with competing cities such as Atlanta (Doyle, 1982). The celebration was largely 
financed by the Louisville & Nashville railroad, which was wrestling with a problematic 
local image as an arrogant monopolist, creating a need for a favorable public opinion 
climate to ensure regulatory favors from local policymakers (Coleman, 1990; Egerton, 
1979). The Centennial was successful and drew more than one million people. The 
exhibition centerpiece was a replica of the Parthenon of ancient Greece; the last thing the 
city wanted to project was a folk theme with "log cabins and coon hats" (Davis, 1967). 
It is doubtful that the Centennial itself left a lasting impact beyond a nice city 
park; however, several institutions had been established that ensured Nashville regional 
primacy. Nashville in 1900 was an economically diverse city, featuring finance, railroads, 
manufacturing, and wholesale. This, over time, solidified into one coherent elite drawn 
from different sectors of the economy. Nashville's elite struggled to live up to the image 
as the "Athens of the South," which had been firmly rooted in the public imagination at 
least since the Centennial 8• By the 1920s, the local elite led by Maxwell House coffee 
mogul Joel Cheek had achieved a position strong enough to establish the Nashville 
symphony orchestra and a new music conservatory (Doyle, 1985b). Nashville 
experienced a cultural renaissance of sorts in the 1920s, much of it tied to its universities. 
Next to prominent Vanderbilt University, several medical, teacher, and black schools 
8 Nashville's claim to be the "Athens of the South" was more a reflection of the collection of colleges in the 
city rather than an outstanding cultural-civic life, although some variations on the origin of the slogan exist. 
The phrase has been attributed to the president of the University of Nashville (or possibly his biographer), 
although in the 1820s it was actually coined as Athens of the West (Davis, 1967). It may even go back to 
native Andrew Jackson who brought some notoriety to the city, and according to some interpretations, 
"Athens of the South" is a reference to Jacksonian democratic ideals. 
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existed, including Peabody College, Fisk University, Belmont College, Meharry Medical 
College, David Lipscomb University, and Tennessee A&I, most of which still exist as 
relatively small institutions. In two cases, the intellectual environment at Vanderbilt 
University in the 1920s did have a nationwide impact. The so-called Fugitives 
championed a style of literary analysis that became known as New Criticism, which made 
an impression far beyond Nashville and the South. Equally famous, but perhaps less 
influential, were the Agrarians, an anti-modernist reaction against the societal changes of 
industrialism and urbanization. The booster culture of the economic elite and the grim 
urban conditions of Nashville were lambasted9, idealizing instead the old Southern rural 
lifestyle. However, both movements had little support in Nashville society or even at 
Vanderbilt outside a small circle of group members, even if one Fugitive was a member 
of the owning family of the National Life Insurance Company (Howell, 1988). 
Part of the 1920s success was financial: Nashville firms controlled capital 
throughout the region. Two insurance companies, National Life and Life & Casualty, 
were established in the first years of the 20th century and later moved on to control assets 
far beyond Nashville into the Deep South, as well as in Texas and the Midwest (Carey, 
2000). The local insurance industry reached its peak after World War II, and the most 
important institution was probably the financial firm Caldwell and Company. The 
company's fortune was based on issuing bonds at a time when such financing was rare in 
9 Nashville's widespread slums, especially near the Capitol, and social disorder gave Nashville the third 
highest murder rate in the country in the mid-1920s (Wolfe, 1999). Poor living conditions were obviously a 
long-standing trend in Nashville, which had the highest mortality rate of any city in the United States 
already in the late 19th century (Summerville, 1996). 
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the South and owed its success to the unwillingness of Northern corporations to penetrate 
the region. Caldwell's bond business exploded as urbanization and government 
infrastructure, Florida real estate, and agriculture expanded in the 1920s (Carey, 2000). 
The owner, Roger Caldwell, was allied with the Tennessean's10 editor Luke Lea both in 
business and politics, usually against the city's machine Mayor Hilary Howse and the 
Nashville Hanner 's editor Jimmy Stahlman. Caldwell largely financed the local building 
boom of the 1920s, including the first skyscrapers in Nashville. The downfall of the 
Caldwell empire was one of the most spectacular in the South; it left Roger Caldwell 
ruined and his companion Luke Lea in jail for financial irregularities, and brought the 
Depression to Nashville, which took its toll on the elite. Both the symphony and the 
music conservatory folded. 
After the collapse of Caldwell and Company, which spread to other financial 
firms in the city, three banks came to dominate the local financial scene in the post­
Depression era: American National (later First American), Third National, and 
Commerce Union. The city's leading financial institutions were intertwined. Third 
National, especially, had close ties with National Life, including a joint president and 
largely overlapping board membership. Caldwell's business as a leading bond house was 
continued locally by Equitable. With a diverse economy, the city came out of the 
Depression in decent shape. After the New Deal, Nashville's political and economic 
structures had molded into a power structure with a small group of individuals that 
10 Called the Nashville Tenne:,sean until 1972, when the name was simplified to the Tennes:,ean.
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controlled local capital and reigned unchallenged for decades, as Nashville's economy 
was characterized by industrial stability and relatively slow growth well into the 1970s. 
5.2 Goo-Goos v. the machine: The politics of urban development in a one-party 
town 
The political history of NashviJle is best described as a struggle between two opposing 
types of forces: the populist-machine and the business-progressive movement. The city's 
early political leadership grew out of the wealthy segment of the community, yet it was 
also always dependent on ward-based politics, much like in other cities. But power had 
its limits-you had to be white, male, and Protestant. Informal organizations, like the 
American Protective Association, made sure that Catholics and foreigners were excluded 
from political power (Waller, 1970). Modest industrialization and immigration did not 
radicalize the local political culture. However, the Irish, with a preference for clannish 
politics, laid the foundation for the importance of the political machine. The traditionally 
ward-based politics with Republican control of Nashville that governed with the support 
of the black population was challenged by a business-led effort in the 1890s (Doyle, 
1985a). With at-large districts and voting laws and a poll tax that discouraged both blacks 
and poor whites from voting, Republican power fizzled. Eventually Nashville got its own 
"boss:" Hilary Howse, mayor from 1909-1915 and again from 1923-1938. Like many 
machines, it was based on neighborhood wards that received favors in exchange for 
votes. Howse controlled a "welfare fund" that could be dispensed to acquire support from 
key groups in the city. The machine coalition included working-class whites, city 
employees, blacks, and the important bootleggers and speakeasy owners, as Howse was 
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first elected on a anti-prohibition platform (Ibid.). Even if political decision-making was 
not always guided by public interests, public services such as health, schools, and parks 
expanded for the first time. In the absence of unions with political aspirations, working­
class participation in a governing coalition was solicited through, and limited by, machine 
politics. 
Opposing Howse was the white middle-class and parts of the business elite. 
Inspired by the progressive ideal of the era, they wanted good, "clean" government run 
by professionals and businessmen that could offer better public services, including 
education, but that could also deal with social problems 11• Most of the time, however, the 
business elite could usually forge a coalition with the machine to ensure that policies did 
not threaten its economic power. Reformists managed to reintroduce an at-large 
commission system of government in 1913 to break Howse's ward-based political base. 
Even though the plan backfired as Howse-supporters won and occupied the majority of 
the commission seats, the machine collapsed shortly thereafter in the wake of a scandal 
involving the city's bookkeeping (Doyle, 1985a). The following years were characterized 
by several administrations, which despite the promises of progress, did not manage to 
control the political system and run the city efficiently. The fledgling reform movement 
stalled as inefficient city administrations quickly succeeded each other, and political 
fragmentation resulted from commissioners guarding their own territory, and an inability 
to fulfill the promise to control bootlegging and vice. This enabled Howse to come back 
as mayor in 1923, a position he held for 15 more years. The West End elite was still his 
11 As in other places, good government proponents in Nashville are often referred to as "'g<x.>-goos." Unlike 
some locals believe, the term is not connected to Nashville's sweet treat with the same name. 
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main opponent, but many business people viewed favorably his capacity to govern after 
the failed reform years. One indication of the emerging coalition between Howse and the 
forces of business progressivism was the establishment of comprehensive planning and 
zoning regulations under a commission influenced by both Howse and business leaders. 
The last five years of Howse's mayoral period experienced a new radical outside 
component in local politics-the New Deal. The Work Progress Administration (WPA) 
was greeted with political suspicion as it could potentially upset the existing patronage 
system. It did not help either that the Crump machine of Memphis was the main ally of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and WPA in Tennessee (Burran, 1975). A famous 
incident was the building of useless malaria preventive storm drainage systems, because 
under WPA control, money could not be spent as political favors and no worthwhile 
project could be found that benefited the patronage system. But soon, "WPA learned to 
work within the existing political structure rather than reform it, and local politicians 
learned that the flow of federal dollars could bolster rather than erode their political 
power" (Doyle, 1985b, p. 89). The emerging Fordist state also affected the relationship 
between business and labor. National legislation strengthened collective bargaining, and 
the intervention in local affairs by the New Deal state brought a heightened importance to 
unions in Nashville. National labor policies forced wages up in the South, integrating it in 
the national economy. 
The response to the New Deal from Nashville business interests was mixed. Some 
within the Chamber of Commerce accepted the new order and praised uniform wage 
setting and consistent hiring practices, while others, especially local manufacturing 
interests, were strongly opposed to any expanded labor rights. Good connections in 
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Congress and the Roosevelt administration made Tennessee a recipient of New Deal 
funds. The Chamber of Commerce managed to get funding for a new airport and was 
generally quite supportive of New Deal policies. Franklin D. Roosevelt won 
overwhelming victories in Davidson County during his presidential races, which also 
indicates general public support of his policies. The New Deal had further imprints on the 
Nashville landscape: public parks were improved, especially in wealthy suburban 
southwest Nashville, which included a new steeplechase track; new high school buildings 
were partially financed with federal money, something that was necessary as Nashville 
ranked 16 out of 17 Southern cities in expenditure per pupil (Summerville, 1996); the 
Public Works Administration built a series of new government buildings downtown 
Nashville to accommodate the increasing number of public officials; and Tennessee 
Valley Authority power improved the economy and the local environment as the coal 
smog in Nashville subsided. 
If the New Deal changed the relationship between the local and federal 
government, World War II brought continued cooperation. Spinney (1998) argues that 
World War II was a watershed moment for the South. Government military investment 
and homogenization of the population transformed Southern culture and economy. The 
Vultee aircraft manufacturer, which was located in Nashville during the war, was a major 
boost to the local economy. In Nashville, the elite also started to embrace government 
action when it could improve conditions in the city without eroding its power. The latter 
was possible as neither blacks or unions were in a position to use government to 
challenge local elite hegemony. Spinney argues that the 1940s were more fundamental in 
this regard than the New Deal period. Urban boosterism could continue hand in hand 
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with expanded local government. Mayor Thomas Cummings, a lawyer and believer in 
business progressivism, had replaced the Howse machine. Initially backed by the 
Chamber and the Tennessean, he pledged to bring efficiency to local government. In a 
fragmented government organization, Cummings tried to amass more power in the 
mayor's office, which earned him the ire of good government forces. These types of 
realignments and shifts on the machine-progressive scale have been common in Nashville 
politics throughout much of the 20th century. 
The following decades of urban growth and need for services legitimized 
progressive, efficient government, especially as the belief in scale economics pointed 
towards the positive aspects of metropolitan government. Like all cities, Nashville 
changed rapidly after World War II. Development began to occur outside the city limits 
as infrastructure hitherto only available to urban residents became readily available. The 
leadership of Nashville began to discuss consolidation of city and county government to 
better control development. The risk was that local government would become 
increasingly fragmented, as in the more urbanized Northeast. Wealthy Belle Meade had 
incorporated in 1938, and in the 1950s a couple other small Davidson County middle­
class suburbs did the same. A city commission, including professional planners and 
Vanderbilt public policy experts, produced a detailed plan for unification in 1956 that 
called for two taxing districts: the general services district, which covered the county 
outside existing city limits, and the urban services district with additional services, like 
fire protection and garbage collection. The entire civic establishment was in favor of the 
proposal: Mayor Ben West, the county judge (the highest executive officer at the county 
level), the sheriff, both newspapers, the Chamber of Commerce, the teachers, the League 
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of Women Voters, and the unions. The 1958 referendum passed in the city, but failed in 
the county. County voters disapproved for the usual reasons: fear of domination of the 
city's political structure and tax increases, and rural areas did not perceive consolidation 
as necessary. Especially middle-income suburbs and rural parts of the county voted 
heavily against the proposal. Belle Meade and the city of Nashville voted for the 
proposal, even if some resistance existed in the black community. 
The black population had increased in the city of Nashville from 28 percent in 
1940 to 43 percent in 1960, and a countywide government would undoubtedly dilute 
power of the black community. Municipal boundary-making in the South often takes 
racial overtones (Aiken, 1987), and unification movements and liberal annexation 
policies in the South may be interpreted as a way to disenfranchise the black voter. Racial 
politics was rarely part of the public discourse during the unification period in Nashville. 
But the prospect of a black-majority city was probably a consideration among the white 
power elite, especially as emerging civil rights legislation would enable the black 
community to seize the political influence to which they were entitled. (Local census 
geography has changed since 1960. However, an overlay of census tracts indicates that in 
1990, the area defined as Nashville in the pre-unification era would have a black 
population of approximately 51 percent and a white population of 47 percent.) 
After the failed referendum, Mayor West pushed to annex a large area, 80,000 
people and 42 square miles, at one time. But the city did not have a plan to provide new 
services, and suburbs would pay higher taxes with no additional services in the 
foreseeable future. Furthennore, the city also imposed a tax on suburban motorists using 
the city street system. These unpopular measures directly influenced a second referendum 
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for a new consolidated charter almost identical to the failed one. The Banner and Mayor 
West, a sure loser in a countywide election, decided to oppose the plan. This policy pitted 
West against unification forces in the second referendum, where he tried to rally 
machine-style support from government workers and blacks, but pro-unification forces 
were better organized the second time. The driving forces behind the winning Metro 
campaign were the Tennessean and its editor Silliman Evans, and the middle-class 
dominated Citizen's Committee for Better Government. Unification passed both inside 
and outside the city limits with the least support in poor city wards, but new district 
redrawing assured some black influence in the future. As a bait to suburban voters, 
property in the general services district was taxed lower than property in the urban 
services district, but both areas shared the same fire and police departments, zoning, and 
school system. The new consolidated government is controlled by a council of 35 
districts and five at-large elected members. 
Nashvi1le was one of the first cities to vote for a consolidated form of 
government, along with Jacksonville and Indianapolis. Unified government brought 
Nashville to national attention as a model for efficient government. The elite feels that it 
enhanced the city's reputation, aided in corporate recruitment, and the ability to organize 
growth and provide services as efficiently as possible. Future mayor Richard Fulton 
(2000) says he "would not have come back from Congress ... had it not been for the 
consolidated form of government. It a11owed the mayor to have a very strong position in 
helping economic development." However, Hawkins (1966) concludes that the election 
outcome was the result of several place-specific events more than a progressive spirit. 
Consolidation passed because suburbanites were unhappy with current services and 
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because they did not anticipate tax increases in a consolidated city. The annexation threat, 
however, may have been the determining factor in the consolidation vote (Coomer & 
Tyer, 1974). Post consolidation surveys indicate that citizens had a relatively positive 
opinion of the performance of the new form of government (Rogers & Lipsey, 1974). 
In the politics of unification, the rival newspapers were very important opinion­
makers. Nashville had a vigorous public debate between its two newspapers, with the 
Tennessean regarded as more liberal than the now-defunct Nashville Banner. After the 
Coldwell collapse and former Tennessean editor Luke Lea's prison sentence, the outsider 
Silliman Evans bought the bankrupt paper with federal financial support-a common 
practice during the New Deal. Not surprisingly then, the Tennessean became a supporter 
of the New Deal, TVA, public planning and progress. The Tennessean supported good 
government candidates, but complex interpersonal alliances made counterintuitive 
endorsements and positions common. One thing was certain though-the antagonistic 
relationship between the newspapers led to opposing positions on virtually all social and 
political issues, as when the ultra-conservative Banner supported Mayor Ben West, one 
of the proponents of desegregation. Evans was succeeded as editor by John Seigenthaler, 
who despite the newspaper's progressive stance became an ally of the dominant figure in 
local politics-Sheriff Fate Thomas, the consummate machine politician. Coming from 
the U.S. justice department under attorney general Robert Kennedy at the height of the 
civil rights era, Seigenthaler served as editor, publisher and CEO of the Tennessean until 
1992. 
With an increasingly active black student body, Nashville became a center for the 
sit-in movement during the early 1960s. Resistance occurred from some of the downtown 
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merchants supported by reactionary, but powerful publisher Jimmy Stahlman of the 
Banner, who provided the wanted media attention (Halberstam, 1998). But black political 
rights at that point had progressed faster in Nashville than in many other parts of the 
South with the election of black city councilmen, a mayor sympathetic to reform (Ben 
West) and a newspaper actively advocating civil rights (The Tennessean). Nashville 
gained a reputation as a city with reasonable race relations by Southern standards, 
especially after Mayor West embraced the black students' demands. Even if segregation 
was of a milder form than in the Deep South, Nashville was and remained distinctly 
racially, socially, and geographically segregated. There have been other high-profile 
disturbances over the years including the bombing of an integrated school and a 
controversial busing program (see Chapter 10). 
Politically, Nashville voters are now willing to elect black candidates 
occasionally. Nashville has recently had both a black chief of police and an at-large 
councilman elected countywide. The white elite stress this as proof of healthy local race 
relations. The black educational institutions are also highlighted as contributors to 
opportunities for blacks to advance in society. They say the average black Nashvillian is 
more affluent than the average black in other cities. A comparison with Memphis has 
been especially common during interviews with the elite. Memphis and some other peer 
cities like Birmingham are characterized as having an "Old South mentality." The 
interviewed make the direct connection between economic growth, a local 
entrepreneurial pro-business spirit, and racial harmony. It is true that growth politics have 
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not been intertwined and hampered by overt racial politics, at least since the coming of 
the interstate, which carved up the heart of black North Nashville 12 . 
The elite is probably correct on the importance of good race relations. During the 
civil rights era, investment avoided places of racial antagonism. Cities like New Orleans 
and Birmingham became synonymous with racial strife, and it has been documented that 
Montgomery and Little Rock lost investments due to a negative image (Larsen, 1990). 
The civil rights movement was helped by geographical extension of Fordism, which 
triggered a filtering down of regime change from the national to the local level. Finding a 
compromise is in the interest of the local regime. The civil rights forced business interests 
to choose between segregation and economic progress (Jacoway & Colburn, 1982). The 
degree to which they did choose reform varied, but over time they all had to. Business 
leadership could become a driving force for less racially discriminatory practices, as 
noted by Wilson (2000b) in the case of Birmingham, even if business leaders did not 
necessarily harbor strong personal convictions of racial equality. Instead, it lies in the 
nature of a regime to transcend the personal preferences of the individuals involved. The 
support for the segregated system was intact within the business elite before the civil 
rights movement, but eroding support for segregation was caused by worldwide negative 
12 Census data paint a slightly different picture than the elite does. First of all, the income gap between 
hlack and white is still cn01mous. The hlack Nashvillian's income is only 53 percent of his white 
counterpart and poverty rates arc more than three times as high. True, the black population in Nashville is 
heller off than the hlack citizens of Memphis in many categories-income, income equality, poverty, and 
poverty equality-but how does Nashville compare to the peer city group? Nashville ranks as number four 
out of ten (data for Columbus, OH missing) in black income, sixth in income equality between black and 
white, third lowest in poverty rates for blacks, and fifth lowest in poverty ratio between black and white. 
Thus, Nashville appears to be only average in its peer group regarding racial economic equality. Source: 
Summary File 3 in FactFinder (income data for 2000) and Social and Economic Characteristics (povt-'lty 
data for 1990). All data are for entire counties. 
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reaction to the events in the American South (Ibid.). Commercial and industrial leaders 
were the first ones willing to forge a compromise with civil rights organizations, and 
eventually were successful in creating a more inclusive local political system. A 
reasonable parallel is the political machine in Nashville, which encouraged black voter 
participation, not because of a moral sense of what was right, but as a tool to control 
power. 
After World War II, Nashville was ready to accept the new relationship between 
local and federal government in other ways as well. Nashville was an early participant of 
federally supported urban renewal programs. The redevelopment of the Capitol Hill area 
once known as Hell's Half Acre was the first grant to be submitted after the passage of 
the Housing Act of 1949. The Metropolitan Development and Housing Authority 
(MDHA), a quasi-independent authority that operates with federal funding for most of its 
$50 million annual budget and is responsible for public housing and urban renewal 
projects, oversaw the cleaning up of the shanties and the development of a parkway 
encircling the northern edge of downtown using public and private money. 
The first mayor in the unified Nashville-Davidson County, Beverly Briley, took 
office with the support of the Tennessean. Briley became a champion of expanding 
government services, downtown redevelopment, and good relations with the federal 
Fordist government. Nashville congressman Richard Fulton was a young Kennedy liberal 
that supported these urban improvement efforts, and John Seigenthaler was a behind-the­
scenes member of the Kennedy family's Camelot political circle. Nashville received 
federal funds at a level well above larger cities (Doyle, 1985b ). During the Great Society 
era, Nashville continued aggressively to seek federal grants and was a first-round Model 
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City, although the process between courthouse, HUD, and citizen committees of black 
North Nashville was not smooth (Gates et al., 1975). Downtown was reshaped during the 
1960s and 1970s with new skyscrapers. The local financial institutions wielded strong 
influence in the urban renewal reshaping of downtown Nashville (Nelson, 2001). With 
the help of the city's condemnation powers, private interests could consolidate entire city 
blocks to build hotels, office buildings, and bank headquarters, such as First American 
(1971) and Commerce Union (1979). The corporate headquarters built during the era of 
urban renewal were often financed by the insurance companies, who also spent 
extravagantly for themselves; the Life & Casualty tower was the tallest building in the 
South. 
The electoral system sets the parameters for development policies in a city. 
Nashville has a strong mayor system with significant budget and appointment powers. 
The mayor appoints most committees and commissions. Metro government has a civil 
service tradition where eight executive department heads are ostensibly appointed on a 
non-political basis. Only the finance director and legal director are automatically 
reappointed when a new mayor is elected. In addition, there are semi-independent boards, 
such as the Board of Education, the MDHA, and the Metropolitan Nashville Airport 
Authority (MNAA). The mayor proposes a budget and the council responds to it. If the 
council cannot agree on a different budget within a month, the mayor's proposal 
automatically goes into effect as the budget. However, the 40-member council that 
governs Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County, one of the largest in United States, is 
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seen by many as too big and unwieldy 13. It takes strong parliamentary skills on the 
mayor's side to maneuver such a large political body. Different mayors have shown 
varying degrees of aptitude for doing so. Neither can the mayor rely on stable coalitions 
in the council to simplify negotiations. Coalitions tend to be ad hoc, and they have been 
shaped and reshaped constantly. Alignments on issues arise, but no black caucus or 
steady affiliations with business or unions beyond individual council members have 
existed (Scobey, 2000). Recent term limits have also reduced the capacity for durable 
legislative coalitions. There have been no significant moves to reduce the size of the 
council. A Chamber-sponsored study reviewed the charter to see if a reduction would 
enhance efficiency, but the consensus was that the advantages of small districts--door-to­
door campaigning and the closeness between the citizens and their government 
officials--outweighed the negative aspects (Cate, 2001 ). District councilmen are 
interested in their own constituency, so they trade support for pet projects. This type of 
informal trading has been institutionalized to the extent that the council defers to the 
wishes of the councilman whose district is affected by a certain development proposal. 
This is referred to "council manic courtesy" and under that system, councilmen introduce 
zoning changes themselves, which are virtually guaranteed to pass. Obviously, such an 
arrangement makes proper urban planning problematic and the system prone to 
corruption, which has been alleged from time to time (Scobey, 2000). Real estate and 
construction interests can especially benefit from having individual councilmen on their 
side. Outside the council, there are various political organizations that endorse and 
13 Mayor Beverly Briley, in a politically incorrect manner, once described the council as "forty jealous 
whores" (Dobie, 1990c). 
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sponsor candidates: the black community (Davidson Independent Political Council), 
business (Chamber of Commerce), labor (various unions, among which the Metropolitan 
Nashville Education Association has a reputation as a power broker), to name but a few. 
The mayor and council are elected to four-year terms in nonpartisan elections, as the 
metro government was established without primaries and party alignments. Nevertheless, 
most leading politicians are affiliated with the Democratic Party. The string of 
Democratic mayors exemplifies this better than anything else (Table 5.1 ). Nashville has 
also retained its Democratic leanings in national politics. Davidson County has tended to 
vote more Democratic than the U.S. average in all presidential elections since 1972. 
Aspiring local politicians align themselves with the Democratic party to be 
electable, but they do not have to commit themselves strongly to partisan politics, which 
enables them to solicit support from conservative, well-moneyed, Republican groups 
(Cate, 2001 ). The one-party system originally designed to exclude blacks from the 
political process has outlived its original purpose. Yet it persists� partly because of 
Table 5.1 Important Nashville mayors in the twentieth century. 
Mayor 
Hilary Howse (D) 
Thomas Cummings (D) 
Ben West (D) 
Beverly Briley (D) 
Richard Fulton (D) 
Bill Boner (D) 
Phil Bredesen (D) 
Bill Purcell (D) 
Mayoral period 
1909-1915, 1923-1938 
1938-1951 
1951-1963 
1963-1975 
1975-1987 
1987-1991 
1991-1999 
1999- present 
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institutional inertia, but also because Nashville leans towards the Democratic Party 
demographically (a combination of minorities, urban white middle-class liberals, young 
singles, union employees, and public employees). Encouraging Democratic Party 
dominance is also the fact that Nashville has become a one-newspaper city, which is, 
generally speaking, liberal-Democratic. The accommodation between the Republican 
business elite and the Democratic political establishment has been made rather well 
without much hostility or open disputes 14. 
Nobody exemplifies the balance of local politics better than Richard Fulton. As 
one of only three Southern Congressmen to vote for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he 
formed a strong relationship with the black community in Nashville. Fulton also took 
other un-Southernlike stances when he opposed the Vietnam War and voted for 
Medicare. As a pragmatic politician the Chamber made him an ex officio member of the 
board when he became mayor, with a representative from the Mayor's Office attending. 
His close ties with the union movement helped maintain a three-part political balance: the 
"silk-stockings" of West Nashville, his natural East Nashville working-class 
constituency, and the city's black population. Fulton could be a "Kennedy liberal" in 
Congress and then a more centrist mayor because of the different roles, rather than 
changes in personal ideology (Fulton, 2000). This balance represented the state of being 
14 The confessions of a pragmatic Nashville politician, George Cate: "I ran as a vice-mayor with the 
support of the Tennessean. I would regard myself as rather middle-of-the-road politically. It has helped me 
to campaign pretty aggressively wtthin Republican circles although they knew I voted in the Democratic 
primary. But I have not held an office as a Democrat. But they probably felt reasonably comfortable with 
me and I with them, and I preferred it that way. For example, my campaign manager was openly active in 
the Republican Party. So you sec, alignments like that arc taking place in campaign committees and 
organizations. But I always voted in the Democratic primary, partially because if I wanted to have a voice 
in local government� and in those elections that arc governed politically, I vote where my vote matters" 
(Cate, 2<X) 1 ). 
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in Nashville for a long time, where West Nashville has not been very successful in 
electing their own candidates, not that they have tried very often. Until Northern-born 
Phil Bredesen was elected in 1991, all mayors in the Metro era had been native 
Nashvill ians with East Nashville roots. 
5.3 The post-industrial local economy 
Nashville is often characterized as a commercial rather than industrial city. This 
perception is common as Nashville is not dominated by any large industry, and it is not a 
city with large industrial headquarters. Furthermore, Nashville's manufacturing sector is 
not based on steel and metals industry. Instead, some of its prominent 20th century 
manufacturers include: Genesco (shoes), DuPont (chemicals), Vultee (aircraft), May's 
(hosiery), Aladdin (thermos), and Werthan (packaging). As an industrial cluster, printing 
and publishing was probably the most important aspect of Nashville manufacturing. Most 
of these companies grew during the 1920s manufacturing boom, and some were 
established by northern management and capital bringing unionization and higher pay, 
which moved the city closer to the national norm. Before the post-industrial transition, a 
third of the Nashville workforce was employed in manufacturing, down to approximately 
one in ten today (Table 5.2). Instead, business services, health care, and retail have 
become major employers. The post-industrial shift is mirrored in most of Nashville's peer 
cities, as County Business Patterns data indicate. Louisville and Indianapolis have been 
the most manufacturing-oriented cities in the group for several decades, but even so, their 
employment in manufacturing is only 15-16 percent today. New Orleans has consistently 
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Table 5.2 Employment trends in Nashville-Davidson County 1966-1996. 
1966 1976 1986 1996 
Construction 8.2 7.0 7.2 5.1 
Manufacturing 33.0 23.8 17.0 11.0 
Printing & Publishing 4.5 3.9 3.7 2.8 
Transportation 5.7 7.6 6.1 7.3 
Wholesale 8.5 9.6 8.6 7.8 
Retail 16.7 18.6 18.8 20.5 
FIRE 7.9 7.9 9.0 7.3 
Insurance 3.6 2.6 2.0 1.8 
Banking 2. l 2.0 1. 7 1.9 
Services 19.2 25.0 31.8 40.5 
Business services 1.6 4.3 6.0 7.1 
Health care: hospital 2.3 3.7 4.9 6.4 
Health care: other 1.2 3.9 3.4 4.8 
Education: college 4.2 2. 7 2.3 3.0 
Education: non-college 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. County Business Patterns (various years). 
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been least dependent on manufacturing, while a couple of cities, Oklahoma City and 
Raleigh-Durham, are not distinctly less industrial than they were in the 1960s. 
Many of Nashville's old manufacturing companies still exist, even if their 
contribution to the local economy is modest. Instead, a new group of corporations has 
emerged since the 1980s. Bridgestone/Firestone, the world's largest manufacturer of 
tires, has its U.S. headquarters in Nashville, lured from Akron, Ohio in 1992. Nashville's 
central location with respect to other company operations-two Tennessee manufacturing 
plants-as well as a new airline hub were cited as reasons for Bridgestone/Firestone to 
choose Nashville. MagneTek, a Fortune 500 manufacturing corporation of electrical 
equipment, relocated its corporate headquarters to Nashville from Los Angeles (one of 
the few choosing a downtown location instead of a suburban "corporate campus"). Dell 
computers took advantage of a tax subsidy offered by Nashville and the state to establish 
a major manufacturing plant in Davidson County in the late 1990s. The automotive 
industry is important in the MSA with a Nissan plant in Smyrna, Saturn in Spring Hill, 
and truck manufacturer Peterbilt in Dickson. Several auto suppliers exist in and around 
Nashville. The recent trend has been that Davidson County is the leading job creator in 
the MSA, but several surrounding counties attract more new manufacturing industries 
than Nashville both in absolute and relative employment tenns. 
Traditionally, banking and insurance has occupied a powerful position locally, but 
the number of employees in those industries has diminished. The presence of locally 
owned banks, insurance companies and investment banking houses helped finance many 
growing local companies. The 1960s saw the birth of important companies, including 
Kentucky Fried Chicken, Service Merchandise, Shoney's, Ingram Books, and Hospital 
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Corporation of America (HCA), the largest private hospital management company in the 
world. As these companies matured (and in some cases declined or relocated) they 
contributed to Nashville's growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Especially the size and scope 
of HCA (about 200,000 employees worldwide in mid-l 990s) is unparalleled in 
Nashville's corporate history. HCA and Vanderbilt's medical school have been 
instrumental in the emergence of an important and innovative health care cluster in 
Nashville. More recently, money from venture capitalists Massey-Burch started 
Correction Corporation of America (CCA), another Nashville enterprise that, like HCA, 
is pursuing profits in an area previously controlled by non-profits or the government. 
Other large corporations of recent prominence include Dollar General Stores and Central 
Parking (the latter has gone international, like HCA and CCA, with 17,000 employees 
worldwide). The CEOs Cal Turner and Monroe Carell are leading corporate givers today, 
and Dollar General is developing a training center near a housing project in a black South 
Nashville neighborhood. 
One of the corporations that has benefited from ample financing opportunities in 
Nashville is Ingram Industries, a conglomerate with a traditional emphasis on wholesale 
book distribution. The Ingram Book Group division is the world's largest distributor of 
general interest books. If Ingram is secular in nature, most of the printing and publishing 
business in Nashville is not. Nashville can claim to be the "buckle of the Bible belt" as a 
center of religious publishing, including the world's leading Bible publisher Thomas 
Nelson Publishers (Longino, 1984), and the wide range of religious organizations 
headquartered in the city. LifeWay (formerly The Baptist Sunday School Board), the 
Gideons, and the United Methodists Publishing House offer a wide range of Christian 
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books and publishing material. Denominational headquarters include the United 
Methodists Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and Presbyterian Board of World 
Missions. Church-sponsored colleges, including the prestigious Vanderbilt Divinity 
School, and smaller colleges, including Belmont College, also contribute to Nashville's 
role as a religious center. The Chamber likes to portray Nashville as a strong university 
region with over 80,000 students. Their definition of the Nashville region is rather liberal 
though, and four-year universities within the MSA have a student body of approximately 
46,000. 
Today, the city is widely known for its music industry. The industry cannot 
readily be measured according to standardized classifications, but information from the 
Chamber tells us that the entertainment industry employs 25,000 people in Nashville, of 
which 5,500 are union musicians. The music industry is integrated into a music, 
entertainment, and tourism complex, which is a fundamental part of Nashville's 
economy. First and foremost is the Grand Ole Opry, which was developed by National 
Life as a vehicle for advertising (see Chapter 8). In 1983, National Life's entertainment 
properties were purchased by the Oklahoma-based Gaylord Entertainment, now a focal 
point in the music industry as well as in corporate Nashville. It is not directly involved in 
recording, but through ownership of the suburban Opryland complex (including shopping 
mall, hotel and conference center, and the Grand Ole Opry), The Nashville Network 
cable television, Country Music Television cable channel, it is the giant of the country 
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music-oriented tourist industry 15. It is the second largest employer in Nashville, behind 
Vanderbilt (Table 5.3). Gaylord Entertainment has added downtown investments such as 
the Wildhorse Saloon and has part ownership of the National Hockey League's Nashville 
Predators. 
The emergent mix of industries documented above started to affect Nashville's 
growth pattern in the early I 980s. Nashville employment growth shows a dramatic shift 
from the 1970s to the 1980s (Table 5.4). During the period I 976-1980 Nashville's growth 
ranked low in comparison to 60 other MSAs. Especially downtown had a hard time 
Table 5.3 Ten largest Nashville non-government employers in 1999. 
Employer 
1. Vanderbilt University and Medical Center•
2. Gaylord Entertainment*
3. Kroger
4. St Thomas Health Services*
5. BellSouth
6. First American Bank (now AmSouth)
7. Baptist Hospital*
8. The Aerostructures Corp. (formerly Vultce)*
9. Ingram Industries•
I 0. Bridgestone/Firestone**
Source: Nashville Business Journal ( 1999). 
Local employment 
10,417 
6,602 
5,199 
4,943 
3,203 
3, 12 l 
3,007 
2,875 
2,562 
2,538 
* Corporate headquarters in Nashville. ** U.S. headquarters in Nashville.
15 Gaylord Entertainment has n,--ccntly endured what can best he described as an identity crisis with 
frequent buying and selling of various assets. Several of the dominant corporations in the city also had 
problems of different kinds: HCA, mired in Medicare fraud allegations, had to negotiate a settlement with 
the U.S. justice department� Correction Corporation of America was less profitable than expected and 
charges of mismanagement also sutfaccd: and Bridge�1one/Firestonc suffered atler faulty tires caused 
several accidents. Overall, Nashville ·s fast-paced development of the 1990s has recently bt..--cn severely cut 
hack. 
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Table 5.4 Nashville's employment growth rank of the 60 largest U. S. metropolitan areas. 
Nashville MSA 
Nashville-Davidson Co. 
CBD 
Nashville-Davidson outside CBD 
Suburban counties 
1976-1980 rank 
45 
44 
55 
29 
29 
Adapted from Linneman and Summers (1993). 
1980-1986 rank 
6 
10 
5 
16 
8 
creating jobs and economic activity. The figures for the 1980-1986 period, which 
represent a new business cycle, show a stark contrast. Now, the CBD is the driving force 
of the local economy. Other areas of the metropolitan region are also performing well. 
For both time periods, however, jobs were suburbanizing in Nashville at a higher ratethan 
the national average (Linneman & Summers, 1993). This means that a common 
geographical urban pattern was developing in Nashville: strong downtown development, 
less dynamic picture for the rest of the central city, and booming suburbs. 
Economic success coupled with greater cultural acceptance of country music 
nationwide created a newfound confidence in Nashville. The city's optimism was 
boundless. Nashville even made a bid to host the 1996 Olympics (which was later 
awarded to Atlanta). With strong population and economic growth figures, Nashville was 
on the threshold of becoming a major city. But as some of the problems of growth 
became more apparent, a sense of urgency developed and it was assumed that decisions 
that are taken now would determine the future direction of the city. Its economic success 
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aside, Atlanta was considered the anti-model. Crime, traffic, and the obliteration of 
history were features of the feared Atlanta-style of development. In 1985, Bill Boner, 
then Nashville's representative in Congress, said: "over the next eight or 10 years you 
will see Nashville grow at a more rapid rate than it has ever grown, and that means we 
are at a crossroads of whether we are another Atlanta that winds up being another 
hodgepodge that has not been properly planned" (Paine, 1985, p. 21 ). In truth, Nashville 
never made any serious attempt at controlling sprawl beyond rhetoric during the 1980s, 
and only modest progress has been made since. The institutional capacity to address such 
issues is low. What has happened, though, is a thorough restructuring of governance to 
manage economic development. But before that could take place, there was Bill Boner. 
5.4 Bill Boner: A name rarely spoken out loud 
After 12 mostly successful years, Richard Fulton left the mayor's office in 1987. His 
successor Bill Boner was typical mayoral material-from humble East Nashville 
background and with a populist approach to politics. And like Fulton, Boner came from 
the U.S. House of Representatives to the mayor's office. Many of his aides also came 
with him from Washington. Boner's mayoral run was largely supported by the old 
business establishment, as he represented continuity and status quo within the local 
political system. His opponent, Phil Bredesen, was not only an outsider, but also 
independently wealthy, without any direct connection with the local establishment, and 
considered a "wild card," a potential disruption who might purse his own strategy 
independent of the existing political structures. One anonymous prominent Belle Meader 
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was quoted as saying: "we decided to vote for [Boner] because he would be easier to 
control than someone with money" (Rogers, 1990b, p. 50). 
Boner arrived as mayor with a questionable ethical reputation after his time in 
Congress. His four mayoral years came to be characterized by political impasse and 
tainted by personal controversy. In his defense, he came into the mayor's position exactly 
at the wrong moment; real estate hit crisis mode and the overall economy was shaky after 
Wall Street took a dive in October 1987, only months after Boner's electoral victory. The 
Metro government's finances-dependent on sales taxes and property taxes-were 
vulnerable to recessions and faced sudden problems in tax collection and budget 
balancing. The 1988-1989 budget saw a deficit of $4.3 million. The citizenry was upset 
as the necessary property tax increase was 89 cents, the largest in Metro history. It is also 
common practice for a mayor to engage in frivolous spending towards the end of the last 
term, so it did not help that Mayor Fulton's last budget was in part financed by a reserve 
fund (Rylan, 1989). Fulton also gave a significant pay increase to city employees phased 
in over three years, leaving his successor with the question how to finance most of it. If 
faulty revenue predictions 16 were not Boner's doing, his expansion of the public 
sector-the number of city employees increased 6.5 percent during Boner's first 
year-was probably timed poorly. 
At the same time, the nature of local politics started to change. The citizens 
became more emboldened and capable of asserting their views in local decision-making. 
16 The city's Board of Equalization oversees property tax assessments and negotiates with property owners 
who want to adjust property value. The board makes a projection about tax revenue and reports it to the 
budget committee. Especially in a time of economic decline, the hoard is under pressure to lower the 
assessed value, which was one cause of the fiscal deficit of 1988-1989. 
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The conflicts of growth that became obvious during the 1980s fragmented the council 
and city politics. Especially the antagonism among neighborhoods and development 
interests became more politicized than in the past, and the once obscure councilmanic 
courtesy was suddenly derided as the leading obstacle to proper growth control (Smith, 
1989, March 7). These conflicts thrived as Boner was unable to maintain control in the 
relatively open political system where the balance between the large council and the 
mayor is not automatically given. The city council's newly expressed preference for 
independent-mindedness meant that "the members are more interested ... in getting their 
way and having empires and little fiefdoms than it used to be" (Honick, 1990, p. 36). 
Political insiders noted that Boner was not as good as earlier mayors in dealing with the 
council and forging compromises with individuals or small groups of council members as 
necessary in the existing political system (Cate, 2001 ). As various political issues 
remained unsolved, most people grew restless with Boner and local politics. In a citizens 
survey, the Metro government's performance decreased from a 2.2 rating (on a four-point 
scale) in 1989 to 1.5 in 1990. The inability of the mayor and the city council to cooperate 
was frequently cited. Those who gave Mayor Boner a "poor" rating increased from 16. 7 
percent in 1988 to 37.5 percent in 1990 (Saponar, 1990, July 16). 
Boner had allies within the economic elite whose idea of governance was shaped 
by decades of political practice. But, eventually, the business community en masse came 
to perceive Boner as a liability. The concerns of business interests in Nashville are listed 
in Figure 5.3, which is based on a 1990 survey of more than 100 business leaders. In 
addition to local political leadership as the number one problem for the city, 50 percent 
also agreed that the lack of leadership extended into the business realm. As discussed in 
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1. Local political leadership
2. Banking environment*
3. General economic slump
4. Availability of qualified labor
5. Education
6. Environment**
7. Rising cost of doing business
8. Depressed real estate market
9. Need for better attitude and image for city
10. Growth planning/attracting business
Figure 5.3 Most pressing issues facing Nashville businesses in 1990. 
Source: Nashville Business and Lifestyles (1990a). 
* Including tight credit, high interest rates, instability and uncertainty, and difficult
relationships with banks. ** Mostly referring to a landfill issue, controversial at the time.
the next chapters, Nashville was experiencing a fundamental crisis of governance. Figure 
5 .3 is a good guide to the issues that converged at the time and produced a response from 
the business elite. 
Politics was not the only source of dissatisfaction with Boner. After tax increases, 
landfill problems, real estate crisis, and a national recession, Boner's approval ratings 
were already abysmal when the mayor's personal life became an all too public topic17 • 
When Bill Boner decided not to run for a second term, a collective sigh of relief could be 
heard from the business elite. The fact that the city was going to have a new mayor 
17 The following story has to be retold to understand the reaction that followed. Boner, who was still 
married to his third wife, announced his engagement to nightclub singer Traci Peel, who subsequently in an 
interview with the Banner discussed the couple's sex life in detail. The highlight was the October 16, 1990 
episode of the nationally syndicated Phil Donahue Show, where the couple debated Nashville media 
representatives. As a grand finale to the show, Boner accompanied Peel on the harmonica as she sang 
"Rocky Top." The Banner called for the mayor's resignation. The possibility of mayoral recall was raised 
but, as it turned out, constitutionally impossible. National media could not resist the story, which was 
dubbed a "Grand Ole Soap Opry" (Time, 1990, October 29). See Pinkston (2001) for an analysis of the 
events. 
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seemed more important than who it actually was. The radical break in style offered by 
health care CEO Phil Bredesen, who was elected over former councilwoman and 
neighborhood activist Betty Nixon, was viewed favorably, however. 
In interviews with several members of the business elite, five themes emerged in 
the assessment of the Boner period. First, Boner offered no leadership in a time period 
when the city needed it. He was a politician whose main goal was to be elected, but when 
in office, he could not clearly articulate a comprehensive political strategy. Boner had 
been socialized politically in an environment where the goal was to help people in a very 
direct manner, either by providing them with employment in the public sector or steering 
them through the city's bureaucracy. This political style was increasingly obsolete and 
resulted in a power vacuum on the public side of governance. Second, it led to discord 
and fragmentation in the city. A rise in political pluralism ( or divisiveness, depending on 
one's perspective) was not for the good of the city, at least in the minds of business 
interests. The cohesiveness of the community, as they see it, was crumbling. Different 
political agendas of business, various segments of local government, neighborhood 
activists, and the general public were voiced frequently in the public debate and de facto 
encouraged by Boner's lack of unifying leadership. He had even driven a wedge into the 
business community between Boner supporters and opponents. The general feeling of the 
direction of the city was one of malaise, which was in fact the word choice of more than 
one interviewee. Third, the Boner period still exerts a powerful influence on the 
Nashville self-perception. What was an embarrassment at the time has become an 
unfortunate episode, which yet had catalytic qualities to it. During the interviews I 
conducted, interviewees generally avoided saying the Boner name, as if speaking it could 
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be a curse, a jinx to the current success of Nashville and best avoided. He was instead 
referred to as "the mayor at the time," or even, "the not-so-good mayor," leaving the 
obvious deductive identification to the listener. Perhaps it reveals an uncertainty about 
the political maturity of Nashville and the fear that a new Boner could come along. In any 
case, it is the duty of the local elite to suppress anything that hints to an outsider that 
Nashville is a peculiar, tacky place that cannot be taken seriously, which is the essence of 
the fourth theme-image. In the competing notions of what Nashville ought to be, the 
Boner experience was a clash in the intersection of political culture and economic 
development: Boner "had his own style, his own way of doing things. It was not the 
optimum style for projecting Nashville to the world as a competitive business center" 
(Hunt, 2000). Finally, Boner had become an obstacle for the city and its economic 
progress. Sometimes the political friction during the period is translated as having a 
negative influence on Nashville's economic progress. Resources could not be pooled 
efficiently, and urban boosters could not overcome the impression of Nashville as a 
politically inept city when the imperative for local economic prosperity was public­
private cooperation. Therefore, not only Bill Boner, but also the politico-economic order 
that he represented, had to be discarded. The period became a break point; political praxis 
that bore strong semblance to classic urban machine politics was viewed as, if not 
entirely corrupt, inefficient and inappropriate for new times that demanded a new 
relationship between city government and local business. The city's elite was ready to 
open up culturally and embrace change; "the way we've always done it" is not 
necessarily best in a changing economy. Boner represents the political side of catalyst 
argument. I will continue next with the economic. 
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6. BUSINESS CYCLES AND THE URBAN REGIME
6.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to show how the economic downturn of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s created an impulse for economic and political changes in Nashville. First I 
will investigate the character of the recession and link national economic cycles with 
local urban change, both in Nash ville and other places. Second, I will examine the 
response of the elite to economic crisis. Particular attention is paid to the involvement of 
the elite in real estate, because the failed real estate economy of the 1980s was a product 
of overinvestment in the emerging infrastructure of the post-Fordist service economy, 
particularly office construction. I hypothesize that the entrepreneurial regime that 
developed in Nashville is a response to the real estate losses that reverberated through the 
Nashville economy in the post-1987 economic downturn. This suggests that Nashville 
needed a long-term growth strategy and to establish an institutional framework to guide it 
in the new economic environment, something that was not in place in the 1980s. 
The periodical nature of the economy is a distinct feature of capitalism. With 
some regularity, investme�t, profits and employment move in long cycles over several 
decades and in shorter cycles spanning only years-the business cycle. The U.S. 
economy expanded from 1983-1990 and then again from 1992-2000, the two latest 
business cycles (Figure 6.1 ). In general, a local business cycle will correspond to national 
trends, but sometimes significant differences between cities are detectable. Inter-urban 
divergences are largely dependent on the differences in the economic base, and economic 
forces specific to each industry. The time lag of the business cycle over space can be 
crucial for investment patterns in specific cities. 
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Figure 6.1 GDP growth(%) in the United States 1959-2001. Source: Economic Report of
the President (2003). 
The spatial configuration of cities is affected by the rhythm of economic activity. 
Some residential or commercial areas experience dramatic changes during a business 
cycle while others are left untouched. The business cycle not only changes the overall 
morphology of a city, but short-term business cycles can also have important implications 
for cities and their strategies of growth and change. Pierre ( 1998) argues that local 
partnerships between government and business keep a low profile during a recession, 
because their immediate concern is beyond the scope of local authorities. The economic 
pressures of a downturn can, on the other hand, provide the impetus for substantial 
changes in the political economy of the city. A poor performance of the city can convince 
the economic elite that "something has to be done." If problems are deemed at least 
partially local, strategies for renewed growth often are formed in these times of crisis. 
The institutional shape of local capitalism can take new forms as new coalitions and 
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organizations are born. In a recession, the economy becomes the overriding concern in 
the public discourse, and growth-promoting policies tend to dominate. If power relations 
in the city can take on new dynamics during such a time period, the economic elites have 
an extraordinary opportunity to shape policies to reflect their broad interests. 
One core element for understanding the local political economy is real estate, 
which is important for elite involvement in urban affairs. High levels of capital and 
personal mobility, both on an intra- and inter-city level, coupled with permissive land 
planning have made real estate a potent component of the U.S. economy and an integral 
part of the urban growth machine. The swings in the performance of the general economy 
are especially noticeable in real estate. However, investment in the physical infrastructure 
does not necessarily exhibit the same temporal pattern as the general economy. Building 
activity can continue after other economic activities decline due to the duration of the 
planning and completion of construction projects. Building can even be countercyclical if 
investment capital is redirected from other economic activities, or if government is 
engaged in Keynesian demand practices (Whitehand, 1987). Moreover, different building 
activities do not necessarily coincide; instead, the logical pattern of investment is first an 
increase in office construction as a response to economic growth, followed by a home­
building phase to serve new immigration, which in tum, spurs demand for expanded 
retail facilities. Nationally, real estate investment rose during the late 1960s and early 
1970s as investment in manufacturing declined following the decline of productivity and 
rate of return throughout Western industrial economies (Figure 6.2). A downswing in the 
manufacturing sector led to a search for other investment opportunities. Conversely, the 
service economy was rising, and demand for office space, both in downtown and 
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suburban locations, created an increase in property prices and new development (Short, 
1996). Real estate could absorb large amounts of capital, but with the industry's 
propensity for overproduction, the market was saturated by the mid-1970s. Empty office 
space became an increasingly common feature of the urban environment. 
As seen in Figure 6.2, different segments of the real estate industry have different 
characteristics. Residential development fluctuates dramatically, but the general trend is 
increasing. Industrial investment is more stable, but has a countercyclical tendency 
compared to economic growth, and exhibits a modest decreasing trend over time. Public 
investment is less predictable with a boost in the late 1990s. During the 1980s, capital 
flowed into the real estate business, not necessarily because of its inherent profitability, 
but rather for tax planning purposes. This is particularly noticeable in the commercial 
sector. The result was an oversupply of commercial real estate that was driven by two 
important public policy trends in the early 1980s: financial deregulation and supply-side 
tax reform. First, savings and loan institutions (S&L) were allowed to expand their 
activities from residential to commercial real estate. The S&L industry nationwide had 
easy access to capital and was overextended into these real estate markets at the time of 
recession and overbuilding, causing it to collapse under the weight of bad loans. The 
faltering oil economy took an especially heavy toll on the S&L industry in Texas (Warf 
& Cox, 1996), but the crisis was national and affected Nashville strongly as well. 
Geographical differences in economic growth resulted in the shuffling of investment 
capital from one region to another in search of a "spatial fix." Second, the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 made it possible to use real estate investments as a tax shelter. 
This was an incentive of the Reagan administration to direct investment into the post-
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industrial economy. The reversal of this taxation policy in 1986 suddenly pulled 
significant investment capital from the industry and halted new construction. However, 
an oversupply situation was already in effect and developers and their financiers suffered 
enormous losses. 
6.2 Experiences in other cities 
The immobile character of real estate is a factor that gives the industry a very special 
position in the fortune of cities. Some cities have experienced a trend towards non-local 
property ownership. While international ownership is rare in most mid-sized American 
cities, non-local owners-such as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs}-are 
increasingly important actors. Yet investment in real estate is often controlled locally, so 
changes also reflect the local power structure. Even if ownership lies with outsiders, local 
interests such as developers and banks are dependent on local real estate. But following 
this argument, one must avoid viewing the relationship between ownership, vested 
interest, and social action too directly and simplistically. The strategy is to create an 
attractive environment in the long run where impacts on property values take an indirect, 
albeit crucial, position. 
Then, what about real estate, business cycles and the elite? The forces of 
recessions on local governance have been noted by several scholars. Yet that connection 
has only been explored in a piecemeal fashion. I want, therefore, to focus attention on this 
connection and place it in a lager context of urban change. At the end of the current 
business cycle, it is appropriate to assess the durability of governance structures that were 
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born out of the previous recession. First, I will consider the connections that already have 
been established in earlier studies. 
To begin with, the real estate crisis was global, even if not ubiquitous and uniform 
in character. Development projects from London's Docklands to Nashville's Maryland 
Farms were mired in financial disaster, yet they remain important parts of the urban 
landscape today. These events amounted to nothing less than the biggest depression in 
building and real estate in the post-World War II era (Leitner & Garner, 1993). From 
interviewing developers, Feinstein (1994) comes to the conclusion that a "herd instinct" 
mentality exists in the industry. Not that developers were solely to blame. Other actors, 
such as the banks whose lending practices were far too liberal, also contributed to 
oversupply. Depending on local market differences and political cultures, some cities, 
such as San Francisco, could afford to restrict development, while most places were eager 
to assist, rather than hinder, the real estate boom. With high profit rates expected, readily 
available capital, a deregulated financial sector, and tax incentives, the ingredients for a 
real estate collapse were assembled. 
The effect on relationships between actors and interests on the local level is not 
necessarily the same across space. One outcome is disruption. In London and New York, 
the real estate cycle was causing "the break-up of established patterns of patronage� 
business and residential communities dissolved and cannot be reconstituted" (Feinstein, 
1994, p. 74). Even Atlanta, the archetype of stable urban regimes, experienced changes in 
the political landscape. Rutheiser ( 1997) found a breakdown in the coalition between 
black politicians and white businessmen during the time period. The city's growth 
machine "had been driven straight into the ground" (Ibid., p. 24). Another outcome is 
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continuity. New York's Mayor David Dinkins, elected in 1989 on a social reform agenda, 
was severely constrained by the economic decline to pursue a political program different 
than his more conservative predecessor Ed Koch (Sites, 1997). Leitner and Garner (1993) 
noted similarly that ''urban entrepreneurship and private partnership have engendered 
new institutional structures and staff competencies in local governments that will not be 
dismantled overnight," (p. 73) but viewed the real estate crisis as a possible starting point 
of more socially progressive local politics, because property-led booster politics had been 
discredited. From the early post-crisis perspective, Leitner and Garner point out that local 
and state governments are less eager to pursue real estate-led development and question 
the viability of urban entrepreneurial ism as the defining characteristic of urban politics. 
In hindsight, urban entrepreneurialism survived, and even thrived, throughout the 1990s. 
However, it has searched for new forms to replace the focus on real estate. The 
underlying logic of entrepreneurial ism has been too strong to be discarded. 
On an ideological level, Leo (1995) suggests that economic circumstances can 
alter the discourse in a city. Analyzing the earlier cycle around 1981-1983 in Edmonton, 
Leo concluded that the late 1970s interventionist tendencies of citizens' groups involved 
in the development process were halted after the cycle. A no-restrictions approach to 
development urged by most, but not all, local business interests found a receptive 
audience in a recession-weary general population. Leo also implies that this had long­
term effects as "in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Edmonton had lapsed into a 
traumatized response to the problem of dealing with developers" ( 1995, p. 295). 
DiGaetano (1997) more explicitly connects cycles and regimes by emphasizing 
the limits of Stone's regime theory, namely that it fails to explain why changes in 
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governing regimes take place. He suggests changes in economic restructuring and 
business cycles are factors with important explanatory powers. "The peaks and troughs of 
the business cycle ... influence local strategic decision-making. That is, expansionary and 
recessionary periods pose markedly different circumstances for the formulation of local 
governing strategies" (Ibid., p. 849). DiGeatano's Boston example conforms to Leo's 
findings in Edmonton several years earlier: a regime emphasizing social reform and 
growth management with restrictions on development was in place in Boston throughout 
most of the 1980s, but was replaced with a pro-growth agenda with local business elites 
playing a greater, but not necessarily dominating, political role. DiGaetano concludes that 
Boston in the 1990s became focused on strengthening its role as a regional capital 
through a private-public partnership model that resembles a coalition rather than a 
regime. 
A related study takes a regional perspective discussing state level politics in 
Massachusetts (Jonas, 1996a). The state's fiscal crisis precipitated a political struggle 
between two business organizations: the traditional industrial association and a new 
organization representing high-tech industries with a low-tax, laissez faire agenda. Jonas 
stresses more the antagonistic relationship between factions of capital that open up in a 
recession, rather than conflicts between business and labor/community interests. The 
outcome in Massachusetts was a victory for the traditional forces in the business 
community, who could present a more convincing development model to politicians and 
the electorate. 
In conclusion, these case studies have established a particular pattern: economic 
recessions place stress on urban regimes and coalition; they may force realignments of 
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interests and lead to new lasting policies and discourses. These case studies have, for the 
most part, only done so in passing and without placing these events in a broader 
framework. 
6.3 Nashville and the 1980s boom 
The building boom that lasted from 1982 to 1987 was a golden era for construction and 
real estate. The high level of building activity was fueled, as discussed earlier, by 
favorable legislation that promoted speculative real estate ventures. Nashville was as 
active as any city during this time period. The 3,200 building permits granted in the MSA 
for residential units in 1981 increased to over 18,000 in 1984. Home sales showed a 
similar pattern, growing from about 4,000 annually in the early 1980s to in excess of 
11,000 in 1986 (Nashville Bu.r,,·iness .Journal, 1992, July 27). Everything was selling, and 
at the highest prices ever. This trend created a new local power elite. Nelson Andrews, 
Ted Welch, Joe Rodgers, and R.C. Mathews were developers with not only local political 
clout, but several of them occupied high level positions nationally in the Republican 
Party. Nashville's construction boom drew real estate investors and contractors in search 
for a profitable location. Outside developers contributed to the high amount of 
construction during the period as Nashville outperformed other cities 18. Encouraged by 
high-profile industrial expansions in the auto industry and a new airport hub, speculative 
construction was prolonged. When some other cities appeared to suffer from a slowdown 
in construction activity, real estate capital continued to congregate in Nashville. Further, 
H< The level of non-local capital is hard to quantify. The Chamber, for example, could not estimate the ratio 
of local vs. outside developers (Avery, 1987). 
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the early decline of the markets in Houston and Dallas due to oil economy problems 
fueled the concentration of capital in Nashville (Carr, 1987). 
The investment activity in the built environment was geographically uneven. The 
airport area, especially after the hub announcement of American Airlines, was a hot spot 
for commercial and industrial real estate. The West End corridor connecting downtown 
Nashvil1e with affluent West Nashville experienced a radical transformation. Older 
apartment buildings and homes gave way to large new office buildings, and the area was 
beginning to be referred to Midtown Nashville, neither downtown nor suburban in 
character (Stribling, 1986). The Music Row area close to West End also changed 
dramatically as national and international investment penetrated the music business. 
Suburban settings like Brentwood also attracted real estate investors, but the urban 
changes in many ways transformed Nashville's atmosphere from a provincial, town-like 
feel to a denser, more urban place with significant business activities outside the limited 
downtown area. It also signified the growth of two important components of the local 
economy: the music industry at Music Row and the health care industry, which was a 
leading tenant and developer in the West End area close to Vanderbilt University and its 
medical center. Less successful was the Metro Center redevelopment project in 
predominantly African-American North Nashvi11e. Metro Center was conceived as a self­
contained "New Town" that began in 1972 as a partnership between R.C. Mathews, then 
president of the Chamber, and Victor Johnson of Aladdin Industries. The ambitious 
project failed to create significant spin-off developments and was scaled back to mostly 
commercial land-use. The prq_ject had problems related to its timing during the business 
cycle, but it also shows the geographically sensitive nature of development. Early signs 
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of a downtown revival could also be detected-expansions include the Southern Baptist 
Convention in 1985, and Life Way in 1990-but the real take-off would have to wait 
until the next round of investment in the 1990s. 
6.4 The collapse 
On peculiar effect of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was that tax depreciation 
on real estate investment proceeded at a much faster rate than true economic depreciation, 
which encouraged investment as loss deductions became more important than the actual 
feasibility of the project. In Nashville, two companies-Jacques Miller and Freeman 
Brothers-took advantage of this perverse logic and sold limited partnerships in real 
estate ventures ranging from apartment complexes and shopping centers to office 
buildings. A 1986 tax reform repealed the availability of tax credits for real estate losses, 
and construction plummeted to early 1980s levels. Without the tax shelter, the continuous 
oversupply of the real estate market was no longer shored up by an artificial economic 
rationale. With most real estate markets in the country facing deteriorating conditions, 
Nashville continued to attract some investment. Market participants were still optimistic 
in February 1987 despite the gloomy national outlook. As one pundit suggested: 
"Nashville is still one of the best markets in the country ... The building boom isn't over 
yet" (Avery, 1987, p. 38). 
Leading indicators, however, showed another picture. Building permits decreased 
sharply between 1985-1987, as did actual housing starts (Saponar, 1988, June 13� Lusky, 
1991). As it turned out, Nashville was not immune from the real estate woes affecting the 
rest of the country, but it was not until the "Black Monday" stock market crash of 
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October 1987 that the Nashville market came to a dead halt. According to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Nashville was the second worst commercial real estate 
market in the country at the time (Egerton et al., 2001). But even without the external 
shock of new legislation, the overbuilt market would probably have suffered in the 
coming lean years. The real estate crisis was geographically indiscriminant: large office 
parks both in city, the inner-city MetroCenter, and suburban locations (e.g. Brentwood's 
Maryland Farms) suffered equally. 
By 1987, economic reports in Nashville started to appear that presented a less 
than rosy picture of the local economy beyond real estate. Preliminary numbers from an 
economic forecasting center at Georgia State University showed a metropolitan area 
employment decline of more than 7,000 in 1987 (Saponar, 1988, June 13). Later 
revisions of data showed a small employment gain, but Nashville still lagged the nation 
and compared unfavorably with other Southern cities (LeDuc, 1989, April 10). The mood 
was negative and real changes were taking place. Much of the growth in metropolitan 
Nashville came from outside investment in the manufacturing industry, while the service 
industry was lagging (Oliver, 1989, December 25). Flat consumer spending curtailed 
expansion of the retail sector and also created a surplus in retail real estate (LeDuc, 1988, 
October 17). At this critical juncture, the Wall Street Journal published an article in 
which Nashville was described as a "boom and bust" city (Smith, 1989, March 7). The
Journal claimed that Nashville had hit hard times with "remarkable swiftness." Citing the 
Georgia State study, the root of the problem was the building bust that hit with a force 
"almost hard to believe." In the article, fingers were pointed at the behavior of the real 
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estate industry and the lack of growth control mechanisms in the councilmanic courtesy 
system. 
The article was not well received locally and still spoken about in harsh language 
among the business elite. It even precipitated a trip to New York by Irby Simpkins, local 
booster and owner of the Nashville Banner, and a meeting with the Wall Street Journal 
editor to inform him that "your story is wrong and you hurt our city" (Simpkins, 2000). 
The preliminary data that were used in the .Journal article were indeed revised later, and 
the decline of the local economy was not as sharp as first expected (Harper, 2001). "The 
Wall Street .Journal has 'tried to depict us as a boom town that couldn't control its 
growth, and as a bust town falling apart at the seams, and they were wrong both times,"' 
contended the economic researcher at the Chamber of Commerce (LeDuc, 1989, April 
10). 
But by then, the impression of a city in trouble was broadly circulated, and to 
make things worse, a front-page story in the Wall Street Journal the following year 
selected Nashville as the case study of a recession city (Wysocki, 1990, August 24). The 
article did not stir the blood of the business elite to the same extent perhaps, as Nashville 
was described as just "a microcosm of what is happening in many cities around the U.S." 
Nevertheless, the investment climate was described as weak, with lack of capital holding 
back all parts of the local economy. Especially the banks, the article continues, suffered a 
hangover after "excessive deal-making" which left the city over-supplied with offices, 
luxury homes, and apartments alike. Slipping local control over capital and corporations 
was noted as well, as a possible contributor to overbuilding. 
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For a short period of time, Nashville's economy performed poorly both in 
absolute and relative terms. A bank study showed that Nashville was the only 
metropolitan area in Tennessee that had a negative economic growth from the third 
quarter in 1987 to the third quarter of 1988 (LeDuc, 1989, January 30). By the first 
quarter of 1989 Nashville's economy was growing, but at a slower rate than the state's. 
During this time, Nashville's economic performance was not particularly favorable in 
comparison with out-of-state cities either. Nashville ranked 14th out of 15 regional cities 
in job growth (Coffey, 199C February 4). In 1990, Nashville had a net job loss of 1,000, 
while peer cities had positive job creation: Birmingham 3,200; Charlotte 7,400; 
Louisville 12,000; and Memphis 16,100 (Liles-Morris, 1991 a). Eventually, a broader 
stagnation led to a nationwide recession 19 in the last quarter of 1990 and the two first 
quarters of 1991. The recession was longer for Tennessee than for the nation, extending 
over a 12-month period (Nashville Business .Joumal, 1992, July 27). 
Even if, as I have argued previously, real estate was a dominant factor in the 
slump, several factors conspired at the same time. Insurance and health care experienced 
problems in the late 1980s that were not directly associated with the stagnant economy. 
The insurance industry had invested much of its profits in the real estate industry. The 
trend in the local high-tech economy took a five-year downward path after 1987 (Button 
et al., 1999). Even if one had not directly lost investment money, the crisis affected 
ordinary citizens. Residential real estate appreciation rates dropped from as high as 9 
percent annually in affiuent neighborhoods like Belle Meade to O percent in 1990 (Lusky, 
19 Commonly defined by the Nationa1 Bureau of Economic Analysis as an economic contraction in at least 
two consecutive quarters. 
123 
1991 ). With significant drops in interest rates, the real housing cost decreased. A cost of 
Jiving comparison weighted against all U.S. cities (Figure 6.3) shows how drastically 
Nashville was affected. A breakdown of the data components reveals that the drop from 
1990 to 1991 is mostly related to housing costs, which represents a significant loss of 
accumulated wealth. The most drastic change was in housing, from 107.7 to 93.1, and the 
provision of health care, from 90.1 to 73.8. Transportation cost, utilities, and household 
services declined at a much more modest rate. Nashville has retained a moderate cost of 
living throughout the 1990s despite high growth. The city is currently ranked six out of 
nine in the peer city pool, which may be a reflection of sprawling development that limits 
excessive real estate appreciation. 
More than anything, the real estate crisis affected the financial industry. The local 
S&L industry more or less disappeared. The dominant institution, the Metropolitan 
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Figure 6.3 Cost of living index for Nashville. Measured at the first quarter every year for 
mid-management standard of living. The composite index is weighted against all US 
urban areas. Source: Accra Cost of Living Index (1981-1999). 
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Federal Savings and Loan, a partner with Freeman on many real estate projects, was 
declared insolvent and taken over by the federal government in 1991; its assets auctioned 
off to outside owners. Real estate loans threatened to undermine the health of Nashville 
banks like nothing experienced since the Great Depression. The largest locally owned 
institution, First American National Bank, was dragged down by bad loans to the extent 
that losses reached a record $68 million in 1990. The financial institutions' credit losses 
halted their ability to lend money and underwrite new projects, which impacted local 
growth. Before the effects of deregulation dispersed ownership (see Chapter 7), the local 
dependency between financing, developers, and other agents of urban growth was strong. 
And, as any banker knows, "if the institutions you serve have trouble, you have trouble." 
In fact, the values declined between 20 to 50 percent for companies in the construction 
industry and at least 10 percent for other industries (Oliver, 1990, September 17). 
Foreclosure-related transactions became the second biggest real estate category in 1990 
(Saponar et al., 1990, August 27). Tennessee led the nation in personal bankruptcies, and 
real estate auctions increased 10 to 40 percent (Nashville Business and l{festyle, 1990b). 
Nashville became a buyer's market without any buyers. 
The question is then: did Nashville's economy behave differently than other 
cities? Conventional wisdom suggests that a diversified economy, such as Nashville's, 
will insulate a city against economic fluctuations. The Chamber of Commerce claims that 
Nashville has a tendency to outperform the nation in hard times. The preferred belief was 
that Nashville's economy is '"recession-proof;" if you have never been a boom town, you 
are insulated from a bust. Empirical data cannot support that hypothesis. In fact, the 
Nashville economy was unusually unstable from 1970 to 1986 and fluctuated to a higher 
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degree than the overall U.S. economy (Whaley, 1989). Since 1986, Nashville has seen a 
real estate crisis, a short economic depression and very high growth rates in the mid-
1990s, so a high degree of fluctuation can be presumed also after 1986. This is certainly 
true in comparison with other Tennessee cities (for which long-ranging economic cycle 
comparisons are more readily available than for the selected peer city group). Compared 
to Memphis, Knoxville, Chattanooga and the Tri-Cities, there is a more drastic swing 
pattern in Nashville during the 1980s with fast growth during an early period and rapid 
decline in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, Nashville's growth is more similar to the rest of 
the state, but nevertheless the strongest performer (Table 6.1-and Figure 6.4). Preliminary 
data also suggest that Nashville's economic development in the current recession has 
been weaker than other Tennessee cities', again confirming the strong cyclic tendency in 
Nashville. 
Table 6.1 Economic performance index of Nashvil]e and other Tennessee MSAs 1992 
2000. (Index: 1992=100.) 
Tennessee MSA 
Nashville 
Memphis 
Chattanooga 
Knoxville 
Tri-Cities 
Index 
126.5 
121.5 
119.2 
117.7 
117.4 
Source: Center for Business and Economic Research (2001 ). 
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Figure 6.4 The Nashville business cycle 1981-2000 (Index: 1985 = 100). Source: Center 
for Business and Economic Research (2001)2°. Used by permission. 
6.5 The elite responds 
The period of rapid growth and decline just described is crucial from a governance 
perspective. Actions taken by the city's elite are based on the recent experiences 
generated by the fluctuations of the general economy and real estate values. The context 
is that after many successful years in the 1980s, Nashville suffered from slow growth and 
overbuilding. Nash ville also felt unfairly treated by national press and the boom and bust 
reputation that was portrayed in national newspapers. Even if the truth lies somewhere in 
between-the city was, and is not, as vulnerable to the problems of high tech and defense 
as California or oil in Texas-Nashville still suffered from cyclical swings. The success 
myth of Nashville claimed that the city would outperform other areas during a recession 
20 Two separate local economic indices exist. The Chamber of Commerce's researcher values the MTSU 
index of local business cycles higher than the one from University of Tennessee (Harper, 2001). However, 
the UT index is temporally more extensive, which makes it more useful. It must be noted though, that 
leading indices, predictive in character, must be used with some caution. Moreover, the accuracy of local 
indicators is often imprecise. 
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and that cycles are less pronounced in Nashville than elsewhere. When that was not the 
case for the post-1987 real estate slump and the 1990-1991 recession, the business elite 
was confounded and feelings of uncertainty colored the local decision-making process. 
The recession affected a broad range of people. In the mid-1980s, the New York-based 
financial company Equitable (formerly Nashville-based) was the largest private holder of 
real estate assets in Nashville (Hrickiewicz, 1985), but real estate investment had 
attracted money from affluent people all over the city. High-end retailers such as Porsche 
dealers, art galleries, and horse traders had seen a significant decline in business, while 
high-profile (and high-cost) society galas were less well-attended than in the past (Liles­
Morris, 1991 b). The elite's pride from the Roaring 20s, the Nashville Symphony, 
declared bankruptcy. It did not reflect well on Nashville when inquiring outside capital 
had to be told that a leading quality of life indicator had found itself in bankruptcy court. 
It took a targeted effort from the dealmakers of highest prominence-notably Martha 
Ingram, Danny Bottorff and Phil Bredesen-to bring the symphony back; a symbolic 
turnaround for Nashville's economic competitiveness. 
With a full-blown recession underway, business leaders were thinking about 
intensifying the city's recruitment efforts. As a real estate-led development path was 
obviously out of the question (Arnett, 1989), a broader development agenda had to be 
conceived, which paved the way for a new economic development 
organization-Partnership 2000 ( see Chapter 7). The imperative was experienced down 
to the individual level. Jacques Miller and Freeman Brothers, who syndicated deals and 
sold real estate equity, went bankrupt within a year after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
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These syndicates drew their investments heavily from local affluent individuals 
(Wysocki, 1990, August 24). A local attorney says: 
"they left hundreds of people in this community with what they thought was a lot 
of wealth, but it all disappeared. It was paper wealth. I represented a lot of people 
and I knew what their stakes were, because I saw their estate planning. One day 
they thought they had $600,000 to $700,000 wealth in these partnerships and the 
next day it was zero. When you multiply that with hundreds of people, the 
leadership in the community, what you found was a very gloomy attitude that 
came to pass here. I remember very sane people remarking back in 1990 that 
given the real estate bust that had occurred, it would take us I 0-15 years to dig out 
of this. We've got to start somewhere, with this [Partnership 2000] initiative" 
(Sherrard. 2000). 
As explored further in Chapter 7, Nashville experienced a dramatic reorganization 
in the local power structure, for which the real estate crisis and economic downturn were 
catalysts. The most indicative example was the transformation of the Chamber of 
Commerce and the establishment of Partnership 2000. From the perspective beyond the 
inner circle of decision-makers, Partnership 2000 was founded because of the real estate 
boom and bust. The architects behind Partnership 2000 agree that the connection was 
indirect. It was not their expressed intent to immediately counter the economic downturn 
and the real estate losses. However, the process that shaped the institutional outcome was 
situated in a time of crisis. At first. the elite was mostly at a loss for how to proceed. As 
one Chamber staffer put it: "a lot of 1989 was spent scratching our collective heads on 
what we wanted to do and how to do it" (Harris, 2000). A clear emotional sense emerged 
from the interviews I conducted with community leaders that captures the "mood" of the 
city. Financial losses were intertwined with a perception of civic disarray. "There was a 
lot of wealth that had been created in this community; there was a lot of collateral in the 
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banks that was wrapped around the real estate industry. No doubt that it contributed to 
this malaise and a sense of depression that existed about the city" (Simpkins, 2000). This 
sentiment is echoed by other observers. The political and economic problems 
accumulating in Nashville "created a period of malaise in the community. It was a time 
when Nashvillians didn't feel very good about themselves. It was all about these larger 
forces and our image projected to the world" (Hunt, 2000). Reorganizing the Chamber's 
economic development strategy was a necessary but time-consuming response to two 
outside pressures: the real estate-led economic crisis and the image-projection of Mayor 
Boner. As Hunt (2000) puts it, Partnership 2000 emerged out of the ashes of the late 
1980s. 
A large segment of the business community had grown fat on real estate, but 
speculative wealth creation was, at least temporarily, frowned upon. What the initiative­
takers found was a climate where it was surprisingly easy to convince people to commit 
and invest in an effort that philosophically broke with the laissez-faire approach to 
economic development that had reigned previously (Rechter, 2000). The shift taking 
place was made possible by the conditions that existed. The crisis was deep, as it placed 
the local financial institutions at risk, the very core of the Nashville elite for most of the 
20th century. While the banks were not in an undisputed leadership position any longer, 
they were eager followers and participants in the process. The advocates of a new 
partnership organization were aggressive, going outside established channels, and 
creating another model for how economic development should proceed. 
The economy itself rebounded relatively quickly. In 1991, the Nashville Business
.Journal could report that "vulture funds" interested in picking up bargain real estate were 
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appearing, a sign that better times are approaching (Campbell, 1991, February 25). 
Capital-strong firms with, for example pension fund money, could buy at a favorable 
price. Real estate people estimated that the value of investment property was 85 percent 
of the value just one year earlier (Ibid.). By the end of 1991, Nashville's economy was 
again growing faster than most cities, albeit with a much more conservative capital 
market. But even if the Nashville market rebounded very quickly, it took several years for 
the market to absorb the overbuilt market. Most of the banks had not fully recovered the 
real estate losses until 1995. In the West End market, it took virtually no construction for 
five years for vacancy rates to drop from 21 percent in 1989 to 2 percent in 1994 
(Mooradian, 1995, April 24). Real estate memory is short though; Subarea 10, which 
includes West End, has been the dominant sector for new office construction in the late 
1990s (Metropolitan Planning Commission, 2000). By 1995, even MetroCenter was 
successful as measured by low vacancy rates, down significantly from the problematic 
years, which lingered as late as 1993. 
The downtown office market still struggles somewhat as new expanding business 
is not necessarily located downtown. With fewer headquarters, the auxiliary services­
lawyers, business services-are less needed. Indicative is American General's move from 
downtown to its new suburban Brentwood headquarters in 1996. When American 
General sold its building to the state, downtown Nashville was without a major insurance 
corporation for the first time in a century. The South Central Bell tower and the 1998 
building hosting Chamber of Commerce and MagneTek are the exceptions as major 
additions to the corporate skyline of the 1990s, but even with those additions, downtown 
only made up 2 percent of all new office space in Nashville 1990-1999 (Metropolitan 
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Planning Commission, 2000). Instead, residential and entertainment real estate is doing 
well downtown even if country music tourism has declined recently. 
Nashville's current real estate market differs from the past with REITs pushing 
Nashville's growth trend. Property cycles are also increasingly dependent on the global 
economy in addition to domestic and local economic conditions (Dehesh & Pugh, 2000). 
Fast real estate growth in Nashville occurred well into the late 1990s. Construction starts 
in 1997 were back to the level ten years earlier, but slowing tourism and employment 
growth after 1998 indicated overbuilding yet again, although not nearly as severe as in 
the earlier cycle (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1999). While REITs can 
weather an economic slump, Wall Street pressure for short-term profits may again lead to 
overbuilding. However, local effects will not be the same as during the late 1980s when 
the elite were severely impacted financially, both on an individual and a corporate level. 
Moreover, the end of the 1980s business cycle was unique as it was one of the factors that 
helped transform the very basic relationship between the political and economic spheres 
in Nashville beyond the point of no return. 
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7. ''TEN PEOPLE CAN'T RULE THIS CITY ANYMORE:" NASHVILLE'S
CHANGING BUSINESS ELITE 
Most of the 1980s was a time of unprecedented growth for Nashville. Even if some of the 
manufacturing companies with a longstanding association with Nashville were 
successively on the way out, branch plants of national corporations moved into the area. 
Changes started to take place in the traditional financial sector along with a growth of a 
diverse group of companies in the emerging service economy as discussed previously in 
Chapter 5. Overall, these changes had a positive impact on the regional economy. Based 
on population, Nashville was moving up the urban hierarchy. However, this success was 
not immediately accompanied by corresponding institutional change. In local political 
terms, the existing urban regime arrangement was disintegrating, but no clear alternative 
was yet emerging. Similarly from a regulationist perspective, no local mode of regulation 
could effectively spell out the nature of the relationship between business and local 
government, and between Nashville and the outside world. Then came the crisis events 
that acted as catalysts for change as described in the preceding chapters-the "Boner 
factor" and the business cycle. As I will explore in this chapter, both the political and the 
economic spheres experienced internal changes, as did the relationship between them 
(section 7.1 ). The business elite abandoned a parochial model in favor of an 
entrepreneurial one that was viewed as more conducive to sustained and focused growth. 
This rethinking was part of a cultural trend precipitated by demographic changes in 
Nashville (and the South), as well as economic restructuring and policy changes like 
deregulation (section 7.2). Reforms of the city's Chamber of Commerce (section 7.3) and 
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the efforts to create a new economic development organization-Partnership 200(}-­
merit special attention (section 7.4). 
7.1 The old "backroom" system 
As iJlustrated in Chapter 5, NashvilJe politics have osciHated between the two poles of 
good government progressivism and machine-like arrangements, although not necessarily 
during clearly identifiable periods or with specific individuals or interest groups. In this 
section, I will provide a more detailed account of these structures and individuals, which 
will clarify the relationship between business and government and lead into the regime 
changes that occurred circa 1990. 
For approximately two decades during the 1940s and 1950s, a behind-the-scenes 
machine existed until the coming of Metro government. The machine was Jed by Garner 
Robinson, an undertaker, and later Sheriff, from the Old Hickory neighborhood in East 
Nashvi1Je21• Local government was used for persona) power and helping friends and 
family with jobs and favors. The ability to hire and fire city employees and control over 
the court and election system were the fundamental sources of power. This could be 
achieved by the maneuvering of two individuals with strategic positions in local 
government-Elkin Garfinkle (county court supervisor and chairman of the local 
Democratic executive committee) and Jake Sheridan (city councilman and public works 
commissioner). To accumulate favors that could be returned on election day was the task 
21 Robinson was elected sheriff in 1945 in a close election that hinged on the J lopcwell precinct in East 
Nashville. The ballot box was deliwrcd late to the election commission after all other votes in the city had 
been counted. and although the number of votes exceeded citizens in the precinct, the machine-controlled 
election hoard accepted the result (Squires, 1996). 
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of the machine's foot soldiers, the local police officers, who frequently rounded up voters 
and took them to the polls. For the machine, any vote that they could manipulate was 
important. For that reason, rather than a concern for social equity, political rights for 
Nashville's black population were not actively resisted by the machine. Alliances of 
some sort between white East Nashville politicians and the black community has been 
common since. The machine helped Ben West win the mayoral election in 1951 (in 
another late ballot box election) who, as a progressive, had an ambivalent relationship 
with the machine. 
The unification of city-county government was heralded nationally as a model of 
progressivism, yet a system of patronage and informal power arrangements continued to 
exist. The three-term mayor of early Metro, Beverly Briley, had a chief supporter in H.E. 
Flippin, the owner of a hardware store in South Nashville. Flippin was the mayor's fund­
raiser and the major source of patronage. As a way to disassociate inappropriate direct 
patronage from the mayor's office, citizens and government rank-and-file were directed 
to Flippin for favors. Then Vice-Mayor George Cate says: "Any given Monday morning, 
you would see more Metro employees out there by Clark Hardware to see Mr. Flippin 
than in the mayor's office. If Flippin supported you, you had a good chance of promotion 
in the police department or public works. I think he just enjoyed the power'' (Cate, 2001 ). 
Essentially, H.E. Flippen did for Briley what Sheridan did for West and was supported in 
his position as informal political operative by the Tennessean editor Silliman Evans, an 
old Robinson-machine foe (Squires, 1996). The conclusion here is that mayoral 
administrations, or newspapers with a strong good-government profile, all operated 
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within the same political system that transcended their philosophical convictions on how 
urban politics ought to be run. 
When Briley finished his 12 years in the mayor's office, Flippin offered his own 
fund-raising capacities and network of support to Cate or David Scobey, also a fonner 
vice mayor, two likely mayoral candidates. However, both chose not to run� instead 
another strong candidate emerged, U.S. Congressman Richard Fulton. Arriving from 
Washington, Fulton was less dependent on the archaic form of power division that 
existed between Briley and Flippin. As discussed in Chapter 5, a significant share of the 
city's budget came from federal sources by the time Fulton ran for Nashville mayor. This 
put Fulton in a very favorable position, as his power disseminated in part from his ability 
to use connections in Washington to the advantage of the city. The Nashville Chamber of 
Commerce, naturaHy aware of the existing relations between federal and local 
government, endorsed Fulton's return as mayor of NashviJJe, even if his pro-business 
credentials were somewhat weak. When federal contributions diminished during the 
Reagan years, the city and its economic development efforts were affected. Fulton had to 
resort to tax increases on three different occasions, although by any standard, Nashville's 
taxes remained very low. Regardless of whether Flippin offered any support to Fulton, 
the hardware storeowner clearly did not wield the same kind of influence after Fulton 
became mayor (Cate, 2001 ). 
Fate Thomas, Davidson County sheriff from 1972-1990, replaced Flippin as the 
informal powerbroker. He was allied with most people within the local Democratic 
political establishment, including Mayor Fulton, who was supported by the political 
establishment and was also accused of being a machine candidate from time to time. 
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From the sherifrs office, which under the Metro charter was nominally a position with 
little political power, Thomas revived an old-fashioned political machine based on loyalty 
and favors. "Fate was a master politician. His advice and counsel was sought by 
everybody who aspired to a life in the public sector" (Eddie Jones, quoted in Loggins, 
2000, July 26). He provided services and government access to his constituents, mainly 
working-class East Nashville, but also the city's black community. They reciprocated 
with loyalty to him and candidates he endorsed. Thomas' blessing was a significant 
advantage for any aspiring politician (Cate, 2001 ). Fate Thomas was the chief political 
navigator for Bill Boner in the 1987 mayoral race. and Boner carried enough of the 
traditional machine precincts to win the election (Pinkston, 2001). Thomas' reign ended 
in 1990 when he resigned and pleaded guilty to various charges of fraud and corruption. 
Despite his conviction and prison sentence, Thomas inspired loyalty in powerful friends 
such as Ned McWherter, Lamar Alexander, John Siegenthaler, Richard Fulton, and Bob 
Clement. At Thomas' recent funeral, Richard Fulton called him "the last of his kind" 
(Loggins, 2000, July 26). Indeed, the kind of personal, machine-politics power he 
wielded has not existed in Nashville since Boner's victory, and old-style politics became 
extinct in Nashville (Pinkston, 2001). By 1993, the Nashville machine was only "a 
collection of rusty parts bound by genealogy. None of the elected officers can get along 
with each other long enough to formally run a person for office, or steal money, or do 
whatever it is that machines do" (Dobie, 1993, March 28). 
In the 1970s, Fulton also had the blessing of another source of local power, a 
group of corporate leaders known as the Watauga Group, which first introduced Fulton to 
the idea of seeking the mayor's position at an informal gathering at the Belle Meade 
137 
mansion of National Life's Bill Weaver. The group was not pleased with the prospective 
candidates to replace Briley and had to seek out a qualified, electable candidate to offer 
their substantial influence and resources (Dobie, 2002, May 5). Watauga was a highly 
informal organization that played an important role in Nashville politics from the 1960s 
to its waning days in the early 1980s. Named after a self-governance charter in early 
Tennessee history, the Watauga Group consisted of a handful of businessmen that met to 
discuss the problems and goals of the city. The goal was high-minded: selfless 
improvement of the community, as seen through the eyes of corporate leaders. The 
meetings took place once a month and protocols were, of course, rarely recorded. Even 
the name was elusive at first, but Watauga was the label that stuck (Dobie, 1990a). 
Assessments on the individual composition of the group and its role in Nashville society 
are somewhat inconsistent, reflecting the informal and fluid nature of the group. 
Nevertheless, a handful of individuals representing some of the dominant corporations in 
Nashville can be identified as the original core group. Seven people "whose mandate 
came not from the voters on the election day but from the boardrooms and executive 
suites of Nashville's largest corporations" (Honick, 1990, p. 36) constituted the center of 
the group22 . They were mostly executives of the locally owned banks and insurance 
companies. With a few individuals from manufacturing companies commonly mentioned 
as members, the core group can possibly be extended to about ten people, and total 
membership was about 15 to 20 individuals. 
22 To he specific, these individuals were Bill Weaver (National Life), Sam Fleming (Third National), Bill 
Earthman (Commerce Union), David K. Wilson (Cherokee Equity/First American), Alan Steele (Life and 
Casualty), Andrew Benedict (First American), and Guilford Dudley (Life and Casualty). 
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The influence of the Watauga Group was generally considered strong enough to 
be called a "shadow government" (Rogers, 1990b) or a "phantom Chamber of 
Commerce" (Nelson, 200 I). The existence of Watauga was not known to the public; it 
was not customary that members talked about their involvement, nor was it discussed in 
the media. It is quite possible that the name Watauga was not mentioned in the press until 
after the group's demise, and was not subject to more comprehensive coverage until a 
2002 article in the Nashville Scene (Dobie, 2002, May 5) when the group's activities 
could be considered history and therefore unindictable. The implicit claims of power 
might be exaggerated in the sense that decisions were never taken directly on behalf of 
the group. It is unclear to what extent power can be attributed to Watuaga as an entity of 
its own or simply as the sum of individual membership. According to Ben Rechter 
(2000), a member during the later stages, "people who weren't there didn't understand 
what it was," alluding to the group's mythological capacity of direct control; instead he 
describes it as a "forum to develop thoughts and ideas." Local problems were discussed, 
evaluated, and various ideas were floated. Jack Massey, a leading Nashville investor, 
concurs that Watauga meetings involved a lot of talking, but produced few results 
(Dobie, 1990a). The nature of the organization prevented any direct collective action, but 
it was a place where positions of various interests were evaluated and general attitudes 
toward the development of the city molded. Based on this socialization process of 
attitudes on the top elite level, individuals then pursued implementation on their own or 
together in smaller groups. Many significant local developments and institutions can be 
traced back to Watauga: 
• Without Watauga Richard Fulton would probably never have been mayor.
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• An effort was made to create other, more formal, leadership forums that would
promote civic engagement and forge alliances beyond the small group of leaders
representing financial power. Leadership Nashville, which the Watauga Group
initiated, was an early and successful example of a non-profit organization with the
goals of educating business leadership on civic issues and socializing relative
newcomers into the city.
• A second initiative was the Davidson Group, an attempt at improving race relations.
Leaders from the white business elite were paired with leaders from the African­
American community to develop individual relationships. The initiative had some
success, but some people also had a hard time making meaningful personal
connections (Simpkins, 2000).
• During its early stage, Watauga discussed the implementation and development of
Metro government, even if its power to control such a large issue was limited.
• One major public downtown building, the Tennessee Performing Arts Center, was
proposed by three Watauga members-Wilson, Ingram, and Massey-to the
governor, and after raising $4 million in the business community, the center was built
with additional public money (Dobie, 1990a).
• Although many of the businessmen involved represented traditional and conservative
values, changing the legal framework of alcohol became part of a modernization
process� it was an effort to move the South closer to national norms and make it more
attractive to investment, and in a larger sense, take part in national economic
integration. The Watauga Group represented businesses that favored the idea, and one
person (Eddie Jones) who was "a good salesman" (Nelson, 2001 ), successfully
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argued publicly for a referendum on the liquor-by-the-drink issue. In 1967, the 
Tennessee legislature allowed it, and the question passed in a Nashville referendum 
with 56 percent of the vote. 
• The Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority was largely a creation of one man,
Watauga member John Tune (see Chapter 9).
• Perhaps the last accomplishment of the Watauga Group was the Adopt-a-School
Program, which later became the Pencil Foundation (see Chapter 10). According to
banker Ed Nelson, also a Watauga member, this initiative caused the group to
disintegrate. Watuga did not traditionally give money as a collective entity. However,
in 1982 Bronson Ingram, the Watauga strongman at the time who had a reputation as
a behind-the-scenes oligarch who avoided the public eye, was approached by two
outside individuals-two women with civic involvement experience from the Girl
Scouts, Junior League, and League of Women Voters-regarding financing for the
Adopt-a-School idea. Ingram then decided to coordinate a fund-raising effort within
the Watauga Group.
"We [Ingram and Nelson] got together and looked at the list and we put down 
assessments for everybody on the list. If it was an individual, a lawyer or some 
revered person that had retired, it was a $500 or a $1,000 assessment. Then we 
would go to the institutions. The four majors had to give $10,000. We raised 
about $80,000 to start Project Pencil and hire somebody to run it and to support 
staff. It was about the last time Watauga met." (Nelson, 2001 ). 
The group simply quit having meetings, says Jack Massey, not attributing a 
specific cause to the demise (Dobie, 1990a). Non-members also recall that the group 
ceased to exist in the early 1980s and that the Chamber of Commerce subsequently 
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became more actively, and openly, involved. Whether or not the breach of the unspoken 
rules precipitated the decline, there are other fundamental and important changes that 
made the Watauga Group disappear as a powetful local institution. The Watauga 
chairman at the time, Victor Johnson of Aladdin Industries, stopped calling meetings, as 
the prevailing notion within the group was that it had outlived its purpose in an 
increasingly diverse and pluralistic Nashville (Dobie, 2002, May 5). This is also 
illuminated by the words of Keel Hunt, a person with ties to both political and business 
interests in Nashville: 
"The Watauga Group was an important institution, probably without ever 
intending to be, in a way that is not appropriate today. At that time, the members 
of the Watauga Group simply helped to organize the community's response to 
various needs and opportunities. It was a very different period of time when the 
culture was different than it is today. There was certainly less diversity in the 
community. It was commonplace to have major civic decisions and influences 
generated by the members of the white male ruling power structure. They didn't 
make decisions for the city, but certainly had access to city government decision­
makers and they had their respect and esteem, and all of that tended to work. The 
Watauga Group was a small, rather informal group of people who would meet 
from time to time and talk about needs and opportunities and some very important 
things came out of that. People who were then members of the Watauga Group 
are still active in the Nashville community one way or the other. Many are friends 
of mine� I respect what they did. I think they themselves would tell you that it 
couldn't operate in the same way today. It was a perfect case of operating in the 
reality of your community at a given time in history. So I think it was a very 
positive force, but it was then important for that to change" (Hunt, 2000). 
The Watauga Group was not the only local institution that brought together the 
leaders of the business establishment. In its own myth, Nashville is a city that thrives on 
tradition and is a center of"old money." Nashvillians have at least in the past referred to 
the city as having the most churches per capita, and a neighborhood (Belle Meade) that 
has one of the highest concentrations of wealth in the nation. (These assertions are, 
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however, without quantification.) The old elite were residents of the Belle Meade 
neighborhood, and more importantly, members of the Belle Meade Country Club. Like 
other similar clubs, it is highly exclusive, intensely private and publicity shy. It is also a 
social institution that tends to change more slowly than society around it, and therefore 
susceptible to occasional criticism, or even, these days, ridicule. The club accepted its 
first Jewish member in 1991 and its first black member in 1994. 
It is readily acknowledged that there is an overlap between the most prominent 
members of the Belle Meade Country Club and the Vanderbilt Board of Trust, which has 
always been a highly prestigious institution. Membership signifies importance, influence 
and respect among the local elite. Belle Meade Country Club is of course a private entity 
that will not disclose its membership list, but Vanderbilt Board of Trust is publicly 
accessible (Figure 7 .1 ). The list is a good representation of the old elite, as Vanderbilt, 
along with the Belle Meade Country Club, is a local institution not prone to rapid change. 
The chairperson's position is currently occupied by Martha Ingram, business leader and 
CEO of conglomerate empire Ingram Industries. When elected in 1999, she was the latest 
in a line of Ingram family members on the board. Her late husband, Bronson Ingram, was 
the chair from 1991 to his death in 1995, and before that, his father Orrin Henry Ingram 
was on the board in the 1950s and 1960s. Martha Ingram has,_ for a long time, also been a 
leading force behind many local charitable and civic organizations. 
Sometimes the notion that Vanderbilt University is aloof and not rooted in the 
local community is put forth, fueled by the fact that the school's student body is largely 
non-local. The University has always had strong connections on the national level, 
receiving money from major foundations. The perception of indifference to local issues 
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Martha Ingram, Chairman, Ingram Industries, Nashville, TN 
Dennis C. Bottorff, Vice-Chainnan, First American Bank, Nashville, TN 
Kenneth L. Roberts, Secretary, First American Bank, Nashville, TN 
Nelson C. Andrews• 
Brookside Properties 
Nashville, TN 
Thomas F. Cone 
Cone Oil Co. 
Nashville, TN 
Irwin B. Eskind, MD• 
Hospital Affiliates lnt'l 
Nashville, TN 
H. Rodes Hart
Franklin Industries
Brentwood, TN
Edward G. Nelson 
Commerce Union Bank 
Nashville, TN 
Charles C. Trabue, Jr.• t 
Life and Casualty 
Nashville, TN 
Dudley Brown White 
Civic leader 
Nashville, TN 
Andrew B. Benedict, Jr.• 
First American Bank 
Nashville, TN 
Miriam McGaw Cowden• 
Civic leader 
Nashville, TN 
Guilford Dudley, Jr.• t 
Life and Casualty 
Nashville, TN 
Monroe J. Caren, Jr. 
Central Parking 
Nashville, TN 
Brownlee 0. Currey, Jr. 
Equitable Securities 
Franklin, TN 
L. Hall Hardaway, Jr. 
Hardaway Contracting
Hendersonville, TN
Joanne F. Hayes Alyne Queener Massey 
Civic leader, daughter of late Sam Fleming Civic leader, wife of late Jack Massey 
Nashville, TN Nashville, TN 
Judson Randolph, MD 
Civic leader 
Nashville, TN 
Cal Turner, Jr. 
Dollar General Stores 
Brentwood, TN 
W. Ridley Wills, II 
National Life
Franklin, TN 
John W. Rich 
Civic leader 
Nashville, TN 
James A. Webb, Jr.• 
Nashville Bank and Trust 
Nashville, TN 
David K. Wilson• 
Cherokee Equity/First American Bank 
Nashville, TN 
Figure 7 .1 Local members of the Vanderbilt University Board of Trust. 
Source: Vanderbilt University (2001) and various sources. Not included: 27 non-local 
members. *Life Trustee. t Recently deceased. 
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and the general welfare of Nashville was accentuated in the 1980s when the campus 
expanded, creating ill feelings among the residents in the surrounding neighborhoods and 
even citywide. Vanderbilt has since then made an effort to engage and interact more with 
local society. The Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies was created with an 
emphasis on local development. Chancellor Joe Wyatt also became president of the 
Chamber of Commerce, tying the university more strongly to local business interests. 
From another perspective, the university has always played an important role as a place 
where connections were forged, which then became important networks in the local 
business elite. Most of the old elite graduated from Vanderbilt. A Vanderbilt degree was 
a preparatory experience funneling individuals to community leadership. The Vanderbilt 
law school and business schools continue to supply leadership in Nashville, but their role 
is more diffuse now without the "grandfather to son to grandson succession" in local 
business leadership (Hunt, 2000). It is still important in other ways-as a driving force of 
the Nashville health care cluster and as one of the largest employers in Nashville. 
Again, if we return to the Watauga Group, it was allied with leaders in the official 
structure, such as Eddie Jones, the long-term executive vice president of the Chamber of 
Commerce. However, Watauga members did not necessarily hold major positions in the 
Chamber, leading to a somewhat ambiguous relationship between the two organizations. 
Some people felt that the Chamber decisions reflected Watauga Group interests and 
ideas, and that Jones "reported" to more powerful people who controlled the city 
(Sherrard, 2000). Simpkins (2000) calls Eddie Jones a Watauga protege who became 
more powerful as the old core of the Watauga aged, retired, or passed away. Rechter 
(2000), on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between the Watauga Group and the 
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Chamber. He describes the latter organization as a downtown club, a "good old boys'' 
network. Rechter adamantly differentiates the Watauga Group and the Chamber, saying 
that they were two different sets of people, which is peculiar as he in the same breath 
singles out the bankers as the core group in the Chamber of Commerce. The explanation 
may lie in Rechter's personal experience of the late Watauga Group of the early 1980s. 
At that point, the old banking leadership had retired from civic engagements, formal or 
informal. Nevertheless, they largely represented the same constituency-mainly the 
financial institutions. It therefore appears that the most powerful individuals in the city 
were only engaged in civic affairs in an informal manner. This created a system in which 
the formal organization retained a limited status and the informal one was not broadly 
active. 
A particular relationship between business and government had also developed 
over time in Nashville. During the early Metro government years, then Vice-Mayor 
George Cate says prospective office holders were expected to solicit support with a dozen 
or so local corporations and their CEOs. The executive officers or chairmen of the board 
were opinion-makers and major players in local politics. However, political connections 
of top business leaders were shallow and did not penetrate beyond top office holders. The 
CEOs of Watauga caliber were quite ignorant of local political practices; a cultural divide 
existed between politics and business. In order to gain political favors they needed some 
individuals had established close connections with political circles, and those individuals 
funneled money from the banks and insurance companies (Nelson, 2001 ). These go­
betweens may have been lower level businesspeople within corporations, or somebody 
positioned with connections in both camps, but with their ties they could direct money to 
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office-holders with favorable policy views, arrange meetings, or disseminate 
information23 . That does not immediately imply that the relationship between business 
and Metro government was closer than it is today, but rather qualitatively different. 
Rechter (2000) indicates that this arrangement did not translate into a policy that equated 
with broad strategic thinking, but rather fragmented, ad hoc development. This view is 
corroborated from the political side. No official lobbying-style system existed with the 
Chamber of Commerce in the courthouse, which instead saw informal talks and close 
connections with certain councilmen, says former Vice-Mayor Dave Scobey (2000). 
During the 1980s, a subtle power shift was taking place away from the financiers 
and insurance industry. Outside investors were entering local businesses in real estate, 
insurance and banks, and even the Grand Ole Opry was bought by the Oklahoma-based 
company Gaylord Entertainment. By 1990, the Watauga Group cluster of individuals had 
retired, leaving something of a power vacuum. Conventional wisdom traces this situation 
to the shift away from local ownership of dominant corporations, such as the banks and 
the insurance companies. Even if an entrenched power structure still existed, its powers, 
as traditionally defined, had diminished. This should be compared with other cities: "In 
Charlotte, N.C., if you ask 10 different people to identify the movers and shakers, you'll 
get the same five names each time; try that in Nashville, and no two lists will be alike" 
(Honick, 1990, p. 36). Martha Ingram, talking from the local fund-raisers' perspective, 
says: "you could gather a dozen or so people in the room who had the ability to commit 
23 The most important individual that perfonned this function was Eddie Jones, the executive director of 
The Chamhcr. With his background as political newspaper reporter, press Sl."Cretary for Governor Clement, 
and an East Nashvillian, he could cross over between the two worlds in a way that nobody c1se could 
(Dobie, 2002, May 5). 
147 
fifty or a hundred thousand dollars to a cause on the spot...If you wanted something done, 
you knew exactly who to talk to. It's not that simple anymore,, (quoted in Rogers 1990b, 
p. 46-47).
Naturally, a small power elite still existed, even if they were not the Watauga 
Group anymore. One group of people was identified as the "brain trust" of Mayor Boner. 
Later, they were conspicuously absent in the formation of policies that were spawned by 
Partnership 2000. A different group, real estate millionaires Ted Welch, R.C. Mathews, 
Joe Rodgers, were named as the "heirs" of Watauga (Rogers, 1990b). The reproduction 
of the Nashville economic elite that had been passed on from one generation to another, 
sometimes in a family lineage, had been disrupted. But nobody paid attention to the lack 
of strategy and clear direction for the city, because Nashville was caught in the real estate 
economy of the 1980s. Growth was taking place in the 1980s despite the hands-off 
approach of a fragmented elite. Not until after I 987 did the issue of strategic decision­
making become a serious concern in the city. Undoubtedly, the perception of an 
exclusive elite unwilling to share power, a situation detrimental to economic success, was 
prevalent in Nashville. One Nashvil1ian said: "there has been recent commercial 
expansion here, but it's been held back by the old aristocracy dominating the local 
establishment" (Paine, 1985, p. 21 ). The leading industrial recruiter at the Chamber also 
concurred that Nashville's political structure was impeding on the city's ability to attract 
new business (Liles-Morris, 1991 a). The Chamber of Commerce itself, as a meeting point 
and conduit for policy arrangements between the public and the private business realm, 
was not working very effectively. As wiJI be discussed in sections 7.3 and 7.4, the 
Chamber did experience a period of reform. But before that process will be considered, 
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several factors that position these events in a changing economic and geographical 
environment should be introduced. 
7.2 New business elites: Migration, inter-dependence, new industries 
Changes in local power, and eventually in local governance, were influenced by non­
local forces. Loss of local ownership of major corporations is often assumed to equal loss 
of local power. The situation is certainly more complex, as will be discussed in the 
remainder of this chapter. The way the national economy is reorganized through new 
policies and technological changes profoundly impacts local industry and governance. I 
will use two pertinent examples, banking and health care, leading components of old and 
new Nashville, respectively. Furthermore, this was taking place as the culture of the 
urban South was changing. 
As noted above, there were significant interlocking relationships between major 
local institutions. The locally owned banks would have board members who also 
occupied seats at the board of the Chamber of Commerce, and sometimes the Board of 
Trust at Vanderbilt University. National Life famously worked hand in hand with Third 
National Bank (now SunTrust) and had control over, among other assets, WSM radio 
(which broadcast the Grand Ole Opry), a television station, and eventually the Opryland 
theme park and hotel. During a transition era spanning from the mid-1970s to the late 
1980s, ownership of these assets became fractured. 
The existence of local headquarters of major corporations is generally regarded as 
having a positive impact on a local economy. Headquarters mean high wage employment 
and multiplier effects. In the opposite case of a city dominated by branch offices, 
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decisions such as which business services to use will be made in another city; the number 
of auxiliary services available locally, especially downtown, is therefore likely to decline. 
Indeed, office investment in downtown Nashville was lackluster in the 1990s. 
As a control center, high-level employees with decision-making power have the 
ability to support the community. For example, a major way for the economic elite to 
shape local society is through the non-profit sector. Charitable giving and funding for 
foundations is assumed to decline if company headquarters are relocated. Corporations 
are territorial; the Nashville experience, which most likely is true everywhere, is that a 
majority of charitable donations by corporations tend to be given within its primary 
geographic area of operation (Bottorff, 2001 ). An organization such as United Way has 
seen contributions decline because headquarters decision-makers are not here. "That is a 
major [his emphasis] negative development" (Hunt, 2000). The financial crisis around 
1990 also took a toll. In the words of one local banker: "it's hard to worry about saving 
the whole ship when you're bailing water up to your neck in your own cabin" (Rogers, 
1990b, p. 51). According to Bottorff (2001), the banking industry has not cut local giving 
in Nashville. On the other hand, philanthropic involvement has not grown like it would 
have during the expansive 1990s if local control had been retained. The underlying 
rationale for giving makes sure that a minimum level is maintained. Bottotff 
acknowledges "that community involvement is a very important part of your marketing 
effort, not just your social responsibility, so [corporations] don't tend to cut back." His 
general assessment, however, is that overall charitable decline and loss of headquarters 
definitely impacts philanthropy. Beyond the fact that the banks play an active, although 
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not leading role, the most significant shift is probably the retraction of the insurance 
industry in civic life. It has also been non-local for a longer period of time than banking. 
Leadership becomes more transient with less attachment to place. When local 
institutions become part of a larger entity, many of the most powerful individuals move 
elsewhere. If your city is perceived to have an excellent "quality of life," that can be a 
mitigating factor in the process. To stay in such a location, people may decline promotion 
and relocation, and may go so far as to leave the company. Under the pressure of recent 
corporate reorganization, some high-level employees in the telecom industry have chosen 
to stay in Nashville (Bottorff, 2001 ). The other side of the process is that it takes some 
time before both new institutions and new individuals are socialized into a role as local 
activists, taking part in social place-based engagement. The loss of local control had a 
destabilizing effect on the civic leadership in Nashville. Instead of lifelong Nashvillians 
who joined Third National Bank with a Vanderbilt MBA, people arrived from other 
places, held a CEO position in Nashville for a few years, but soon moved elsewhere. 
"There is one bank in Nashville that has gone through so many changes of leadership, 
nobody can keep track of who's the CEO anymore. Does that mean that everything 
collapses? Of course not. It means that the city is operating a little bit differently" (Hunt, 
2000). 
7. 2.1 The financial industry
The most important force behind these trends is deregulation. Dating back to the 1930s, 
banking laws separated commerce and industry from banking. The crisis following the 
stock market crash of 1929 created a backlash against unregulated finance capitalism, and 
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a stronger regulatory hand of the state was viewed favorably. Federal legislation placed 
geographical limitations on banks, confining them to their home states. Horizontal 
integration in the banking industry was also disallowed. Despite the practice of forming 
holding companies to circumvent regulations, most banks have been local or regional in 
scope until the 1980s. In addition to national restrictions, state laws could limit banking 
even to the county level. In other places, banks were allowed to compete on a statewide 
basis. In the 1980s, federal law again made it possible for holding companies to invest 
over state boundaries, and most states had removed many of their barriers against 
interstate banking by 1990. The Federal Interstate Banking Act of 1994 also gave states 
more power to locally legislate branching and acquisition. Technological developments 
and renewed faith in the market mechanism have been the driving forces behind the 
deregulation of the industry. Various restrictions still apply-for example, regional 
banking is encouraged over national banking in order to keep strong banks from New 
York and other national financial centers from creating national empires. Many Southern 
states have, for example, regional reciprocity laws that limit ownership to banks in these 
states. 
Following the earlier argument about the importance of headquarters, the 
assumption is that cities that manage to attract banking headquarters or whose banks are 
strong players in the merger and acquisition trend will benefit economically. The trend 
under deregulation has been that control over banking assets are now more spatially 
concentrated than before (Lord, 1992). North Carolina, especially Charlotte, is a winner 
in this process, while Texas has lost much of its financial control. Several reasons can 
explain why some cities and states have lost and others won. First, legislation that 
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regulates the flow of capital and control of assets still varies between states. Those with 
more liberal policies regarding out-of-state investment are more likely the losers of 
capital control. Second, states that historically allowed statewide banking fostered a few 
strong banks that were later able to acquire out-of-state banks when deregulation was 
enacted. This is in contrast to states where only one office (e.g. no branching) was 
allowed. Consequently, the scale of operation provided a competitive advantage or 
disadvantage later under deregulation. Moreover, the economic crisis around 1990 led to 
several bank collapses and left others vulnerable to out-of-state takeover, especially in 
combination with liberalizing banking laws. 
The deregulation of banking and financial services has had a major impact on 
banking in Tennessee. State laws limited branching to home counties until the 1970s, 
with some exceptions for holding companies and single out-of-county branches. 
Basically, banking is an example of anti-urban policies on the state level where regulation 
prevented wealth and power concentration in cities. Tennessee, like most states, was 
fragmented in its terms of banking services, although it was not the most fragmented 
state. "Banking laws were as different and peculiar as whiskey laws" (Nelson, 200 l ). 
Since banks with out-of-state headquarters were allowed to operate banks in Tennessee, 
all but one of the state's major banks have been acquired by distant rivals. Charlotte and 
Atlanta have become the regional capitals of the banking industry with banks such as 
Bank of America, SunTrust, and First Union. 
In the recent past, Nashville was the headquarters of three large banks, two large 
insurance companies and two major investment firms. In 1985, Nashville had three banks 
in the top 150 in the country: Third National was ranked at 87, First American at 96 and 
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Commerce Union at 136 (Cason, 1985, April 4). The city was sometimes referred to as 
the "Wall Street of the South." Locally, the term "Fourth and Union," after the center of 
the downtown financial district conveniently located only a few blocks away from the 
political power of the courthouse, became synonymous with the power of the local 
banking and financial institutions. All these financial institutions had deep roots in 
Nashvi11e. They formed the cornerstone of local business life, and over time they had 
become integrated in Nashville's economic life on many different levels. The insurance 
giant National Life owned the Grand Ole Opry and Opryland. Life & Casualty erected 
the city's first skyscraper. The insurance companies were conservative in their business 
methods and social outlook, paternalistic rather than profit maximizing (Carey, 2000). A 
hostile takeover by the Houston-based American General in 1982 took NL T, the holding 
company that owned National Life, out of local ownership. The entire elite community 
was stunned, not only because such a significant company, but the entire Opryland 
complex with its symbolic importance, was lost to outside capital. Opryland was later 
bought by Oklahoma-based Gaylord Entertainment. (But because of the extremely 
decentralized decision-making structure of the corporation, Gaylord is, in practice, a local 
company.) In the banking industry, a merger and acquisition process started in the 1980s 
as interstate banking was allowed. Third National Bank and Commerce Union bank were 
acquired rapidly. First American was in such a bad shape that it was not a prospect for 
take-over for many years after the crisis. In the merger era, First American bought out-of­
state banks, but these acquisitions did not prove to be productive. That, combined with 
weakness from the 1990 debacle, enabled Birmingham's AmSouth to take over in a 
merger. As far as the other investment companies goes, Equitable was the South's major 
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municipal bond house and the second largest in the country. In 1967, Equitable was 
purchased by the up-and-coming American Express. Finally, the ownership transfer out 
of Nashville was complete when J.C. Bradford, which had 2,500 employees in 16 states 
(mostly in the South), was sold to Paine Webber of New York (Table 7.1). 
An emphasis on local capital fostered close relationships between banks, 
industrialists, developers, and politicians. The local bankers were the people to know and 
to go to. Much local investment was financed locally. For larger or complex deals, 
developers and industries that needed more capital than the local banks could provide had 
to approach bigger out-of-town banks, but this was frequently brokered by Nashville 
banks. One benefit of deregulation is the amount of capital that the new institutions 
command. Long distance search for capital is less necessary. Cases when necessary 
funding cannot be provided by institutions with a major presence in Nashville are 
Table 7.1 Wall Street of the South no more. 
Nashville institution Acquiring institution New HQ location Date 
Banks: 
First American AmSouth Birmingham. Ala. 2000 
Third National SunTrust Atlanta, Ga. 1986 
Commerce Union Nations Bank Charlotte, N.C. 1987 
(Bank of America) 
Insurance: 
National Life - NL T American General Houston, Tx. 1982 
Life and Casualty American General Houston, Tx. 1968 
Other financial institutions: 
Equitable Securities American Express New York, N.Y. 1967 
J.C. Bradford Paine Webber New York, N.Y. 2000 
Note: Since the acquisitions listed here took place, other reorganizations have occurred. For example, American 
General's parent company was purchased by British-owned Prudential in 2001, now headquartered in New York 
instead of Houston. Compiled by author from various sources. 
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few. The industry is headed towards a dual business structure consisting of very large 
institutions with a wide range of services and small community banks providing a high 
level of personalized service (Bottorff, 2001 ). 
Banks are not the dominant power brokers in most cities any longer, although 
they are still involved in civic affairs. Being active locally, several representatives for the 
banking industry noted, fills an important public relations function for the banks. But 
there is also a sense of inactivity and diminishing leadership. The initiatives from the 
banks affecting civic society are not there anymore. These types of substantial initiatives 
that can effect the path of a locality are associated with the headquarters function, but 
now the capacity to act is more elusive. Banker Ed Nelson says that in contributions to 
educational and cultural institutions, Nashville banks are involved, but yet missing in 
some ways. New powers have moved into the void left by the banks, but it is hard to 
exactly define what those powers are (Nelson, 200 I). The various Nashville banks have 
responded similarly in this reorganization situation with only "nuances in differences" 
(Bottorff, 2001 ). Although everybody acknowledges a leadership problem, banking 
holding companies are also decentralizing, which moderates the tendency towards 
diffusion of power. Simpkins (2000) adds that the older generation of local corporate elite 
was "moderate" in its ability to perform a civic governance function. In fact, the 
generation that came afterward and experienced the deregulated period was much more 
competent, better educated, and better leaders, on both a corporate and societal level. 
Many of the banks and other financial institutions that propelled the downtown 
economy are no longer headquartered in Nashville. Some of the headquarters that were 
amassed and erected by the financial companies during urban renewal have been sold to 
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other investors or to local government. That means, among other things, fewer jobs 
downtown for accountants, lawyers and other service providers. Instead, downtown has 
grown as a center for entertainment and government. The dynamics of downtown has 
changed, as have the spaces of power: 
"The fifth floor of the First American bank is the dining room. On a given day at 
noon it used to be jam-packed with people. Primarily bankers, but also other 
business people meeting with bankers, lots of activity going on. I have been there 
since and it's a ghost town. Only one or two tables have people sitting at them. 
All that activity and cross-fertilization of ideas, talking about transactions, that is 
gone now. The leadership is down in Birmingham, and when somebody answers 
to someone in Birmingham, it's different. The power to make decisions in 
Nashville made the business community stronger, but we've lost that power" 
(Sherrard, 2000). 
As the last indigenous bank, First American was special; it had assembled a board 
from the cream of the elite. "Visiting the bank's executive dining room was for years like 
being summoned to a city hall, only one with money" (Dobie, 1999, June 3). But Bottorff 
(2001), who is familiar with all bank facilities in Nashville, says a similar process 
happened at all banks. The number of employees is smaller than when the banks' 
headquarters were located in Nashville. This is especially true for special functions, such 
as policy managers for credit that bring people into the institution. It is not only a place 
"where deals are done," but also for civic involvement. The dining rooms were places for 
community relations efforts as much as a place where business synergy is taking place. 
More broadly speaking, the number of people in top level management positions 
throughout the city are fewer and therefore impact the role of banking in the governance 
structure of the business elite. Nelson (2001) too recognizes that the "buzz" is no longer 
in the dining room, but instead says it has moved to other places: the City Club, the 
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Cumberland Club, and the University Club at Vanderbilt. This type of activity is still 
going on, just not at the banks anymore. 
7.2.2 The health care industry 
To make a rather diffuse social process concrete, I will juxtapose the changing nature of 
the Nashville banking with the health care industry. The health care industry makes up an 
increasing share of the post-Fordist service economy. The American health care system is 
highly advanced and expensive, and health care makes up a greater share of United States 
GDP than any other industrialized country. For many companies this represents a 
significant cost, while it enables profits and employment in a growing health care 
industry. Access to the health care system was broadened when Medicaid and Medicare 
legislation passed in 1966, and health care is the area where government spending has 
increased the most. 
As a health care center, Nashville is more likely to reap benefits from this system 
than most other cities. The cluster of growing health care finns is generally perceived as 
the most dynamic growth industry in Nashville today. Figure 7.2 shows all the different 
activities in the agglomeration. The industry developed in association with the city's 
medical schools, especially Vanderbilt, which has a reputation for groundbreaking, Nobel 
Prize-winning research, and strong funding from both public and private sources. The 
dominant company is HCA (Hospital Corporation of America) whose entrepreneurial 
decisions as pioneers in the development of for-profit hospitals have shaped the health 
care industry in Nashville. Led by the physicians Thomas Frist, Sr. and Thomas Frist, Jr., 
together with investor Jack Massey from Kentucky Fried Chicken, HCA grew from a 
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Figure 7.2 The agglomeration of health care related firms in Nashville. 
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hospital originally financed by National Life and Third National Bank to become the 
largest private hospital management company in the country. Hospitals usually originate 
from large universities, strong government involvement, or non-profit foundations, with 
which the South was not well endowed. As Southern health care was served with small­
scale, under-capitalized hospitals, it was logical that private for-profit hospital 
management emerged in the South along with population and economic growth. 
By 1990, the health care industry had grown to become a dominant force in the 
local economy. It had more than 80 businesses with headquarters in Nashville with multi­
state or national operations. Ten on the top I 00 privately held local companies were in 
the health care industry (Nashville Business and Lifestyle, 1990a). Nashville's health care 
environment has yielded 15 publicly traded health care companies in the first half of the 
1990s, which represented 12 percent of all the health care public offerings in the United 
States during that period. Nashville's health care industry produces approximately 7 
percent of the region's annual economic output (Eck, 1997, June 16). 
HCA has been instrumental in the formation of the cluster because of the high 
number of spin-offs from the company. The industry is very dynamic with a rapid rate of 
merger, acquisition, and spin-offs. This constant corporate reshuffling regularly idles 
management skills that immediately search for new ventures. Many firms have grown by 
developing a particular niche of the industry, sometimes aided by contacts that have 
developed in a close-knit segment of the business community. Important companies with 
roots in HCA included Equicor, �hyCor (at one point the second largest physician 
practice management company in United States), and HealthTrust (a leading employee­
owned hospital management company led by HCA executive Clayton McWhorter). 
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As the city boosters stress, Nashville is an entrepreneurial place24� people are 
interested in opening new businesses, and health care is the best example of that attitude. 
Nashville's entrepreneurialism, coupled with ongoing industry efforts to reduce costs and 
target new sectors, mean there continues to be new local health care start-ups even as 
some companies leave Nashville in the merger and acquisition process. New companies 
have also been aided by abundant venture capital (Gallivan, 1998, February 23). 
Traditionally, the accessibility to venture capital in the South is relatively low, but a local 
venture capitalist ranked Nashville as second in the South in terms of capital investment 
after Atlanta (Lavey, 1996, August 12). The leading venture capital firm is Massey 
Burch, which like most Nashville venture capital firms seeks out entrepreneurs in the 
health care industry. Most of this risk capital, which amounts to hundreds of millions of 
dollars a year, also originates in the health care industry (Nashville Business and 
J,tfestyles, 1990b ). The rapid growth of the industry led local economic recovery and
produced a new layer of affluence in Nashville: 
"After the real estate bust it was expected to take 10 years to climb back, but after 
three years, by 1994, the health care industry had bailed us out. Everybody felt 
poor after the two main real estate companies went down the drain. Well, health 
care was so successful, that by 1994 it had created 200 new millionaires, so there 
was a sense of wealth and well-being in the city .. .lt was so clear to me how 
people felt poor in the late 1980s, but wealthy again in the mid- l 990s. People 
were willing to take risks, be more entrepreneurial, which the economy 
accommodated, and they were successful" (Sherrard, 2000). 
24 Some -data exists to back up that claim, including top-l O rankings in categories such as hest cities for 
entrepreneurs in the country and new start-ups (Nashville Arca Chamber of Commerce, 2<XH� Partnership 
2000, 2000: Wolf, 1999). 
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Shortly after its inception, the economic development organization Partnership 
2000 started to position Nashville as a center for health care-related industries. The 
Nashville Health Care Strategic Planning Project was formed to develop strategies on 
marketing Nashville as a leading health-care city. The goal was to bring more health-care 
jobs to Nashville, not primarily providers, but companies that produce a product or 
service for a broad geographical area, a national or in some cases even a worldwide 
market. A 1994-1995 study conducted surveys, interviews and focus group discussions 
with more than 200 people in health care and related fields in the Nashville area and 
around the country. The study's conclusions indicated that there was not enough 
recognition of Nashville's position in the industry outside of the city, limited cooperation 
among companies, not enough financial support for health care, and a lack of diversity in 
the industry. The absence of a trade organization was noted, and on a recommendation 
from the study, the Nashville Health Care Council was created in 1995 to support the 
existing industry, encourage relocations, promote venture capital for the industry, and 
foster good public relations for Nashville as a center for the health care industry. Half a 
dozen health care executives fronted by venture capitalist Luscious Birch became the 
nucleus of what became the Council, but essentially all powerful leaders in the industry 
took part in the effort. The Partnership 2000 program provided seed money, but the 
Council is financially independent. Twenty-seven founding member companies 
committed the initial $810,000 for the operation of the organization. One focus has been 
the establishment of an information services sector in the health care industry, often 
considered a missing link in the formation of a comprehensive industrial cluster in 
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Nashville. Information management companies typically require superior technological 
skill, and Nashville lacks a premier technical university. 
The health care industry as a whole has been conspicuously absent in city 
governance. Unlike the old financial community consisting of a handful of equal players, 
there is one dominant health care company in Nashville: HCA. Beyond HCA, there are 
smaller companies with professional management staffs. "In many, many cases, these are 
people that don't have particularly strong roots in Nashville. They were either recruited to 
that job, or they found themselves here like me" (Bredesen, 2001). As part of a young, 
volatile industry, they have so far only intermittently formed strong community ties. This 
character of the industry, together with its geography, is important in understanding its 
civic behavior. The geographical shifts in corporate headquarters location are especially 
common in industries with strong tendencies towards mergers and acquisitions, either 
because of cost pressures or organizational restructuring. 
Moreover, the health care industry is geographically dispersed within Nashville. 
While the old business elite was clearly identifiable with downtown, most new industries, 
like health care, are not. Health care firms are found in two other areas of 
Nashville-foremost in the West End district west of downtown, but a secondary cluster 
also exists in the office parks of Brentwood25 . The corporate geography is distinct and, at 
least in the past, distance is almost prohibitive of interaction with the old elite. Phil 
Bredesen says of the downtown establishment centered around Chamber of Commerce: 
"I started a company of my own in 1980 two miles from downtown or so. [There] didn't 
25 The location of health care finns in Nashville is detennincd by using the Nashville Health Care Council's
onlinc membership list. The location of 209 out of 289 finns could he identified. 
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seem to be room for somebody like me; a young CEO out on West End Avenue" (2001). 
With the health care industry increasingly suburban, there may also be a decrease in 
opportunities for inter-personal contacts detrimental to new institution-formation that has 
the capacity to pool resources from disparate branches of Nashville's corporate world. 
Not only are many companies found outside Nashville proper, but new wealth has created 
its own residentia] areas outside Davidson county. This trend is particularly reflected in 
the fast-paced development of affluent Williamson County (Johansson, 1998, October). 
Such a evolution has the capacity to introduce intra-metropolitan fragmentation of 
interests not found earlier in Nashville, where previously only branch-plant 
manufacturing was located outside Davidson County. Yet, the industry has potential to 
increase involvement over time. There is a distinct place-based interdependency in the 
industry that relies on skill, innovation, and cross-fertilization of ideas that is unique to 
Nashville. 
There are some signs that the money of the health care industry has started to 
influence Nashville governance, although much of it can so far be attributed to 
individuals like Thomas Frist, Jr. rather than a systematic industry effort. On his 
initiative, the Frist Foundation started in the 1980s as a corporate foundation branch of 
HCA. The Frist Foundation quickly became the largest foundation in Nashville and has 
assumed a leading position in the local non-profit society. It started supporting worthy 
but relatively inconsequential projects, such as the newly-opened Nashville Zoo, United 
Way, and Cheekwood, a Belle Meade arts center. More recently, the Frist Foundation is 
stepping up from giving to existing institutions and organizations to projects that have 
potential city-forming character. The best example is the establishment of a downtown art 
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museum, the Frist Center of Performing Arts; such a facility had been on Nashville elite's 
wish-list for decades. 
Thomas Frist also played a leading role when the operation of the city-owned 
General Hospital was transferred from Vanderbilt University to the traditionally African­
American Meharry Medical College, a move that was applauded as race sensitive and the 
right thing to do. The issue also received support from the Chamber of Commerce, which 
pursued the issue through a committee led by Ben Rechter. The Chamber saw it not only 
an important reform in local health care, but also a step towards improving race relations 
"that could have a positive effect in how Nashville can compete in the world, how we 
appear to the outside, and how we become a more diverse and harmonious city" (Hunt, 
The other two major foundations in Nashville are the Community Foundation and 
the Memorial Foundation. The Community Foundation, established in 1991, received 
over $6 million in HCA stock from Clayton McWhorter, a health care executive and the 
second individual who has been active in local elite life, and is possibly headed toward 
"the Bredesen route" (i.e. leaving the health care industry for a political career as a 
Democrat). The Memorial Foundation also has ties to the health care industry and was 
created when a local hospital-Nashville Memorial Hospital-was sold. 
In some cities, foundations or similar non-profit organizations are involved in 
strategic urban development. These types of organizations frequently have the resources 
lb The hospital move may have been triggered by Meharry president David Satcher, later the U.S. Surgeon 
General. who in a spL'CCh to the husincss community pointed out that the city's leadership had once saved it 
from becoming another Binningham (Carey. 2000). 
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to observe and act on the larger issues in a city. They are often tools for the local elite to 
influence a city's direction in an organized way. Historically, foundations have not 
played an active role in Nashville. The three foundations mentioned here, although the 
largest in the city, are recent creations and are relatively small, comparatively speaking. 
The main reason why an otherwise well-monied town27 like Nashville lacks established 
foundations is that Vanderbilt University is very efficient in raising money among their 
alumni. Bronson Ingram raised half a billion dollars for Vanderbilt during a fund-raising 
drive between 1992-1995 (Wood, 1996, June 6). Also, fund-raising activities in Nashville 
for national political candidates reach sums well above virtually every other city in the 
country. Without doubt, this limits available money for civic projects in Nashville and 
restricts the elite's ability to shape the city in accordance to their beliefs and wishes. 
7.2.3 Culture, power, and the Nashville elite 
Judging from the events described so far, it is apparent that Nashville was dramatically 
changing, not only economically, but also culturally. The civil rights movement ended 
the era of inward-looking Southern cities that placed a very high value on family 
connections within the city. The civil rights movement liberated Nashville from this 
walled mentality and allowed it to be integrated with the rest of the country ( even if 
vestiges lingered for decades in the shape of school busing; see Chapter 10). Many 
27 In 2003, Nashville ranked as the seventh most philanthropic city in the U.S. as measured hy share of 
disposable income donated to charity (Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce, 2003). 
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perceived liquor-by-the-drink in the late 1960s as a cultural dividing point. With Sunbelt 
prominence came demographic changes-newcomers were moving to town28 • 
"All ofus that came into Nashville had different ideas that those that existed here. 
We simply had different experiences, where we lived, what we did. The people in 
Nashville were very open to taking newcomers in, but [the city] needed a change. 
You could almost see it and smell it if you were looking around and [being] 
involved in social and economic activities around town, you could easily tell what 
was happening" (Rechter, 2000). 
As an immigrant during the 1970s, Rechter is self-reflective when he says that 
newcomers had been attracted to Nashville because a good quality of life, but yet viewed 
Nashville as provincial. Even if that was in many ways true, he also lauds a new 
generation of Nashvillians as open-minded, less confined by old structures, and eager for 
new people to participate in civic and economic affairs. Newcomers, both business 
owners relocating and people moving into management positions of older companies, 
were creating a leadership change (Hunt, 2000). The main new wealth-creating industries 
were health care and real estate. Manufacturing was also more dispersed in the 
metropolitan area. "You had a lot more people who had real economic clout in their 
hands that had no idea who Bronson Ingram was" (Simpkins, 2000). The ''new money" is 
28 Census data shows that the immigration rate in Nashville, as measured by those moving into the city 
from previous residences outside the MSA, has remained relatively high for a long period of time, which 
has an accumulative effect of demographic change. In the 1960 census, 16.9 percent were newcomers, in 
J 970 14.8 percent, in 1980 15.5 percent, and in 1990 18.3 percent. There also appears to be a socio­
economic component to immigration where outsiders move into relatively affluent neighborhoods. This is 
particularly noticeable for immigrants from outside the census designated South. In 1960, the correlation 
hctw<.,-cn non-Southern immigration level and income level on the census tract level was 0.499 and in 1970 
0.228. Correlation between immigration level and Southern immigration was positive but more modest: 
0. 192 in 1960 and 0. I 89 in 1970.
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also "more likely to be concerned with the local school system than ... cracking into the 
old guard" (DuBose, 1994, February 17, p. 16). 
The newfound willingness of the existing structure to accept newcomers, as 
reflected in Rechter's comment, resulted in the creation of a new organization in 1975, 
Leadership Nashville. As pointed out earlier, the Watauga Group was behind the 
initiative. Leadership Nashville's basic purpose is to invite community leaders to take 
part in the organization, and attend a series of seminars on local government, politics, and 
civic affairs. A class of 40 meets once a week to discuss various issues over a 10-month 
period. Leadership Nashville is generally considered successful in socializing people into 
leadership positions with a broad sense of place and commitment to the city. It is 
"probably considered one of the most successful leadership organizations in the country, 
and clearly played a part in developing leadership in the city," says Sherrard (2000). 
The changes in Nashville cannot be detached from developments in the South. 
Nashville was situated well for growth; indeed, its location played a major part in the 
growth in the auto industry. The service economy was a combination of homegrown 
industries and the migration of wealth. Yet, the feeling was that Nashville had a potential 
that was not realized, but things were ready to happen (Rechter, 2000). It was a Southern 
city with some good resources, but at that time was not a wealthy community per capita. 
"You had a Southern culture that was laid back, slow talking and moving. You 
didn't have an environment that was conducive to promoting a lot of vision ... I 
think all that has changed now ... There are a lot of good people spending time 
trying to find resources and answers, and that's where change will come from" 
(Simpkins, 2000). 
168 
Rechter (2000) found a receptive audience in business circles for a focus on 
economic development and regional issues, and he ties that attitude to broad, even 
evolutionary community changes, using the metaphor of "going from a teenager to an 
adult." This is virtually identical to the idea of the city's coming of age used by Squires 
(1996) to describe Nashville's post-WWII political history. The general idea that 
underlies such a position is, to paraphrase a commonly-held local sentiment, that "ten 
people can't rule this city anymore." 
As Nashville was immersed by cultural changes with new people coming into the 
community and the loss of old institutions, there was no "naturally anointed" local 
leadership, as Phil Bredesen puts it; and when Bredesen ultimately was elected as mayor 
in 1991, he exploited the power vacuum. Bredesen acknowledges a number of factors 
that can explain why it was possible for him to be elected. The influence of a small elite, 
and, like most people, he mentions the banks and insurance companies, had diminished� 
there was no business leadership "wearing the crown of power," and nobody just by 
virtue of their position was considered a leader in the community. Management had 
become more a professional activity than an entitlement of birth (Bredesen, 2001 ). There 
was Jess emphasis on who they are and their family connections and more emphasis on 
management training, a development with parallels between the business and the public 
sector. In the past, mayors had deep family roots in the community and their families had 
been significant political players. 
"There was a natural political class in the same way there was a natural business 
class ... Most of the mayors, probably all of the mayors post World War II, came 
from the same political [environment]. This was the business side of the river 
we're sitting in [downtown], and that was the political side of the river over there 
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[in East Nashville]. Of course, J came in with none of those connections 
whatsoever" (Bredesen, 2001 ). 
An analysis of the electoral geography of Nashville indicates that Bredesen's 
1991 election constituted a clear break in how mayors were elected. A review of earlier 
electoral results show that East Nashville politicians like Fulton and Boner had a political 
base that was broader than just a few neighborhoods, but machine operations nevertheless 
enabled the political landscape to be maintained over time (Nashville Metropolitan 
Election Commission, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987). A combination of low turnout, effective 
organization, favors to wards, and even resorting to shuttling voters to the polling station 
on election day-allegedly a trick of Fate Thomas-usually mobilized enough voters. As 
long as the system was powerful and effective, alliances with other groups came easily. 
Although Boner had friends in high places, as indicated earlier in Chapter 5.4, it is 
incorrect to say that he was the candidate of the wealthy. In fact, the opposite is true. The 
1987 mayoral election was one of the closest in Metro history (Boner won 52.5 percent of 
the vote compared to Bredesen's 47.4 percent) and voting patterns are geographically 
quite distinct: working-class and minority-heavy north and east went for Boner and white 
middle-class and affluent south and west for Bredesen. The Belle Meade precinct, for 
example, voted 78-22 in Bredesen 's favor (Nashville Metropolitan Election Commission, 
1987). Traditional notions of how mayors are elected in Nashville still held true at that 
time. 
Despite the openness in the power structure at the time-Boner discredited, 
Thomas in jail, the banks sold, Watauga fading-was Nashville open to an outsider 
taking on a leadership role? The outsider/insider issue was manifested in a few ways. 
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First, Bredesen had not been substantially involved in community affairs. Bredesen's 
view of politics is that any citizen can and should participate. This view is certainly 
colored by his position, at least initially, outside the organizations and institutions from 
which leaders were normally recruited29 . His substantial economic resources have, of 
course, also enabled his view to be heard. Second, he was not a local Nashvil1ian; in fact, 
he was a Northerner. The demographic changes were significant enough almost to 
neutralize these strikes against Bredesen, who was running against the consummate 
insider-Bill Boner, the local Congressman, former high-school basketball coach, native 
East Nashvillian who literally had watched and learned from the political ascent of one of 
the neighborhood sons, Richard Fulton. 
After losing to Boner in 1987, it was almost a foregone conclusion that Bredesen 
would ascend to the mayor's position. He was everything that Boner was not, which was 
exactly what Nashville wanted in 1991. His core constituency was not necessarily 
different four years later, but his appeal had broadened considerably. In 1991, he handily 
won with 70.3 percent of the vote over Betty Nixon, a Vanderbilt-area councilwoman and 
neighborhood activist. Nixon only won 18 out of 164 precincts, most of them located in 
African-American neighborhoods to the north and to the south of downtown (Nashville 
Metropolitan Election Commission, 1991 ). In the changing political winds of the early 
1990s in Nashville, the black community had lost its role as an important component of 
the winning coalition of the political power structure that had existed for a long time. 
19 At the time of his second mayoral candidacy, Bn . -descn was less of an outsider, holding board 
memberships at United Way, a prominent local private school, and the Nashville Symphony, as well as 
founding programs for the homeless. I le had also established a relationship with the Tennessee Democratic 
Party. 
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Most people describe Bredesen in similar ways: a man of energy and intelligence, 
but not necessarily a natural politician. He is not very comfortable with small talk, but is 
a goal-oriented businessman-politician focused on the broad tasks of moving the city 
forward, with less interest in the day-to-day management of Metro government. Bredesen 
came to Nashville in 1975, following his wife who got a Nashville job. Equipped with a 
Harvard degree, Bredesen was successful in the health care industry, eventually founding 
new companies, such as HealthAmerica and Coventry. In 1986 when he sold Coventry 
for a handsome profit, he decided to run for mayor without having previously been 
actively involved politically or in civic organizations. Since his first mayoral run, 
Bredesen had strong backing from the Tennessean (if nothing else, because of 
Siegenthaler's antipathy towards Boner) and from the weekly Nashville Scene (whose 
political commentator Phil Ashford eventually became Bredesen's senior policy advisor). 
Bredesen reigned unchallenged, both in elections and in policy formation, for a 
long time. The last few years, however. Bredesen came back to a city after a failed first 
attempt at the governorship, and to a Council more prone to challenge his policy 
hegemony. Initially considered harboring "liberal leanings" by local media (Ashford, 
1990b ), Bredesen's early reputation as a liberal was later revised. His capital projects 
were decidedly "tax-and-spend" but hardly embodied a progressive social agenda. 
Bredesen certainly played a formidable role in Nashville's repositioning as a dynamic, 
active, high-profile city (see Chapters 8-10). This repositioning did not come without a 
price tag. The final tally of public investment beyond operational cost amounted to 
approximately $400 million during Bredesen's eight years (Garrigan, 1999, September 
16). 
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The post-Bredesen period after 1999 indicated both continuity and some change. In an 
open three-person race, Bill Purcell, the current mayor, best represents continuity after 
Bredesen. A Philadelphia native elected to the Tennessee state legislature from his East 
Nash ville district, Purcell's election was far from the return of the East Nash ville 
machine. More than anything, Purcell's political career reflects the changing 
demographics of Nashville. The east side is now gentrifying, a demographic movement 
that Purcell is part of. Although his previous position as majority whip in the state 
legislature gave him a high profile job with strong connections to labor unions, as elected 
mayor he found his support predominantly among the middle class, an electoral 
continuation of the Bredesen years and another sign that political regime changes in the 
city appears durable (Nashville Metropolitan Election Commission, 1999). Figure 7.3 
shows that Purcell's support was particularly strong in upper middle-class West Meade, 
in the urban neighborhoods around Vanderbilt, and in parts of East Nash ville. Purcell's 
leading opponent was Richard Fulton, who decided on a final run at public office. His 
community base was clear: East Nashville and the city's black neighborhoods. His failure 
to win, despite a formidable network, monetary contributions from old elite friends 
(Fulton was able to raise more money in Belle Meade than the other candidates), and 
front-runner status throughout the campaign, depended largely on the lack of support in 
West Nashville. Neither did he command the same backing from unions and the political 
establishment as formerly. The most common explanation heard after the election was 
that Fulton's old political style was perceived as out-of-sync with the new Nashville. 
Fulton's micro-management approach to city politics and his habit as mayor of 
employing friends was highlighted in the campaign (Sullivan, 1999, August 3). A third 
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Figure 7.3 Electoral map of the mayoral election in 1999. 
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candidate, Ben West, son of the fonner mayor, also mounted a credible campaign. The 
moderate-to-conservative Democrat had suburban appeal, a pro-business attitude, and 
support from real estate and the descendants of the old Garner Robinson machine, but 
lagged significantly in more urban areas. Purcell's first tenn was characterized by a 
continuous neighborhood turn in local politics and less emphasis on entrepreneurialism. 
He was recently re-elected to a second tenn. 
7.3 Reforming the Chamber of Commerce 
History has not been kind to the Nashville Chamber of Commerce as it existed before 
1990. It represented a large numbers of businesses30, but power was, by all accounts, 
strongly centralized. Few people offer a favorable rating� instead it has been described as 
a "good old boys" network, or more colorfully, "downtown plutocracy nonsense." Ben 
Rechter (2000) is very explicit: 
"The Chamber was just downtown business people, and it was mostly the banks. 
It was a very closed group, it was incestuous in every way that you could say, it 
was an archaic form of governance. The leadership never changed, the people 
involved never changed, the people they hired never changed. Somebody had to 
die before they got a new executive director .. .It was not marketing or being very 
aggressive in economic development. .. There wasn't any accountability involved 
in anything that was going on." 
Any outsider, somebody relocating to Nashville or even business people 
representing smaller local companies, had a hard time penetrating the organization. 
"There were no chairs leading to the leadership. If you came in to the city, you could be 
10 The NashvilJc Chamhcr had the 6th largest mcmhership in the country despite its modest position in the 
I 990urhan hierarchy (I Junt, 2000). It currently has a roster of 4,300 husincss members. 
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the chair of five committees and work your tail off, you'd hit a glass ceiling where you 
could not go above that if you hadn't been picked and chosen by the leadership of the 
Chamber" (Simpkins, 2000). Phil Bredesen as a newcomer tried to make inroads, but 
found the organization inefficient and socially closed, and he did not care much for them 
at the time. There was a lack of activity in the things that chambers traditionally do 
best-recruiting industry and promoting the city. The Chamber was not adequately 
organized as a force to spearhead economic development. When that became a major 
issue, it was not surprising that the organization came under some pressure. 
Even if the Chamber itself is now criticized, most people speak favorably of the 
longtime executive officer, Eddie Jones. Jones had been the executive director the 
Chamber for two decades when he resigned for an ill-fated mayoral campaign in 19873 ·1.
His successor at the Chamber was Keel Hunt, recruited from Republican Governor 
Lamar Alexander's office. The Chamber's chainnan of the board at the time was Bronson 
Ingram, an extremely wealthy and powerful member of the business elite and the man 
behind the appointment of Keel Hunt, which gave him a powerful position within the 
Chamber. In fact, his position was too powerful, according to some--"people didn't want 
to dance to Bronson's tune. There were various uprisings of independence" (Simpkins, 
2000). Clearly this was a time of debate, discontent, and rethinking within the Chamber. 
Hunt was fired after only three years following Ingram's departure as chairman of the 
board. That the organization needed a change was an opinion shared by all, from rank-
31 Business had also noticed that the political regime as it had existed in Nashville for decades was coming 
to an end: in search for a new arrangement, they tried to run their own candidate. l lowever, the limited 
influence of business interests in clccloral politics was evident when the lack of puhlic support made sure 
that Jones' candidacy ended long before election day. 
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and-file members all the way up to the leadership. Hunt (2000) says (possibly an ex post 
facto opinion revision) that it was clear that Nashville was changing, the structures had to 
change in response-for example, with an emphasis on small businesses and more 
minority business in the circle of decision-makers. But some hard feelings lingered: "The 
transition is never amicable. There were a lot of people involved. They don't. .. easily 
give up that power base" (Harris, 2000). 
The Chamber's localist faction, which among others now included businessman 
Richard Fulton, regarded outsiders with suspicion. Symptomatic of the change in power 
structure, the localist faction's candidate for Executive Vice President lost to a 
newcomer, Mike Rollins (Dobie, 1990b ). While Eddie Jones had deep local roots and a 
local viewpoint, Rollins was an up-and-coming member of the National Chamber of 
Commerce Association, and part of a new and younger generation. Rollins attracted a 
new breed of people into the Chamber. Young people had a chance to participate in what 
became an evolutionary process over several years. Simpkins does not hesitate to call it a 
democratization process, and in that assessment he is not alone. Virtually all observers 
agree on the nature of the organization after that point: "open," "broad-based," 
"inclusive," and "more democratic" are words and phrases echoed repeatedly. While 
Jones reported to "a distinct group of people ... Rollins has a much broader constituency 
that he talks to" (Sherrard, 2000). 
After the goal of broadening the base had been set, the first step was to forge new 
relationships with those alienated from the organization. Bud Wendell, CEO of Gaylord 
Entertainment, was one of the critics of the old Chamber. He became actively engaged 
and could establish connections with the music industry. Ben Rechter, who had been one 
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of business leaders criticizing the Chamber from the outside, eventually became president 
of the organization. The new 1991 chairman banker Bob McNeilly was very open in his 
statements on diversity and broad-based representation within the organization, 
something the media interpreted as indicative of the social changes of the city's business 
elite (Dobie, 1991, April 8). Both minorities and women have assumed leading positions. 
Margaret Salle, leader of a company called Corporate Child Care and a Lamar Alexander 
associate, is a former chairperson. So is African-American Samuel Howard, CEO of the 
Xantus Corporation, a Nashville health care company. The chairman's role has also been 
awarded to at least two leaders of public and non-profit entities: Craven Crowell of TVA 
and Joe Wyatt, Chancellor of Vanderbilt University. Joe Wyatt's tenure as chairman in 
1995 also coincides with the Chamber's emphasis on improving public education (see 
Chapter 10). The Chamber's by-laws were revised to encourage a leadership group as 
diverse as possible. Chairmen at the chamber are no longer appointed by the fonner 
chairman, but a committee. Small businesses were encouraged to take part, countering 
the traditional domination oflarger businesses before that; in fact, half of the board today 
represents small business interests. 
Another interest group previously slighted by the Chamber was corporations in 
the metropolitan region outside Nashville. The Chamber had a reputation for only 
representing downtown business; but with settlement and economic geography in Middle 
Tennessee taking an increasingly dispersed form, the Chamber reacted, albeit rather late, 
by broadening itself geographically. Contributions today come from corporations in 
many counties, but even if there is more MSA-wide cooperation within the Chamber than 
there used to be, the regionalization goal of Partnership 2000 was more ambitious than 
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what could be accomplished. While counties surrounding Nashville recognize that they 
do not necessarily compete with Nashville in a broad sense, notions of cooperation often 
come in second in the daily quest for improved tax base. 
The changing nature of the Chamber does not mean, however, that some of the 
old institutions abandoned the Chamber. Banks retained involvement and continue to be 
major financial supporters of the Chamber, as they are still financially impacted by how 
well the market area they serve is performing economically. Banks, regardless where they 
are headquartered, will continue to be institutionally involved in local markets, but 
beyond remaining individual ties, the role is likely to be as a financial contributor rather 
than as policy-leader. As a leading member of the growth machine, their role can be 
expected to decline. 
Both local government and the Chamber like to portray their current relationship 
as a strong partnership. The Chamber's agenda is broader than previously, now including 
social, economic and educational issues, and from that perspective acts as an advocacy 
group. Earlier, the business way of creating influence was based on ad-hoc involvement 
and political expediency. Now, the interaction is different in character. The Chamber 
supplies voting records of Metro Council candidates on "pro-business issues" to area 
companies. Annual riverboat tours on the Cumberland are meant to bring Council 
members and committee chairs of the Chamber, and policy interaction, closer together. 
The Chamber's staff has been very visible at the Courthouse, lobbying for downtown 
arena funding and public tax abatements for HCA. The Chamber's efforts are working: 
leaders admit that the Chamber has been known for effectively advocating the 
perspective of the business community in local public policy. Moreover, the two have 
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become more financially intertwined. Metro government usua11y contributes to 
Partnership 2000 and the Sport Council, another division of the Chamber. This is in 
addition to longstanding contracts such as the Convention and Visitors Bureau, a quasi­
governmental entity with a $9 million annual budget that has been operated by the 
Chamber since 1973. 
Amicable business-government relations were ensured by the election of Phil 
Bredesen as mayor. Business leaders were very pleased with his abilities as well, and 
Bredesen was greatly sympathetic toward all activities of Partnership 2000--the 
association has been described as a close working relationship (Sherrard, 2000). The 
Chamber leaders were more comfortable with somebody with a business background like 
Phil Bredesen. He was "one of their own, and they ... can talk to him as a CEO talks to 
another CEO" (Cate, 2001). Business perceives the time period as one of great synergy 
involving the democratization of the Chamber, the resources of Partnership 2000, and the 
presence of a new mayor. "Bredesen was a breath of fresh air; he was rich, honest, and 
smart." He was a dynamic politician who stepped into a city with "a lot of resources 
already there. He wielded those in a way that was almost unbelievable ... Partnership 2000 
and the Chamber were really like putting fertilizer on the earth." (Simpkins, 2000). The 
economic development director at the Chamber adds: "Bredesen is probably, and I have 
worked with a lot of politicians over the last 40 years, the most effective politician for 
growth that I have ever worked with. And I have worked with seven governors and five 
mayors. It was amazing that he could even get elected in Nashville because he is from 
New York" (Harris, 2000). 
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7.4 Partnership 2000: Joining the economic development game 
The emergence of a new institutional framework in the early 1990s, centered around the 
public-private economic development organization Partnership 2000, is possibly the most 
important component of Nashville's local mode of regulation. (The organization was 
recently renamed Partnership 2010, but for consistency, I refer to it as Partnership 2000, 
the name by which it has been known for most of its existence, throughout the 
dissertation.) The importance of public-private partnerships in Nashville, as well as in 
many other cities, represent a shift toward privatization of planning along the lines of 
post-Fordist ideology in an era when federal involvement is reduced. A cooperative 
consensus between business leaders and politicians can be found in Nashville resembling 
an entrepreneurial regime with a mayor, Phil Bredesen, coming from the business 
community, and Partnership 2000, a branch of the Chamber of Commerce. This is where 
entrepreneurial city governance is explicitly connected with the framework of the post­
Fordist paradigm as well as the local urban regime theories. In many ways there is 
nothing unique about Partnership 2000-it operates like other public-private partnerships 
found in countless cities. It is more private than public and its aim is to promote 
Nashville in a broad sense. In order to understand the role of Partnership 2000, we must 
investigate how it was created, why was it created, what objectives were present at the 
creation, and how these objectives have been implemented. 
7.4. I Creating Partnership 2000
The two issues of reforming the Chamber of Commerce and initiating an economic 
development program in Nashville emerged the same time. The connecting of these 
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questions was logicat the lack of economic development strategy was one of the 
criticisms lodged against the Chamber, along with the lack of pluralism within the 
organization. As the 1980s were coming to an end, the presidency of the Chamber was in 
the hands of bankers and insurance CEOs: James Carrol of American General and his 
successor, John Clay of Third National Bank. During their tenure, a group had fonned 
challenging the Chamber hegemony by assuming some of the functions that ought to be 
in the domain of the Chamber. They felt left out of the leadership process, but had 
enough political clout to exercise power independently instead of direct engagement 
, within the Chamber. The leader was Ben Rechter, businessman and president of Rogers 
·I>· 
Group Investments, a multi-million dollar holding company. Rechter came to Nashville 
from Indiana, expanding a family business and taking advantage of the opportunity for 
new development in the South. The core of the business was raw material and 
infrastructural development, especially state-financed road construction. The group had 
raised some money from regional constituents, but most capital came from Rechter's own 
deep pockets. They planned to fonn a "citizens chamber of commerce" and start an 
economic development effort. They represented small and medium-size businesses with, 
as Rechter puts it, an understanding for regional development. The economic 
development efforts at the state level or in Middle Tennessee were not very aggressive� 
none of it was properly financed, nor was it planned well with a defined long-tenn 
strategy. 
Chamber President Clay approached Irby Simpkins, editor and co-owner of the 
Nashville Banner, to lead a new economic development organization as a response to 
Rechter's group. As a newspaper owner, Simpkins occupied a strong position within the 
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Chamber and had a strong economic development incentive. The Banner had suffered a 
decline in circulation since Simpkins bought it and became editor, from about 86,000 in 
1979 to 66,000 in 1988, only half of the Tennessean 's numbers. Despite a joint 
agreement with the Tennessean in which the Banner's advertising, distribution and 
production was controlled by the Tennessean, media analysts suggested that a recession 
could further diminish the Banner's profit, as the second newspaper in a city traditionally 
suffers during an economic decline (Hood, 1988, November 21 ). The Banner's prosperity 
was also limited by its afternoon paper status when the national trend favored morning 
papers32. Simpkins had been member of a Vanderbilt-led task force to study local 
economic development strategies. The study showed an uneven local economy, a 
struggling education system, and a shortage of skilled people to fuel future growth. 
Simpkins contacted Rechter, his longtime friend, and suggested the groups should pool 
resources as their core economic objective was identical. This understanding was the 
catalyst for Partnership 2000, but both sides agree that cooperation did not come easy 
"because the Chamber was very focused on itself' (Simpkins, 2000). 
Simpkins hired a consulting firm from Atlanta, National Community 
Development Services (NCDS), to investigate the possibility of raising money within the 
business community in Nashville to fund a new economic development initiative 
affiliated with the Chamber of Commerce. As opposed to earlier development initiatives, 
what Simpkins had in mind was a public-private partnership also supported by the Metro 
government. In some ways, Partnership 2000 replaced Nashville Plus, a Nashville 
:u The Banner finally folded in 1998. 
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marketing plan from the Chamber that was in effect from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s, although Partnership 2000 was far broader in scope and scale. Simpkins and the 
Banner footed the bill for the consultants, as the Chamber's board continued to be 
skeptical. In June and July of 1989, NCDS conducted more than 50 interviews among the 
business elite to gauge the need for a focused development agenda and the willingness to 
fund such an effort. A fundraising goal was set at $4 million based on the interview 
responses. The general opinion that emerged was that the Chamber was not as efficient as 
it should be. The NCDS study gave the Chamber's overall performance a grade of six on 
a ten-point scale (Brayton, 1989, September 4). The critique of the effectiveness of the 
Chamber was one of the things that led to the resignation of the organization's highest 
executive officer, Keel Hunt, in August 1989 (see also Chapter 7.3). 
Rechter was adamant that the condition for cooperation would involve greater 
changes in Chamber governance: "radical changes, not just tweaking the edges" (2000). 
Simpkins persisted to convince the Chamber that the best course of action was to engage 
more people in the process, and he found several individuals within the Chamber of the 
same mindset. The first step toward a solution was a meeting with all interested parties. 
At Beersheba Springs, a Cumberland Plateau retreat, a meeting took place with a 
facilitator where diverse views were voiced on how the future of Nashville should look. 
Obviously the Chamber had an organization in place that could incorporate an economic 
development effort, but the question was: would that effort be politically feasible? The 
Chamber board continued to be reluctant to match the money from the Rechter group. 
The media started to report on the internal turmoil, and "the Chamber board didn't like 
the press that was going on because it looked like it would usurp their authority. This 
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democracy was a little unattractive to them, because they liked the way it had been the 
last 50 years" (Simpkins, 2000). But with compromises on both sides and commitments 
from key leaders in the Chamber to democratize the organization apart from Partnership 
2000, the plans could proceed. To make a clean start, the Simpkins plan called for an 
organization separate, but affiliated with the Chamber� but with the changes in leadership 
and institutional governance, Partnership 2000 eventually became directly integrated into 
the Chamber organization with Simpkins as its chairman. 
Disagreements between the civic community at large and business interests, 
especially neighborhoods protesting developments dear to the Chamber such as 
infrastructure and airport expansion, became a significant hindrance to economic 
development. Together with the economic downturn, this discord gave impetus to 
Partnership 2000. So when the fundraising started, the business community was eager to 
contribute. The banks continued to be the primary funding source. Once the largest local 
corporations committed, about 100 to 150 smaller businesses followed. Direct costs 
intended to create indirect benefits are harder for small companies to absorb; but 
interestingly, Rechter's experience was that businesses were willing to listen, understand, 
and participate because <?f. rather than in spite of, his position as a relative newcomer less 
attached to entrenched power structures. 
As the publisher of Nashville Banner, Irby Simpkins was a high-profile opinion­
maker. His leadership in Partnership 2000 made it vulnerable to critique as just another 
project of the usual business oligarchy. After some discussions with real estate developer 
Nelson Andrews and Gaylord CEO Bud Wendell, the administrative leadership of the 
Chamber. Simpkins left the leadership position of Partnership 2000. The young lawyer 
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Tom Sherrard, a civic activist and elected member of the Chamber board since 1989, had 
participated in the Partnership 2000 strategic planning teams with 30 to 40 other people 
to put the initiative in place. Wendell, the new chairman of the Chamber, joined with 
Andrews and Mike Rollins to ask Sherrard to head Partnership 2000 in June 1990. 
Sherrard himself was surprised considering his relative youth and inexperience. But 
Simpkins (2000) clarified that the initiative had to be depoliticized: "we needed a much 
more 'vanilla' kind of profile in the community for subsequent leaders so we could get 
about the business of raising money and put some of this controversy behind us." 
Partnership 2000 was launched in the spring of 1990 with a four-year plan and 
funds that had grown to $6 million, exceeding the original goal. Partnership 2000 was not 
conceived as a ready-to-implement plan, but instead as a dynamic process with certain 
general objectives. These general objectives included improving the relationship between 
business and government to promote economic development, organizing support for 
public education within the business community, explaining the importance of economic 
development to the community, and recruiting new industries, as well as aiding existing 
businesses in Nashville. The breadth of these developmental objectives led to the 
perception that the effort lacked focus, which was a common critique in the program's 
early stages. As a development organization, Partnership 2000 had a rocky media start. 
The open-ended nature of the process led the media to portray it as lacking in focus. 
According to the media, the visioning process was slow and the promised initiative would 
not materialize--perhaps it was doomed to become just another shelved plan (e.g. Dobie, 
1991, April 18). But with continuous process-based involvement, Partnership 2000 soon 
gained broad support, at least among business interests. Selling the strategic plan to 
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Nashville was equally important as recruiting new businesses to the area. It was argued 
that "Partnership 2000 should reach the soul of the community and provide residents a 
'positive vision of where we are going"' (Simpkins quoted in Brayton, 1989, October 2). 
Compared to similar efforts around the country, those involved believe 
Partnership 2000 to be very successful, among the top three efforts of its kind in mid­
sized cities on the basis of business recruiting, money raising, and participatory levels 
and status within the local business community (Rechter, 2000). In contrast to previous 
arrangements, Partnership 2000 is a relatively diverse and democratic institution with a 
decentralized system where chairpersons of subcommittees within Partnership 2000 had 
real power. 
7. 4. 2 Implementing Partnership 2000
Partnership 2000 was originally intended to be an independent organization. It is now, 
however, the Chamber's economic development arm. It is financed in four-year segments 
with the third cycle currently at its end. The funding for the 1998-2002 period was $8.2 
million (Harris, 2000). In the com modified language of the Chamber, money is spent on 
two things: "improving the product," and "selling the product." Improving the product 
includes initiatives on public education, government-business relations, and building 
business infrastructure and institutions. Selling the product is city marketing and 
industrial recruiting. The effort was to present Nashville as a community that would be 
inviting to people with businesses located in large cities, the Rustbelt, and California. 
Many of these activities took place earlier, but not in an integrated, comprehensive, and 
well-financed way. In the marketing arena, the Nashville boosters started from scratch. 
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While peer cities such as Memphis and Charlotte spent $2-3 million in advertising and 
promotional activities, the Nashville budget was only $250,000 in 1989 (Rogers, 1990a). 
Now, Nashville's effort only falls behind competitors that are significantly larger, such as 
Atlanta and Dallas (Harris, 2000). "We marketed on a one-on-one basis ... where we 
literally went to companies in cities around the country and told them about Nashville" 
(Sherrard, 2000). 
The major financial sponsors of Partnership 2000 are called lead investors (Table 
7.2). They commit money for an entire four-year period. Below the lead investors, there 
are numerous small financial supporters as well. On the public side, Nashville Metro 
Government is a lead investor. Much of the interaction between Partnership 2000 and the 
local government is coordinated by the Mayor's Office of Economic Development under 
the direct supervision of the mayor. Additional independent public contributors include 
the Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority and two local/regional utility companies, 
Nashville Electric Service and the Tennessee Valley Authority. On the business side, all 
banks represented locally are consistent contributors. Overall, private money finances 
Partnership 2000 to 90 percent (Harris, 2000), making the partnership much more private 
than public. BellSouth, Gaylord Entertainment, and the Tennessean are all lead investors 
during the two latest cycles. 
Some corporations have dropped out of the leading group for various 
reasons-American General followed a long-standing trend of disengagement in 
Nashville, Nissan's involvement was largely tied to one individual, and Shoney's and 
Service Merchandise due to business misfortune. On the other hand, the entertainment 
complex centered around Gaylord was more financially supportive in the late 1990s as 
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Table 7 .2 Lead investors in Partnership 2000. 
Industry 
Banks 
Government 
Music/Entertainment 
Telecommunication 
Newspaper 
Insurance 
Manufacturing 
Retail 
Health Care 
Distribution 
Non-profits 
Other service 
1994-1998 lead investors 
• First American
• First Union
•Sun Trust
• Union Planters
• Nations Bank
• Nashville/Davidson County
Metropolitan Government
• Metropolitan Nashville
Airport Authority
• Nashville Electric Service
• Tennessee Valley Authority
• Gaylord Entertainment
• BellSouth
• The Tennessean
• American General
• Nissan Motor Co.
• Service Merchandise
---------- --
• Shoney's Restaurants
Source: Partnership 2000 (1995, 1999). 
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1998-2002 lead investors 
• AmSouth
• First Union
• SunTrust
• Union Planters
• Bank of America
• Nashville/Davidson County
Metropolitan Government
• Metropolitan Nashville
Airport Authority
• Nashville Electric Service
• Tennessee Valley Authority
• Gaylord Entertainment
• Nashville Predators
• The Nashville Network/Country Music
Television
• BellSouth
• The Tennessean
• MagneTek
• Dollar General
eHCA 
• Ingram Industries
• The Frist Foundation
• Central Parking
were Frist interests (HCA and the Frist Foundation) and newly successful companies led 
by dynamic CEOs (Dollar General and Central Parking). But not all leading companies in 
Nashville are main contributors to Partnership 2000. Of the top ten non-governmental 
companies with headquarters in Nashville, five are not represented in the partnership as 
leading investors. Three of them are health care related companies. The city's largest 
employer, Vanderbilt University/Medical Center, is not represented. Earlier experiences 
show that it is generally difficult to establish institutions that span business, local 
government and non-profits (Sbragia, 1990). 
Over time, the activities of Partnership 2000 have become more focused. Target 
industries with especially strong potential to succeed and bring desired growth to 
Nashville are identified. The health care and the music industry were two important 
growth areas singled out early as having good growth potential. As new important issues 
emerge the developmental focus is always redirected. During the second period, five 
target areas were established: education and work force skills, regional cooperation, air 
service, professional sports, and the information technology infrastructure. The 
organization recently ended its third plan, spanning from 1998-200233• Transportation 
and industrial space availability have been recent additional top concerns for Partnership
2000 as Nashville is trying maintain its dominance in the growing urban region. Work
force improvement continued to be a priority for economic development under the third
plan.
33 The last one for which I have collected data. 
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Partnership 2000 operates under a strategic plan based on data on comparative 
demographic and economic trends supplied by consulting firms. The consultant presents 
research material for the Chamber's executive committee, board of directors, and selected 
Partnership investors. They direct a course of action, another round of research 
determines what businesses and industries will likely grow in the future, and a strategic 
plan is formed. Every four years, the Chamber then asks their investors to fund the plan. 
Exactly how are these funds spent? During one sample period ( 1994-1996), 
Partnership 2000 spent $2,048,000 on marketing (Partnership 2000, 1996a). Half of this 
finances communications efforts, which includes advertising campaigns and public 
relations efforts. The other million in the marketing fund supports business attraction and 
retention. Included here are 30 recruiting trips around the country made by Partnership 
staff. Finally, a smaller amount-$697,000-was spent on "making the Nashville region 
competitive." This is composed of three approximately equal parts: education initiatives, 
supporting the airport authority (which essentially funded their marketing efforts), and 
creating an infrastructure for regional economic cooperation. 
Despite the regionalization efforts, the list of lead investors suggests a lack of 
involvement from regional constituents. One of the hardest goals to implement was the 
establishment of a single, consolidated economic development agency for the region with 
centralized advertising and promotion. During Sherrard's early tenure, Partnership 2000 
did not raise money outside Davidson County in order to solidify support from Nashville 
businesses. On the government side, three fringe counties, Williamson, Wilson and 
Maury, started economic development programs of their own shortly after Partnership 
2000 was initiated. Eager to project a picture of unity, Partnership 2000 depicted those 
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moves as a supplement to its own efforts. In truth, cooperation with surrounding counties 
has been weak, leading some to question outright the true regional approach of 
Partnership 2000 and benefits the efforts have for Metropolitan counties other than 
Davidson. Some members of local, non-Nashville Chamber of Commerce organizations 
said Partnership 2000 cannot do for them what really needs to be done for the county to 
grow economically and be more attractive to industry (Hobbs, 1991, April 1). To combat 
these perceptions, Partnership 2000 moved regional cooperation to the front of its agenda 
during the second four-year period, and seven surrounding counties agreed to be 
partnership investors. "People in the counties were wary of being involved. They thought 
they were being taken over. It was a partnership, but we encountered a lot of resistance at 
first. After two-three years the barrier broke down" (Sherrard, 2000). 
Although Partnership 2000 meets six times a year with other regional actors to 
discuss problems and marketing opportunities, its cooperation with these regional actors 
remains limited. These participants include Chambers of Commerce of nine surrounding 
counties, the marketing division of the State of Tennessee, and the Middle Tennessee 
Industrial Development Association, which is sponsored by the electric power 
distributors. Only TV A is a lead investor and committed $100,000 a year to the 
organization during the second four-year plan. On the private side, few regional 
industries been involved in Partnership 2000. In the branch plant automobile industry, 
Nissan has been active, but Saturn has not. Nissan's Jerry Benefield headed the 
partnership's effort to build a regional task force to address economic development for 
Middle Tennessee. But Benefield acknowledges that only modest progress has been 
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made, adding that "the counties are usually quite suspicious of what Nashville wants to 
do, and they haven't been very cooperative" (Murray, 1994, August 1 ). 
Partnership 2000 is a proven, well-respected program; every four years the 
businesses have been supportive and a new plan is funded despite intermittent fundraising 
troubles ( e.g. American Airlines; see Chapter 9). Participatory practices have also 
generated enthusiasm. For example, ambassador's groups entertain and inform people 
who come to Nashville for scouting relocation. When these groups were successful, 
businesspeople wanted to participate. Partnership 2000 activists often use their positions 
as steppingstones to becoming Chamber leaders. 
Partnership 2000 itself has also been satisfied with local economic development 
during the first half of the 1990s according to their own internal evaluation (Partnership 
2000, 1996a). Economic indicators for the city are above or on target. In some important 
cases, such as net job growth, Nashville exceeded the Partnership 2000 four-year goal in 
only two years. The city also had a more favorable trend in economic development and 
population growth than competing cities. Nashville is growing more prosperous, which 
ironically has created "strains on business climate" (Ibid.). 
In conclusion, Partnership 2000 has emerged as an integral part of how Nashville 
business is organized and the function of the city at large. Therefore, the organization has 
in effect, become institutionalized. The high rate of implementation of proposals from 
Partnership 2000 is a good indication of the importance of the organization and the 
impact it has had on the development of Nashville during the 1990s. Its influence has 
been strong in, for example, airport, promotional, and educational affairs, which will be 
discussed subsequently. 
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8. PUTTING THE CITY IN "MUSIC CITY:" POSSIBILITIES AND
LIMITATIONS OF IMAGE REMAKING 
The institutional changes documented so far have opened up possibilities for NashvilJe to 
more forcefully pursue growth policies. The theme of this chapter is the closer attention 
paid to image-making, which represents one of the new policy areas in the theoretical 
framework described in Figure 1.3. Image politics is of course not entirely endogenously 
determined, but is also an outcome of post-Fordist economic tendencies. Cities are not as 
tied to their hinterlands, as dependent on natural resources and manufacturing, or the 
Fordist state and federal money as they used to be. No longer are cities cushioned by 
these forces, and cities' niche in the urban hierarchy does not provide a stable and 
predictable growth environment. Cities are instead thrown into a competitive 
environment where the goal is to attract investment. City leaders are always seeking to 
improve their cities' position within the system of cities, and therefore "image creation is 
central to economic development strategies, especially in cities that aspire to a higher 
level [in the urban hierarchy]" (Pagano & Bowman, 1995, p. 47). They have to present a 
picture of a growth-friendly environment to pull in increasingly mobile capital as well as 
an image of livability to attract a productive labor force. Before addressing the Nashville 
case, a description of the underlying components of contemporary urban image-making 
should be made. 
8.1 The nature of urban image-making 
While urban promotion was unsophisticated and piecemeal for a long time, the 
development has moved towards more coherent strategies. Place promotion is now a 
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fundamental part of guiding city development and an expanding activity (Fretter, 1993). 
Holcomb (1994) says that place promotion has become big business, but at the same time 
acknowledges "the selling of cities is still in its infancy" (p. 121 ), thus predicting a 
tremendous growth in the field. 
One way of projecting a favorable image is to stress a unique place identity. There 
is a tendency for cities to use generic images on one hand, and on the other, to try to 
distinguish themselves, to be different and unique. Familiarity assures investors that the 
city is a safe object for investment� that it plays by the rules that everybody follows, 
while the unique and place-specific catch attention. This dualism of the generic and 
unique produce individual places that nonetheless have strong physical similarities. A 
city's image is dependent on the visual impact of its urban environment. The identity of a 
city is especially influenced by the visual quality of the downtown area-usually the 
most imagable space where the unique is readily observable. From the image-maker's 
perspective then, the question of how a downtown should be designed and revitalized is a 
concern that extends beyond its relatively confined geography. 
A closer look at place advertising reveals that cities stress the generic as often as 
the unique and place-specific in representing their assets. Imitation is a safe strategy. A 
type of imitation is the use of a relational image (Eyles & Pearce, 1990). Usually, a 
relational image is not viewed as desirable and distinct as a non-relational one, and often 
associated with second-tier cities. Relational often means lower status, like Nashville's 
"the Third Coast" explicitly ranks itself third in the music industry after New York and 
Los Angeles. Similarly, "Athens of the South" is also a relational image. Although a 
construction often used by cities, the relational image does not create as strong of an 
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identity as a non-relational image. In that sense, "Music City" as a place specific, non­
relational identity is more attractive than "Athens of the South." 
In the post-industrial society, the marketing goal is often reinvention (which is not 
directly captured in any of the Nashville slogans). The ultimate objective is to change 
people's general perception of the city, although direct place marketing must be satisfied 
most of the time with enhancing exposure. In fact, cities may be more successful with 
promotional campaigns designed and executed during times of growth and prosperity, 
rather than pursuing image reversal amidst post-industrial decline when economic forces 
raise formidable obstacles to image rejuvenation (Ward, 1994). However, it takes a 
certain level of strategic far-sightedness to pursue image revision and change in 
prosperous times that otherwise would suggest a safe strategy that does not deviate from 
the status quo. 
Social critics view place marketing with an emphasis on the reconstruction of old 
images in the post-industrial era as a sign of the times: "The packaged image reflects the 
aesthetic taste of the postmodern society, with its eclectic conformity, its commodified 
ethnic culture and sanitised classlessness" (Holcomb 1993, p. 142). This implies that the 
confonnity of projected images rarely approaches any "real" diversity. Cities "are being 
produced as commodities to be marketed rather than as vessels of society" (Holcomb, 
1994, p. 117). The critique is reasonable as an exercise in interpretive analysis; however, 
marketing is by its very nature a vehicle for commerce, and it is illogical to expect that 
promotional material should entail much more than a message designed to help a seller 
(the city) find a buyer (investor, resident). 
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A more complex situation arises if physical urban redevelopment becomes a 
blend between the substantive and the image-dependent. Here, history is commonly 
represented in the urban landscape; it can be reconstructed to fit a particular purpose, and 
with content selected to represent a particular viewpoint useful to image-makers. Some 
see this representation in the urban landscape as a sanitized historical pastiche (Roberts & 
Schein, 1993), while others stress that it is in the interest of the elite to incorporate 
minority history in a public narrative (Foresta, 1996, April). But as Foresta observes, the 
transformation of capitalism can give birth to "many different, competing, and 
countervailing place making strategies/' this urban representation does not necessarily 
correspond with other cities34 . Representation, or manipulation, of history and culture is 
often executed to enhance feelings of a common heritage. Philo and Keams (1993) call 
place marketing a subtle form of socialization aiming to convince citizens that they are 
have an equal part in something important, and benefit more or less equally from growth­
promoting strategies. Such strategies become more and more appealing for the elite in 
order to moderate political conflict and enhance local capacities for social and economic 
action that further their own notions of progress, but may, at times, also lead to local 
tensions and conflict over symbols. 
There are solid economic reasons why city officials and business interests are 
turning to image politics. When geographical investment options are greater for capital, 
more information is required to make the best business decision. What economists call 
"imperfect information" characterizes the investment climate, and therefore image 
.'4 A similar public nmTativc in Nashville, the walking tour of downtown (swveycd in the fall of 1997), 
covers themes ranging from the frontier myth to Music City, hut minority (hlack) history is ahscnt. 
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politics become increasingly important. The most direct way of engaging in image 
making is advertising. The question is if this type of place marketing is of any 
consequence. There is no reason why selling a city should be treated differently than 
other products� from the advertising professional's perspective the logic is the same. But 
as individuals rarely admit to being influenced by commercial messages, companies 
might not be immediately swayed by a city advertisement. The key, however, as in all 
advertising, is visibility. So it is reasonable to assume that it does work, just like all 
advertising� at least in cases where a clearly defined consumer is targeted and his or her 
behavior is well documented by marketing research. Thus, city advertising tends to target 
specific groups like relocation experts, corporate decision-makers, tourists, and recent 
university graduates. 
When selling the city moves beyond this type of direct place marketing, the 
audience is broadened to the extent that the control of the image-makers is increasingly 
diluted. The images of a city held by any given individual cannot be controlled by one 
agent. The increased numbers of media outlets, the latest of them being the Internet, 
creates exposure opportunities for cities and an exponential increase in available 
information for the receiver. Moreover, different individuals perceive objects in different 
ways. So from the perspective of the city official, or any other image-maker, the process 
of creating a city image is not an easy task, as images not only change (and change 
meaning) over time, but their perception varies among individuals. Images exist that are 
multiple and even contradictory, and the complexity of a city must be reduced to a 
manageable image. At the same time, the audience is highly differentiated, so the image­
maker must produce multiple images of the city. Thus, the city booster must have a firm 
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grip on the product and the audience, i.e. what image is being projected and to whom it is 
being projected. The diverse audience often limits the aim of image creation to "create 
and sustain awareness" (Ashworth & Voogd, 1994). 
When scholars have approached the issue of city promotion, they have often 
performed various kinds of content analysis of the advertising themes and the images 
projected. Short and Kim ( 1998), for example, divide the advertisements of cities into 
two basic categories in terms of their slogans and message: business-oriented and quality 
of life-oriented. Common themes include pro-business political climate, workforce, 
location, high-tech and infrastructure. On the quality of life side, themes include nature 
and recreation, weather, cost of living, friendliness, cultural attractions, and historical 
heritage. There are, however, fewer case studies directly related to the processes, or the 
"machinery" behind image creation. One exception is a cookbook-like overview 
providing the essentials of promoting the city (Fretter, 1993). Fretter's recipe for a 
successful promotional campaign includes: a shared vision within the city, knowledge of 
your own city and what you are promoting, targeting your audience, and the desirability 
of a high degree of organization and coordination. According to Fretter, speaking with 
one voice is better than multiple and potentially contradictory voices. 
In addition to the deliberate, strategic and calculated image generation, there are 
other ways in which images are created. Public relations efforts are as essential but not as 
well analyzed. This activity is harder to track and does not produce interpretable images. 
Particular policies that a city pursues, if they are coherent, consistent and reach a broad 
audience via media, will over time change the way a city is perceived. Some cities may, 
over time, establish a reputation as business-friendly, and others as livable places whereas 
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before they were known as polluted industrial cites ( e.g. Pittsburgh and Chattanooga). 
However, long-standing images, often tied to a city's economic base, cannot be discarded 
instantly. They must be embraced or addressed in a direct or indirect manner-Nashville 
as Music City is a case in point here. Cities are inevitably tied to its own historical 
progress as well as unpredictable events over which image-makers have no control. 
Unfortunately, the level of control over imaging that can be asserted by targeted efforts is 
most likely inversely related to the impact level in producing desired perceptions. An 
advertising campaign or a new sports stadium reflect the desires of a city, but are 
probably less powerful than long-standing associations tied to the city's economic 
function. Although such a relationship may be logically assumed, no research addresses 
this problem directly. This relationship is conceptualized in Figure 8.1. 
Following this model in my Nashville case study, this chapter will consider the 
connections between the role of governance change and image-making, the goals of the 
urban regime, as well the city's cultural and economic identity. First, I will discuss the 
Can image be controlled? 
lligh • Direct place marketing
Low 
Level of • Image by public pol icy Level of 
control impact 
Low 
• Path dependency and
unpredictability High 
Figure 8.1 Levels of control and impact of image-making. 
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marketing strategies of Partnership 2000 and look behind the promotional material and 
the official image of Nashville it tried to create. The goal is to fi]I the gap in the city 
promotion literature identified by Short and Kim ( 1998): "the authorization of particular 
image, the politics of image making, is, as yet, rare1y studied" (p. 60). I will identify the 
main players behind the image creation and ask to what degree is there an organized 
strategy behind the public image of Nashville. Who is creating images, for what purpose, 
and who benefits from the way Nashville is represented? Do conflicts over city 
representation exist in the process of image creation? What is represented and projected 
in Nashville images and what is not? This is followed by an analysis of high profile 
development and business recruiting projects from an image perspective-image by 
policy in Figure 8.1. A closer look at the changing country music industry and the 
cultural context in which it operates also places Nashville's image in a path dependent 
context: the close association with country music. I have also assessed the impact of these 
promotions, policies, and trends on the imagability of Nashville by examining internal 
Partnership 2000 documents and by conducting content analysis of selected national 
media. Because this research goes beyond the central analysis oflocal image-making, it 
is presented in Appendix 1. 
8.2 Partnership 2000 and the Music City strategy 
Parallel with the efforts to create Partnership 2000, the Chamber of Commerce initiated 
an image-making process. A 1989 consultant survey done for the Chamber examined 
outsiders' perceptions of Nashvi1le. It concluded, to no big surprise, that if Nashville had 
a positive image, it was the association with country music. But the image of Nashville 
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was also accompanied with a perception of rurality (Duffy, 1997). The city's image was 
in some respects interconnected and indistinguishable from Tennessee's. What did 
Nashville want to present itself as? The instinctive reaction was to move away from the 
traditional stereotype--country music-which by its very definition conveys rurality at a 
time when Nashville's goal was to be urbane. During the initial Partnership 2000 
brainstorming sessions, other slogans with vague notions of centrality were suggested, 
like "The New Beat of the Heartland" (Sherrard, 2000). After a series of suggestions 
failed to raise above the banal, the central question was what distinguished Nashville. 
After conducting brand testing, country music was the only positive and usable image 
associated with Nashville, and the emphasis fell on ''Music City USA" as the slogan for 
the city, which had existed for a long time but never adopted officially35. This decision 
was certainly reinforced by the recognition of Music City in the survey. It was in fact the 
second best-known city label in the country, after New York's "The Big Apple" 
(McGraw, 1992), which was a tremendous asset considering how hard it is for cities to 
adopt slogans that will not be lost in the chaotic world of messages. 
However, there were both positive and negative aspects to Music City USA. The 
slogan suggested Nashville is exciting and creative, which is attractive both from a 
quality of life perspective and in signifying fertile ground for sophisticated service 
industries. It also exaggerated Nashville's weaknesses-the hick town image-a sore 
spot that has haunted city boosters for decades. Business Nashville is full of anecdotes 
35 The cmTent usage of Music City USA is associated with an announcer at the WSM radio station around 
1950. There are, however, references to Music City that date as far hack as the 1870s to the Fisk 
University's Juhilee Singers (Feilier, 1998). 
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such as this one: "Economic developers called and said 'we want to put a plant in 
Nashville, but when you get off the main road, are the streets paved?' We couldn't 
believe it, but country music was associated with Appalachia and it didn't seem Nashville 
could be a sophisticated place" (Sherrard, 2000). Not that this image problem was new to 
the city. The same concerns and the same dilemma regarding Music City has been voiced 
by the Chamber and other boosters at least since the 1970s (Ridley, 1995, November 9). 
The business community had to come up with a solution of how both to take 
advantage of Nashville's association with the music industry and to eventually evade its 
inherent limitations. The idea behind the adoption of the slogan Music City USA was to 
capitalize on an existing image. From this starting point, the aim was to diversify and 
broaden the general perception of the city (McDaniel, 1997). This strategy is logical in 
the context of Sunbelt growth, which, for example, is reflected in an upbeat 1978 
National Geographic article that portrayed Nashville as affluent and dynamic. The 
article's theme was the diversity of the city beyond country music (Kernan, 1978). The 
magazine largely repeated the story in 1986 after the Saturn plant helped Middle 
Tennessee expand the idea of economic and· cultural diversity (Vesilind, 1986). 
Through advertising, Partnership 2000's image building process was in progress. 
Aimed squarely at corporate elites, the advertising was placed in magazines like Forbes 
and Fortune and depicted Nashville as a corporate city using businesslike images of the 
downtown. With the location of an American Airlines hub to Nashville, images of 
airplanes were used to convey the message that Nashville was easily accessible and 
equipped with excellent transportation. As the strategy suggested, the advertisements 
displayed a Music City USA logo at the bottom. The rather generic images of modernity 
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displayed a Music City USA logo at the bottom. The rather generic images of modernity 
with buildings of glass and steel and airplanes lined up at an airport are aimed at putting 
Nashville on the business map. This reflects a building process where new, but rather 
simple images are attached to the already established, music-dominated image. 
The follow-up process included one-on-one calls to relocation consultants, and 
making presentations before business groups around the country in regions of corporate 
exodus. One of the first relocation successes was the financial service consulting firm 
Deloitte & Touche, which moved its back office functions to Nashville in 1990. Today 
the Chamber feels that Nashville probably overattracted back office operations. Together 
with Omaha, Nashville became the place where you find more of that type of operation 
than anywhere else, says the first Partnership 2000 chairman Tom Sherrard. Nashville has 
� . 
since moved away from that approach, instead focusing on economic activities-a few 
service-oriented industries complemented with a healthy number of manufacturing 
companies-that have a better capacity to raise the local average income level. 
The strategy from the initial campaigns was later refined, but still emphasized the 
same theme of image expansion. A successful advertising series launched in 1995 shows 
an object easily identifiable with the music industry and underneath it the reader can 
catch a glimpse of a product associated with an industry operating in Nashville. In the 
picture, the surface layer of the commonly held image of the city is peeled off and below 
the reader is encouraged to "Discover the Unexpected" (Figure 8.2). The campaign 
included several advertisements based on the same principal concept. A stack of music 
sheets reveals a pile of books (the printing and publishing industry), a piano keyboard is 
seen on top of windshield wipers (automotive suppliers), and underneath a compact disc, 
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Figure 8.2 The "Discover the Unexpected'' campaign. Source: Nashville Area Chamber 
of Commerce. Used by permission. 
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a Bridgestone-Firestone tire is visible. This is a clever game with shape and form that 
reinforces the core message-there is more to Nashville than the music industry; more 
than most people think. The goal statement for the ad campaign reads: "Three new ads 
[are] designed to generate inquiries among target audiences and industries ... The new 
concept repositions the Nashville region as a stronghold for business" (Partnership 2000, 
1995). The ads are more targeted than earlier promotions and were placed in industrial 
recruitment magazines instead of general interest business magazines36. It is a diversified, 
yet focused strategy. Promotion has become more and more specialized. Later, trade 
journals serving specific industries such as health care and entertainment were also 
targeted. What has taken place is an attempt to completely reshape Nashville's business 
image from the bottom up. 
The most recent campaign focuses on attracting technology companies 
(Partnership 2000, 2000). Especially since Dell computers expanded to Nashville, the 
city's strategy has been to address one of the deficiencies in the local economy: the lack 
of a computer industry. The new technology campaign has thematic similarities with the 
Discover the Unexpected campaign. Now, one tag line is "Arguably, the most popular 
instrument in Nashville," accompanied by a picture of a laptop computer. Another ad 
states, "These days, being part of Nashville's skilled labor force doesn't necessarily mean 
you play guitar," and shows a hand holding a microchip. Again, these ads have been 
featured in various business and site selection magazines. In addition, Partnership 2000's 
36 In the 1997-1998 fiscal year, the complete list of publications advertised in include: Area Development, 
Business Facilities, E�pansion Management, Plants, Siles, & Parks, Site Selection, Outlook America, 
Southem Business and Development, Tennessee Economic Development Guide, and Forhes. Partnership 
20(X) maintains a list of upcoming cditmial themes for a wide selection of magazines to advertise in the 
issues that most likely attract their particular target audience (Partnership 2CX){), 1997, May). 
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advertising for the first time not only attempted to attract new investment, but also 
recruiting a college educated workforce using, for example, movie screen advertisements 
in targeted U.S. cities. The workforce issue is addressed further in Chapter 10. 
In most cases an advertising agency is contracted to develop the promotional 
advertisements. Only one of the producers of city promotion ads, the Visitors and 
Convention Center, uses both an ad agency and produces material in-house. The two-way 
communication process always involves a series of meetings between the client and the 
ad agency. Like most work of this type, be it consumer products or a city, the sellers and 
the professional marketing people develop ideas together. They also rely on national 
surveys conducted by a hired research company to detennine what people think about 
Nashville and other competing cities, what they read, and where they get their 
information in order to fashion the appropriate advertising and public relations effort 
(Harris, 2000). In this case, the Chamber of Commerce provides the basic theme-there 
is more to Nashville (other than country music) than you would expect. The ad agency 
develops design ideas that would best meet the objective in an imaginative and inventive 
way. After a mutual discussion on alternatives, a final concept is chosen: for example, the 
layered image of the "discover the unexpected" campaign. 
Partnership 2000 has also assessed the effectiveness of their advertising 
campaigns. The period l 994-1996, which covers the "Discover'' campaign, produced 482 
"inquiries" and 283 more serious contacts with businesses called "leads" that can be 
attributed to advertising (Partnership 2000, 1996a). On the public relations side, 
Partnership 2000 had 209 outside media visits and the organization's staff made 30 
recruiting trips around the country. In alJ, 225 relocation prospects visited Nashville, of 
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which 71 eventually decided to relocate to Nashville, although Partnership 2000 does not 
explicitly tie this to their advertising. Of those 71 companies, 67 were among the six 
groups of targeted industries Partnership 2000 focused on during the time period. 
Since "Discover" and earlier campaigns, media advertising has decreased. The 
first year Partnership 2000 spent $293,300, but by year seven ( 1996-1997) the advertising 
allocation had declined to $164,400 (Partnership 2000, 1997, May). The organization's 
public relations plan instead stresses the importance of educating the audience about 
Nashville, rather than selling the city to them. Partnership 2000's own analysis points to 
outside interest in relocation and awareness of Nashville as a strength. But at the same 
time, Partnership 2000 is self-critical. In the organization's public relations plan, the 
inevitable mixed message of Music City v. cosmopolitanism is listed under 
"weaknesses." Media fragmentation makes messaging harder, and the plan calls the 
Music City image "oversaturated." Other negatives include a lack of marketable qualities 
that set Nashville apart from competitors and a poor perception of the Nashville school 
system. They also noted a declining status for Nashville in various city ratings since the 
early 1990s (Partnership 2000, 1997, June). 
One recent move in the representation of the city regards the focus on the slogan 
Music City USA. As the campaign of broadening the image base has been considered 
successful, a need for reconstructing the image has arisen. Conscious moves have been 
made to redirect the focus onto Nashville and away from Music City. In newer 
advertisements and other forms of logo display, Music City is subordinated to Nash ville 
graphically. Note the temporal changes in the logo in Figure 8.3, which is taken from 
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Figure 8.3 A change in emphasis away from Music City, as seen in the Chamber of 
Commerce logo. Source: Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce. Used by permission. 
Chamber employees' business cards. The current logo only alludes to the music industry 
with an ambiguous star. 
Image-making has become increasingly centralized, directed from Partnership 
2000, which depends to a certain degree of consensus in image politics. However, the 
attractiveness of the Music City slogan varies among different industries. Presumably, 
Gaylord Entertainment is one company that benefits from the extensive use of the Music 
City image in advertising. The growing health care industry has expressed feelings that it 
is not benefiting from this promotional strategy (McDaniel, 1997); the health care 
industry is also the least represented industry in Partnership 2000. Similarly, Vanderbilt 
University has been marginally involved in Partnership 2000 (although Vanderbilt 
Medical Center has been listed as a "minor investor") with the emphasis on Music City. 
Vanderbilt University embodies the other Nashville image-The Athens of the South. 
Indeed, the proposal to use Music City USA as the dominant slogan initially met with 
some resistance from the old elite: "the Vanderbilts of the world thought it played of 
something that didn't capture all of Nashville" (Sherrard, 2000). But despite some 
dissatisfaction with the slogan, most of the business establishment has backed the 
ubiquitous, but declining, use of Music City USA. 
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The shift in strategy at this point was in part due to changing economic 
circumstances. By 1997, Nashville had reached an economic plateau (Nashville Area 
Chamber of Commerce, 1997b ). To continue to spur growth, the Chamber and the 
Partnership worked to correct several identified problems affecting the business climate: 
eliminating labor shortage by improving the skills of people entering the workforce, 
encouraging better government services (i.e. air, highway, and rail transportation, and 
crime prevention), and improving financial resources (venture capital and government 
investment). These efforts are reflected in Partnership 2000's public relations and image 
work. The marketing plan of 1998-2002 stresses workforce recruitment to a much greater 
extent than before, and the resulting marketing efforts placed a stronger emphasis on 
Nashville's quality of life. The stated strengths of Nashville include an entrepreneurial 
culture, acceptance of outsiders, strong name recognition, sports and entertainment in a 
dynamic downtown, affordability, and a relatively large number of college students. The 
unresolved ambiguity of Music City, however, continues to be a concern even as a partial 
shift from corporate recruiting to quality of life marketing is evident. Nevertheless, the 
recent Partnership 2000 strategy continues to stress the unique, but through means other 
than Music City. The generic messages that most cities rely on-low taxes, light 
regulation, moderate climate, nice neighborhoods-will be used sparingly due to their 
lack of uniqueness (Partnership 2000, 1998). The marketing goal is instead to have a 
message that makes an "emotional impact" on the audience. To do so, Partnership 2000 
has devised a strategy focused on a so-called "Unique Selling Proposition" which 
emphasizes Nashville's entrepreneurial culture with an open attitude towards both ideas 
and people. Moreover, the marketing plan states that public relations tactics rather than 
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narrow advertising are effective on decision-makers who develop their attitudes by 
dialogue with peers, personal travel experiences, and by articles in media more than 
direct advertising material. That said, the plan does not propose to abandon traditional 
advertising-it is a "valuable source of leads"-but to broaden city marketing in other 
directions (Ibid.). 
A handful of other players also promote Nashville through advertising. Major 
power companies are usually important in the selling of a place or a region. At least two 
reasons contribute to their role in this regard. First, they are firmly attached to place. 
Traditionally being a regulated industry, power companies have a service area where they 
often occupy a monopolistic market position. Their fortunes are thus closely tied to local 
growth, not only through multiplier effects, but also through direct income from increase 
in energy demand. The second reason is their size. A power company is often one of the 
largest companies in a city, commanding tremendous financial resources. This 
combination of local growth dependency and capital strength has made power companies 
an important player on the industrial recruiting scene. 
The Nashville energy market is divided by the publicly owned Nashville Electric 
Service and Nashville Gas, a private company. Nashville Electric Service has been one of 
the lead investors in Partnership 2000. However, NES does not spend anything on 
promoting themselves and the region directly, according to their development director 
(Duffy, 1997). No independent advertising campaign has been launched by Nashville 
Electric after 1991 when their efforts were coordinated with Partnership 2000. It is more 
efficient "to speak with one voice," (Ibid.) i.e. through the centrally organized campaigns 
of Partnership 2000. Their input, as well as the input of the other members of the 
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organization, is limited to the marketing committee where the direction of the 
promotional campaigns is discussed. Duffy also stresses that from a development 
perspective, many factors are more important than generic ads in industrial recruitment 
magazines. Targeting specific industries and the ability to present hard data regarding 
economic issues, site availability, and tax deals are fundamental to attracting new 
business. Good rankings regarding the "business climate" and quality of life in key 
business magazines are equally important. By downplaying imagery, Duffy places 
advertising in a more modest role for industrial recruitment purposes. 
Nashville Gas, the other main power company, occasionally produces advertising 
for the national market directed towards industrial location (DiMeola, 1997). 
Interestingly, Nashville Gas is not one of the lead investors in Partnership 2000 (although 
it is a minor contributor). Their advertising is only in an indirect sense promoting 
Nashville, but where to place the ads is carefully researched so as to have the greatest 
impact with regards to the specific target audience. 
Direct place marketing has two main audiences: relocating businesses and 
potential tourists. As in most cities, the entity for marketing Nashville for tourists is the 
Convention and Visitors Bureau. Their promotion activities span a wide range of 
activities. Through demographic and geographic research, states such as Illinois, Texas 
and California have been identified as important source areas of country music tourists 
(Sanders, 1997). Resources are often combined, for example when tourist promoters in 
Nashville and Memphis, jointly with the State of Tennessee, set up an office in England 
at the same time American Airlines offered a short-lived Nashville-London flight. As an 
international spokesperson, leading country performer Marty Stuart wrote the song 
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"Magic Town" to promote Nashville. The video was aired in selected markets worldwide, 
especially through Gaylord-owned Country Music Television, developing an integrated 
city-industry promotional strategy in a manner that few cities are positioned to do. The 
office in Britain was established to promote Nashville in the European market, but proved 
less productive, so Nashville is not currently pursuing international advertising. 
Demographically, women are increasingly a prime audience for country music and 
advertisements are placed in lifestyle magazines such as Southern Living. The 
Convention and Visitors Bureau relies mainly on such general interest print media, 
although radio advertising can also target specific audiences in particular regions. Figure 
8.4 shows an example of an ad by the Convention Center portraying Nashville as a hot 
place, referring to the growth of country music. The Convention Bureau and Opryland 
have studied the effectiveness of the advertisements placed on television and in print, and 
73 percent of tourists visiting Nashville said the ads influenced their decisions to visit 
(Campbell, 1992, December 14). 
The Convention and Visitors Bureau has the authority from the Mayor's Office to 
act as the central tourist promoter of Nashville. It is not only responsible to the mayor and 
the Metro government, but also to the Chamber of Commerce and its members, who 
support the Bureau financially. Although all promotional decisions are eventually taken 
within the Bureau, major marketing strategies must be approved by the mayor and the 
Chamber. In practice, the bureau claims, any restraint placed on promotional activities 
has been budgetary rather that objections to content (Sanders, 1997). 
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Figure 8.4 In the wake of the big country music breakthrough, the Nashville Convention 
Center produced an advertising campaign that reflected the mid- l 990s status of the genre. 
Used by permission. 
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8.3 Entrepreneurial projects and image-making during the Bredesen administration 
While direct place-marketing may have some effect on how a city is perceived ( and there 
are indications that the perception of Nashville has changed; see Appendix l ), it certainly 
reveals how a city would like to be perceived. But beyond advertising and public 
relations, there are other activities that may be more influential in materially changing 
Nashville, and along with it, its image. In this section I will discuss public policy from an 
image perspective as suggested in the conceptual model of image control (see Figure 
8.1). 
Phil Bredesen exerted limited influence in terms of direct activities affecting the 
image creation process. The Mayor's Office plays a role in the coordination of the image 
production through an annual event called the Selling Greater Nashville Workshop. The 
goal of this workshop is to inform business leaders how Nashville has developed over the 
year, how it compares competitively with other cities, and how the development strategy 
is proceeding. In short, the goal is to feed business leaders the same data, which is useful 
in presenting a coherent front in the recruitment process. More importantly, as mayor 
Bredesen had a good grasp of the potential for image-making by entrepreneurial policy. 
When considering day-to-day decisions, Bredesen reflected how these decisions would 
affect Nashville's competitive position. He found running the daily business of 
government less interesting; it almost runs on auto-pilot. Instead, his eight-year mayoral 
tenure focused on the tools at his disposal that could reposition Nashville both internally 
and externally (Bredesen, 2001). Bredesen's enduring legacy was grand projects. His 
strategy was to focus on specific issues crucial from a broader development perspective 
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(Hawks, 1997). Entrepreneurial projects during the Bredesen period can be divided into 
three categories: corporate incentives, sports development, and downtown revitalization. 
As mayor, Bredesen secured five large corporate tax breaks. They benefited: I. 
Industries unique to Nashville that play an important part of the economic identity of the 
city; 2. Industries that form a vital local cluster which without the subsidy would be in 
doubt; or 3. Growth industries in the high-tech or advanced service sector. In most cases 
tax subsidies were offered to retain or attract corporate headquarters. The result was 
mostly favorable through media exposure portraying Nashville as a dynamic city building 
on existing strengths and expanding in the right direction (see Appendix I). However, the 
economic rationale of offering large corporate incentives is often challenged. The payoff 
in terms of jobs and wages created, either directly or by multiplier effects, may or may 
not exceed the costs of the subsidy package. Especially the financial cost of attracting 
major league teams and building stadiums may outweigh the gains (Euchner, 1993). 
However, some of the multiplier mechanisms are poorly understood and hard to quantify 
or subject to economic analysis. Such effects operate in at least two subtle ways: by 
making a city appear as pro-business and by supporting a forward-thinking image in the 
popular imagination. A brief overview of the subsidies follows. 
1. The Opryland Hotel and Convention Center is one of the largest complexes of
its kind in the United States and one of the most profitable enterprises of Gaylord 
Entertainment. Since the city-county consolidation, Nashville has two taxation districts. 
Opryland is located in the Urban Services District but adjacent to the General Services 
District. Metro government agreed to change the boundaries and place Opryland in the 
General Services District with its lower property tax rate. Together with a hotel tax break, 
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Gaylord stood to save $22 million (Hobbs, 1993, June 14). The move freed capital for a 
massive expansion of the Opryland Hotel, which ostensibly was dependent on this 
subsidy. Bredesen also promised Gaylord not to expand the city-owned convention center 
downtown for ten years after the reopening of Opry land Hotels. Metro government also 
had one additional reason for pursuing the policy: as a strong connection exists between 
convention activities and air traffic, the move would help secure Nashville's American 
Airlines hub (see Chapter 9). 
2. Not long after the Opryland deal, the question of headquarters location for the
religious publisher Thomas Nelson emerged. The Nashville-based corporation grew 
dramatically in 1992 following an acquisition of a publishing company in Texas. The city 
of Dallas tried to lure Thomas Nelson and its 1,300-employee operation, but a Bredesen­
negotiated package for Thomas Nelson that included tax abatements resulted in the 
company choosing to stay in Nashville. 
3. A similar situation existed when HCA merged with one of its main
competitors, HealthTrust. This occurred less than a year after HCA moved its 
headquarters from Nashville to Louisville after merging with Columbia in 1993. 
Nashville made it clear that the city wanted the new company's headquarters. Bredesen, 
who had a reputation of completing deals and was elected to office with overwhelming 
support to run government as a business, led the negotiations. Nashville Metro Council 
also passed a resolution that gave Bredesen a free hand in negotiations with the company. 
Nashville was successful competing with Louisville and, again, Dallas for the 
headquarters. Nashville was an advantageous location because the company already 
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owned a large expandable office complex near Vanderbilt University. The value of the 
HCA tax subsidy has been estimated to be between 26 and 116 million dollars. 
4. Mayor Bredesen also played a crucial and influential role in the process that led
to the move of National Football League's Houston Oilers (now the Tennessee Titans) to 
Nashville. The acquisition of one or more professional sports franchises had been on the 
priority list for the city for a long time� several local businessmen had tried 
unsuccessfully to purchase major league baseball or basketball teams for years. By the 
mid-1990s, Nashville, based on market size, wealth, and corporate backing, was a serious 
contender. The broader goal was to strengthen the city's position as an entertainment 
center. However, some inside reports on the workings behind the relocation of the 
Houston Oilers recount a process where the team targeted Nashville, not vice versa, 
through connections at the Nashville Convention and Visitors Bureau (Dobie & Horick, 
1995, August 17). After the initial contact, Bredesen was reportedly skeptical with 
National Hockey League and National Basketball Association relocation failures fresh in 
his memory. Only after realizing the seriousness of the Oilers' interest would Bredesen 
pursue the deal with full force (Ibid.). He enjoyed the fervent backing of the business 
establishment: one observer characterized it as "one of the most impressive collections of 
Nashville's business elite ever to gather for a Metro Council meeting" (Lavey, 1995, 
October 9), when Bredesen presented his plan and urged support for bringing the Oilers 
to Nashville. The council eventually decided to put a bond-financed relocation and 
stadium deal before the voters in a referendum. The Chamber was "very active" in 
219 
working with their members and to get their employees to vote in favor (Harris, 2000)37• 
The referendum passed with 59 percent of the vote in 1996. The image value of the new 
team is perceived as invaluable in business circles: "It has put Nashville on the map with 
decision-makers around the country ... We're on the tip of the tongue with the Super 
Bowl" (Hunt, 2000). Undoubtedly, it has had the desired effect of creating awareness. 
5. The last deal of the Bredesen administration was the 1999 construction of a
3,000-employee Dell computer manufacturing plant in the industrial area close to the 
airport. Most observers believed this sprawling development would land in one of the 
surrounding counties, but a property tax break and free land deal was worked out by 
Metro government and the airport authority. High value manufacturing benefits from a 
location near airports, a fact that clearly influenced the location decision. Critique from 
the Tennessean questioned whether the cost of the public subsidy (which they placed at 
$116 million) together with indirect costs, such as schools and services, exceeds the 
benefits of the deal (Wissner, 1999, May 7). At this point the public opinion of Bredesen 
started to reflect the question of whether Nashville's resources had been overextended in 
the pursuit of economic development, but the deal finally passed in city council (27-11) 
despite some resistance. 
The major elements of image-making through policy are mutually reinforcing. 
Attracting sports teams involved major corporate subsidies, but it is also a leading 
component in the downtown development efforts. During the last ten years, downtown 
37 The Yes campaign outfinanced the No side 20-1 with the biggest contributors being NationsBank, 
Gaylord, Nissan, and Bridgestone/Firestone (Ippolito, 1996, May I). A leading local public relations firm 
also put a positive spin on the deal. Local businesses snapped up luxury suites quickly, but when ordinary 
season tickets did not sell out as required, Thomas Frist purchased the necessary tickets (Dobie, 1996a). 
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Nashville has undergone substantial changes. Second Avenue was upgraded back in the 
1980s during Mayor Fulton's beautification initiatives, but the physical improvement was 
only accompanied by a modest increase in downtown visitors, businesses, and residents. 
On lower Broadway, heavy-handed tactics of selective liquor violation enforcement in 
non-desirable establishments were reported during the Boner administration to "clean up" 
the area (Dobie, 1989b ). But in 1990, only one million out of seven million annual 
tourists visited Nashville's downtown (Hinds, 1990, December 17). Downtown held 
equally low attraction value among local residents. Commercially, Second Avenue was 
abandoned by retail over the decades, leaving Broadway in commercial isolation; it 
developed as a location for more space-consuming goods, especially low-end furniture, 
which tied it closer to the warehouse district to the south (Marshall, 1975). Before the 
current revival, commercial activities in the area were, for the most part, restricted to 
pawn shops, peep shows, and second-hand stores intermixed with empty retail space. 
Lower Broadway on the south edge of downtown, with its proximity to the area once 
called Black Bottom, had a seedy side to it that is no longer present. 
The transformation from a dormant city center to an active, albeit tourist­
dominated, street scene is apparent to most visitors and citizens of Nashville. Several 
landmarks have been added to the cityscape (Figure 8.5). The first sign of rejuvenation 
after the real estate crisis was the 1993 construction of a highly visible new corporate 
headquarters for BellSouth, a postmodern skyscraper with the vernacular name "the 
Batman Building," due to its two pointy side towers. However, the path of the 1990s was 
not to be based on office development. Several major investments have followed, such as 
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an arena built to attract a major league hockey team and the Ryman Auditorium 
renovation, bringing pedestrians to lower Broadway and Second Avenue. The streetscape 
is a peculiar mix of the generic and the unique. Well-known commercial pop culture 
symbols with big city, even worldwide, appeal, such as the popular theme restaurants 
Hard Rock Cafe and Planet Hollywood (the latter is now defunct), are found next to old 
Nashville icons such as Ryman Auditorium. Restaurants of all degrees of sophistication 
line the streets together with souvenir shops and some unchanged, colorful honky-tonks 
left from years past. With these changes, downtown has become the centerpiece for 
image rejuvenation. This is where people-tourists, potential investors and other 
important targets for image-makers-can gather, eat and be entertained. The traditional 
urbanity that is recreated forms the backdrop to give credibility to Nashville's claim to be 
Music City USA. A new landscape of cultural consumption is produced in Nashville as 
increased middle-class interest in country music has influenced the downtown changes. 
After having Jived in Boston and London before coming to Nashvil1e, Bredesen 
valued traditional urbanism, which became one component for his vision of a future 
Nashville. The goal was first to reestablish downtown as a cultural and entertainment 
center. Bredesen was even suspicious of the Bicentennial Mall, primarily a state project, 
which detracted from the spatial focus on the southern end of downtown as the place for 
urban rejuvenation (DuBose, 1994, February 17). In January 1993, Bredesen announced 
that a downtown arena was under consideration (which together with the Ryman 
renovation announced by Gaylord in March 1993 was the starting point of the 
revitalization process [McCampbeH, 1993, March 23]). Both downtown development and 
Nashville's strategy as an entertainment city could be enhanced with an arena. The arena 
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site just south of Broadway was an obvious choice, as some land was in public hands 
through the Metropolitan Development and Housing Authority (MDHA). In addition, 
MDHA acquired 36 different properties needed to make way for the four block-long, 
three block-wide arena project. Initially, Gaylord was singled out as the main corporate 
partner; they were uncommitted, yet interested. The arena was not conceived as a space 
for a NHL team, but instead as a music and conference venue, with the possibility of 
attracting a NBA basketball team. Metro government and Gaylord Entertainment initially 
teamed up to bring the NBA's Minnesota Timberwolves to Nashville, a project that 
eventually failed, although floor space design was planned in such a way as to keep open 
the possibility of hockey (Dobie, 1994, April 7). 
Everybody involved in downtown issues strongly supported the idea. Historic 
preservationists of Historic Nashville, the tourism planners in the Convention and 
Visitor's Bureau, and the Metropolitan Planning Commission all agreed that the 
infrastructure and traffic issues could be solved satisfactorily, and the historic integrity of 
downtown would not be compromised. Strong support from the Chamber was achieved at 
an early stage. A subcommittee within the organization was formed to approach the arena 
issue, but the Mayor was the driving force behind the idea and implementation. Just like 
in the Oilers' case, Nashville was helped by personal connections in attracting a NHL 
expansion team. Dick Evans, the new CEO at Gaylord, was formerly a member of the 
Board of Governors of the National Hockey League and an executive with the New York 
Rangers and their arena, Madison Square Garden. His strong ties with commissioners of 
the league were undoubtedly a crucial factor. 
224 
The downtown arena and professional sports have been Bredesen' s "pet projects." 
From there on the image creation "will take care of itself," says Cliff Hawks at the 
Mayor's Office. He clarifies with an example, the National Figure Skating Championship 
held in the new arena: "It is great to have your skyline out there nationally, night after 
night on primetime television" (Hawks, 1997). With the arena, Bredesen gets at least 
partial credit for the revitalization of downtown, and the implications from an image 
perspective. MDHA figures show that $172 million worth of business investment 
occurred in the downtown area between the announcement of the arena and the end of 
1996, the most intense period of development. Much of it was invested on lower 
Broadway: $33 million in new or renovated restaurants and another $33 million in 
residential development (Lawson, 1996, December 16). (Meanwhile, downtown 
Nashville had one of the highest office vacancy rates in the region at this time--13 
percent in 1996.) Downtown scenes are increasingly important pictures for the city's 
promotion, especially tourist-oriented material. National chains decided to move in to the 
downtown area after the decision was made to build the arena-Hard Rock Cafe 
announced its arrival in October 1993 after the take-off was obvious, Planet Hollywood 
opened in 1996, and NASCAR Cafe in 1997. One major downtown investment, the $100 
million BellSouth tower (project planning started in November 1991), predates the arena 
announcement, although its impact on the creation of entertainment space is negligible. 
National media exposure of yet greater magnitude followed shortly after the 
arena. The city entered negotiations with the Houston Oilers and eventually settled on a 
financial agreement. The football stadium is located on the east bank of the Cumberland 
River across from downtown. The area was characterized by mixed land use, including a 
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dwindling amount of barge-related businesses. It was a logical site; high visibility next to 
downtown, but without disruption of desirable urban land uses. A major portion of the 
Coliseum is financed by state bonds to be repaid by sales tax revenue generated by the 
stadium. 
Unlike in the past, the music industry plays an active role in local urban 
development. Cooperation between the music industry and the traditional business 
community has produced a series of investments downtown such as a revived Ryman 
Auditorium and a new Country Music Hall of Fame operated by the Country Music 
Foundation. The tourist facilities of country music had been on Music Row for decades, 
but increasingly there were potential synergy effects with downtown development. At the 
same time the arena idea was developed, Bredesen had other ideas of how to further 
enhance downtown's entertainment potential. In the winter of 1993, Bredesen contacted 
Bill Ivey, the director of the Country Music Foundation with a proposition for a 
partnership to build a new Hall of Fame near the new downtown arena. At first, Ivey was 
not interested, but after the arena moved from plan to reality, the leadership of the 
Foundation rethought the opportunities of the new location (Dobie, 1994b). In October 
1994, the Country Music Foundation announced the move of the Hall of Fame to the new 
1ocation downtown, but the move was slow as the city council was reluctant to subsidize 
the development over a period of two years (1994-1996). But the Foundation was 
eventually granted the title of the old Hall of Fame (the city owned the land) to back 
bonds for the construction of the new building. The financing of the structure, in order of 
magnitude, was achieved through Country Music Foundation bonds, private donations 
(private pledges in the$ 1-3 million range came from the Frist Foundation, record label 
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executive Mike Curb, Opryland, and Dollar General), and the National Endowment for 
the Arts. $19 mil1ion worth of city bonds and hotel tax money also supported the project, 
which was completed in 2001. 
It was not obvious that Gaylord should embrace downtown development. In the 
early 1990s, few Opryland visitors ventured downtown. With significant investments 
made in "Music Valley," the suburban area at Opryland, perhaps downtown revival even 
posed a threat to Gaylord� it was not clear whether enough tourists existed to support both 
downtown and Opryland. Eventually a decision was taken to renovate the Ryman, which 
at the time was a dusty museum and only a brief stop on the bus tour itineraries. The 
venue can now host mid-size music acts not limited to country music. Later, Gaylord 
created the Wildhorse Saloon, a restaurant and bar with a large dance hall designed to 
attract country music fans. Gaylord also became part-owners in the NHL team Nashvil1e 
Predators, who play in the downtown arena, officially named the Gaylord Entertainment 
Center. Gaylord's downtown investment was tied to the Opryland complex through a 
river taxi until Opryland theme park closed in 1998. In the late 1990s, Nashville suffered 
from a slump in tourism at least in part due to the Opryland closing, but the most 
significant underlying factor is the declining sales of country music. Naturally, this has 
posed some challenges downtown development, but the urban revival trend has been 
strong enough to avoid serious disinvestment. 
A handful of other investments of more recent dates, both public and private, have 
had some success in transforming downtown beyond the immediate entertainment district 
into livable spaces. A new public library, Bredesen's last monument, is an attractive 
state-of-the-art facility. Next to the library sits the Cumberland, a new residential 
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skyscraper with upscale apartments. Both are located on Church Street, once the city's 
premier business address that after years of neglect has found a new fonn and function. 
Finally, the Frist Center for the Visual Arts makes good use of the old downtown post 
office38. The Nashville Civic Design Center, a non-profit sponsored both by the city 
under urban design minded current Mayor Purcell and Vanderbilt University, can perhaps 
provide comprehensive guidance to a downtown, and indeed a whole city, historically 
oblivious to planning. 
8.4 Country music: From anachronism to ideal 
What has been said so far indicates that Music City USA was the obvious choice for a 
promotional strategy. As a ready-made brand label, the slogan has apparent advantages as 
a promotional tool. However, the usage is not free of conflict. In this section, I will 
discuss the third level of image controt the city's dependency on the country music 
image. Moreover, I will explore the changing cultural meaning of country music that 
underlies the ambivalent relationship between the business community and the music 
industry, and between the social elite and country music. Attitudes toward country music 
are important both for the promotional push by Partnership 2000, and the role of Mayor 
Bredesen in the remaking of Nashville's image. 
Such an analysis calls, first of all, for a brief overview of the music industry in 
Nashville. The rapid urbanization of the South in the post-war era meant that many city 
38 The F1ist Center was perhaps the most suhstantial outcome of Nashville's Agenda, the city's version of a 
collective visioning process currently popular after Chattanooga's suc cess. The realization of the project, 
however, was dependent on the deep pockets of Thomas Frist. 
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residents were born in rural areas. Music was one cultural tradition that was transplanted 
to Nashville. The industry started with radio broadcasting, and later expanded to 
recording, music publishing, television, and tourism. Even if the leadership of this 
industry came from the outside the established business elite of the city, one connection 
was established early: live music radio was developed in association with the insurance 
industry, which used it as an advertising vehicle. National Life broadcast its message 
through WSM. The station was not focused on country music, but its show Grand Ole 
Opry soon became the most popular. WSM and the Grand Ole Opry were originally little 
more than expensive toys for a National Life executive's son, Edwin Craig, an early radio 
enthusiast. WSM's Grand Ole Opry did emerge, however, as a vehicle for name 
recognition for National Life, and despite its position as one of the leading elite 
institutions in Nashville, it stuck with the "hillbilly" fonnat of the Opry because its 
customer base was mainly rural and working class (Peterson, 1975). 
Record companies, still based in New York or Los Angeles, set up offices and 
studios in Nashville, but it was a local talent and WSM musician, Owen Bradley, who 
can take credit for creating a whole music industry district by starting a small studio in 
what is now Music Row. Subsequently, Fred Rose, songwriter with Hank Williams Sr., 
built Acuff-Rose, a music publishing company, and Chet Atkins persuaded RCA to build 
studios at Music Row. The rise of country music was accompanied by a new licensing 
agent, BMI, that challenged the established industry dominant ASCAP. One trade 
organization in particular, the Country Music Association (CMA), emerged as the 
industry's leader after its establishment in 1958. 
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This structure makes for a seemingly unbreakable connection between the city of 
Nashville and country music. The genre may experience upswings or declining fortunes, 
but there is little risk that the industry would abandon Nashville and relocate elsewhere. 
The structure of country music industry-the publishers, producers, musicians, and 
songwriters-makes Nashville indispensable as a location (Daley, 1998). It forms a 
place-based cluster of activities that cannot be replicated elsewhere. Two area universities 
(although not Vanderbilt University) even offer business degrees targeted towards the 
music industry. However, the main attraction and success lies in the daily contacts and 
the close-knit intra-industry network, facilitated by the Music Row neighborhood. 
Originally Music Row was a small neighborhood converted to office use. A strong 
relationship based on physical proximity between record companies, music publishers, 
songwriters, recording studios, and other businesses was crucial for the emergence of the 
industry. The producer/recording studio-owner attracted recording artists to their 
facilities. On Music Row, the executive was often one and the same as the producer and, 
at times, even the musician. This configuration has led to an informal and unique 
business culture. In fact, the music industry today is still the segment in the Nashville 
economy that is most concentrated geographically. Moreover, there is a close relationship 
between the dominant outlet of country music, the radio stations, and Nashville-based 
industry organizations, most importantly the Country Music Association (CMA). 
Mainstream country music is by definition music acceptable for country music radio, 
which means music originating from Nashville more than strict, unchangeable rules on 
musical content. 
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The acceptance of country music nationwide and among a larger spectrum of 
socio-economic groups started in the 1970s. It was part of the South moving into the 
mainstream of America; the Americanization of Dixie and the Southernization of 
America (Egerton, 1974; Cobb, 1982). The Sunbeh South enjoyed migration surp]uses 
and positive imagery as o]d racia] problems diminished rapid]y. Whi]e society was 
disenchanted with the prob]ems of modernism and urbanization, the South, at least in 
myth, represented traditiona] ideals that again served renewed ideo]ogica] re]evance. 
When Richard Nixon inaugurated the new suburban Grand 01e Opry in 1974, he lauded 
the conservative va]ues embodied in country music. What had been anachronistic and 
irre]evant as the Agrarians suddenly became accepted. One music scho]ar (Lewis, 1991) 
notes in passing that the exp]oding popu]arity of country music coincided with the 
increasingly conservative politica] dimate, but this theme is dearly understudied in 
scho]ar]y approaches to country music. Such a comprehensive treatment of cuhura] 
change is beyond the scope of this chapter; here it wi11 suffice to contextua]ize the growth 
of country music, its use as a promotiona] too] for the city, and loca] e1ite attitudes 
towards the music industry. 
A]ong with changes in societal ideo]ogy, the musica] and thematic content of
country music was ahered as we1l. Currently, the social context and origin of country 
music has been de]eted to make it more appealing to a midd]e-dass audience. What 
remains is ]argely a superficia] connection to idea]ized rural values. Music Row has been 
successful in adapting the message of the music to address middle-dass concerns and 
become part of mainstream America. This trend is reflected in the demographics of the 
Nashvil1e tourist. In 1994, 73 percent of the tourists were co11ege-educated and averaged 
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an income of $46,000, a significant socio-economic shift from the traditional working­
class country music audience. In the present world, the distinction between high and low 
culture is less and less pronounced. 
The first taste of widespread pop culture success in Nashville occurred in the late 
1970s when the so-called "urban cowboy" wave popularized country music and the size 
of the industry experienced an unprecedented leap. Country music became a booming 
local industry. Unfortunately, country music, like most other genres of popular music, is 
highly cyclical. By the mid-1980s, country music's share of overall record sales had 
dropped again, and conventional wisdom suggested that the previous success was only a 
brief interlude dependent on the whims of a fickle audience always demanding new 
musical experiences. In a 1985 front-page special, New York Times predicted the demise 
of country music (and implicitly Nashville), but country proved to be more resilient than 
that. The following year, country was on the verge of entering a new wave of popularity 
and music journalists around the nation were talking about the fresh approach of a new 
group of artists, the "new traditionalists." Garth Brooks became the leading star of the 
"class of '89," the real breakthrough year. Country music sales more than tripled in early 
1990s and country music's share of records sold shot up from 7.3 percent to 18.7 percent, 
providing a tremendous boost to the local music industry and Nashville in general (Figure 
8.6). 
Nashville's independent music publishing companies have at the same time 
gradually disappeared. During the 1980s, transnational corporations acquired ownership 
of country music. Five dominant publishers established in the 1940s and 1950s were sold 
to companies like Japan's Sony, and Britain's PolyGram (whose parent now is Seagram's 
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of Canada) and EMI during the late 1980s (Hansen, 1990). Acuff-Rose retained quasi­
local ownership a bit longer as part of Gaylord Entertainment but was eventually sold to 
Sony in 2002. It has been suggested that the large non-American influence in the music 
industry ownership has had a positive effect on Nashville. Nashville may be considered 
rural, ignorant, and Southern in New York and Los Angeles, but foreign owners are more 
likely to be unaffected by these stereotypes and willing to invest in Nashville, as long as 
it proves to be at least as productive as the two world metropolises (Kosser, 1994 ). 
As country music was remade from a cottage industry into corporate empires, the 
culture of the industry was transformed (Oliver, 1990, September 10). Depending on 
what you read, old Music Row was either "clannish, suspicious of strangers, and riddled 
with nepotism" (Lomax, 1985, p. 38) or characterized by a family atmosphere (Hansen, 
1990). In either case, with corporatization came a new approach to music-making and 
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serious marketing efforts. CMA set up a marketing department, and conducted research 
on the country music audience, including purchasing habits, occupational categories, and 
demographic analysis including age, household status and individual income. The level 
of sophistication in the approach to business management is similar to any major industry 
(Campbell, 1992, September 28). Nashville's music industry has also been diversified, 
especially through the growth of Christian contemporary pop. Not only more non-country 
recordings, but also additional business functions such as tour management, booking 
agents, music attorneys, and special accounting groups, have stabilized an industry 
otherwise suffering from a current decline in sales (Harris, 2000). 
Traditionally, the cooperation between the music industry and the rest of the 
Nashville business community has been weak (McGraw, 1992). This does not mean that 
partnerships were not forged when mutual interests could be found. In the beginning, the 
success of the Grand Ole Opry was made possible by National Life insurance company. 
Later CMA formed an alliance with the city and outside business interests to build the 
1973 Country Music Hall of Fame, which became a major tourist attraction for Nashville. 
The local business community was involved in raising money for the Hall of Fame. 
Prominent banker and Watauga member Andrew Benedict was chairman of the effort, 
which was an early signal that country music industry was forging connections with the 
business elite of the city. The modest tourism retail activity in 1960s Nashville was 
located on lower Broadway, but with the Country Music Hall of Fame it moved to Music 
Row (only to return downtown 20 years later). 
Apart from brief interludes of cooperation, a clear cultural distinction exists 
between the music industry and the rest of the business community. In the business 
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community at large, the entertainment industry has had a reputation for shady business 
practices. More than anything else, it is this cultural distinction that kept music industry 
and the old corporate elite separate. For some time the music industry was a relative 
newcomer and most people associated with it were outsiders, albeit from rural Tennessee 
or other parts of the South. As a business enterprise, the music industry existed in a 
parallel universe in Nashville and developed, as noted, a community in itself. 
The attitudes of separation stayed in place until the early I 990s, when the 
profitability of the industry skyrocketed and interest in cooperation to market and develop 
Nashville as Music City USA grew stronger. The collaborative efforts between the 
business community and music industry were aided by the Nashville Entertainment 
Association (NEA), which was founded by maverick music executive and producer 
Jimmy Bowen and operated parallel to the more powerful and entrenched CMA. NEA, a 
formerly independent organization, became (temporarily) an official affiliate to the 
Chamber in 1990. The NEA's alliance with the Chamber was an indication of the 
growing economic influence of Nashville's entertainment industry at that time. The goal 
of NEA is to attract more music business, and to expand the entertainment development 
plan into the realm of film and video production. It has been recognized that the success 
of the city's entertainment and country music profile must be reproduced through an 
active and focused growth agenda. Spectacles, such as the "Extravaganza" and "Fan Fair" 
are, respectively, aimed at highlighting the city's live music scene, and giving the fans an 
opportunity to meet the country music stars. Especially Fan Fair is a significant event for 
the city as well as the music industry. Hundreds of journalists travel to Nashville for the 
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weeklong event, which generates national media exposure outside the narrow country 
music press. 
The music industry became an official Partnership 2000 priority in 1992 with the 
creation of a development director, a task force, and a strategic plan. It was a starting 
point of more active approach and effort to understand how the industry matters to 
Nashville in general. The focus was both internal, taking care of the needs of the industry, 
and promoting Nashville as a music industry center, expanding into new genres and 
embracing new ways of reaching an audience, e.g. music videos. Cooperation was 
extended to produce advertising and surveying the industry to understand its needs. 
Partnership 2000 had the capacity to bring the music industry and the rest of the 
business community closer together. In the early 1990s, Gaylord's Bud Wendell was 
president of the Chamber, while local business leaders were selected to serve on the 
CMA board. An increasing amount of cross-serving on corporate and institutional boards 
made the relationship closer than before. One of the dominant forces behind the 
cooperation was economic; the music industry was one of the contributors to the wealth 
created in Nashville at the time. It was natural for the Chamber to embrace the music 
industry considering the openness of the governance system at the time. 
Adopting the music industry into the Chamber organization was made possible by 
new people and new attitudes. On the music side, a more traditional business approach 
was rising with the corporate take-over of the industry. Some of the profits from 
increased sales of country music have been invested locally. Important bridge-building 
entities such as Gaylord and Partnership 2000 have ensured the cooperation was now 
manifested in downtown Nashville. Nashville's urban redevelopment is dependent on the 
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new integration of music industry into the local power base. On the other hand, the music 
industry can gain from the planning capacity of Partnership 2000. For example, efforts to 
market internationally and attract more tourists and music industry business have been 
approached together. 
There appears, however, to be a cyclical element to the relationship. "The more 
vibrant the business, the closer those ties become," says the Chamber's economic 
development director (Harris, 2000). The music industry's modest participation in 
Partnership 2000 produced few results in terms of new programs and activities. Closer 
ties were developed, but "we have still not been able to bridge that gap as successfully as 
we wanted to. It is a bit of a divide. We made some serious efforts" (Sherrard, 2000). The 
music industry does not rise and fall with the fortunes of Nashville. There may be some 
truth to the opposite--that Nashville's fortunes parallel the music industry's--but to a 
lesser degree than in the past. Nashville needs country music less and less as it grows 
larger and more affluent. This is reflected in the attitudes and relationship between 
business and the music industry. There has always been an on/off ambivalence, but in 
times when country is not in a boom phase, there is less need to cultivate strong ties. 
Nashville's association with music is from a historic perspective a relatively new 
phenomenon and in many ways antithetical to "Athens of the South." The city's elite has 
been discontented with the country music image for a long time. There are two parts to 
the ambivalent relationship. The first one, as discussed, is the cultural and physical 
separation between the business establishment and the music industry that can be bridged 
if economic and institutional conditions are favorable enough. Second, on a fundamental 
level concerning the representation of the city, the elite is unhappy about the high profile 
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that country music has carved for itself in the national mind. As Nashville is "their" city, 
the parochial image that country embodies devalues the realm which they ostensibly 
control. Entertainment in general is not a legitimate elite endeavor from the "old money" 
perspective. A distinction between the social and the economic elite is necessary here, 
even if there is significant overlap on an individual level. 
The social elite is foremost embodied by the Belle Meade neighborhood, which 
was carved out of an old horse plantation that provided the right environment for a upper­
class neighborhood with its park-like atmosphere and historical connection to an 
idealized past still visible in the landscape (see Chapter 7.1). The arrival of country music 
was not particularly welcome in this part of town: "Just as blue-blooded Nashville had 
beaten back the stench of Dayton, another cultural hurricane arrived from rural Tennessee 
to muddy their dinner party" (Feilier, 1998, p. 88). Naturally, the music elite created their 
own social space. "Shunned for the most part by the established, monied families of Belle 
Meade, many of the nouveaux riches from Music Row laid out their own grand mansions 
along Franklin Road or in Hendersonville [ northeast of the city near Old Hickory Lake]" 
(Doyle 1985b, p. 157-158). More recently, representatives from the music industry have 
also played a role in the transformation of the Williamson County countryside as an 
idealized exurban environment (Johansson, 1998, October). 
The country music elite found their own charities to support in much publicized 
events, but some intermixing did occur. Wesley Rose of the Acuff-Rose publishing 
company became a member of the board of directors of traditional elite institutions and 
businesses, such as First American Bank and the Nashville Symphony. Buddy Killen, one 
of the major music publishers on Music Row, craved acceptance into elite circles and to 
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some extent won it through lavish contributions to the "right" charities (Feiler, 1998). He 
also brokered the first country music entertainer to performat the Swan Ball, the elite 
event of the year39• Country music was becoming too big simply to be ignored. Nashville 
government, the business elite, and the music industry joined to build the Country Music 
Hall of Fame on Music Row in 1973 and old guard National Life invested in the 
suburban Opry land complex. 
Nevertheless, there exists a "deeply entrenched well of uneasiness about how 
country music, and by extension, Nashville, is perceived by the rest of the world" (Daley, 
1998, p. 13). The most disliked image of them all is the Nashville-filmed Hee-Haw 
television show, which was in production from 1969-1991, but since has continued to be 
aired on The Nashville Network (TNN). The latent, under the surface, conflict over 
representation became apparent when a local debate occurred in the fall of 1995. Mayor 
Phil Bredesen discussed the "hee-haw" image of the city in an interview with the Wall
Street Journal in the context of recruiting a NFL team and the image implications thereof 
(Rains, 1996). Stirring up a great deal of controversy, the mayor was scolded by the local 
business community as well as Music Row 4°. There was indeed a great deal of sensitivity 
involved in the representation of the city, an issue that is largely unresolved today. 
39 Johnny Cash was the first such country music entertainer to perform at the Swan Ball in 1970, which also 
saw subsequent performances by entertainers such as Loretta Lynn and Barbara Mandrell. 
40 The quote in the Wall Street Journal was: "People who have hesitations about moving to Nashville from 
New York or San Francisco or Chicago wonder 'Am I going to a nice small city with a lot of good 
amenities, or am I going out in the wilderness? ... Nashville isn't big, and it is well known for its hay bales" 
(Helyar, 1995, November 21 ). In a personal interview with Bredesen, he continues to be frank on this 
image theme: "There were a lot of people who were--horrified is too strong of a word-but really rejected 
the notion of Nashville and the hee-haw image. One of the geneses of Partnership 2000 was the desire to 
move away from the hillbilly image and start projecting a different image" (Bredesen, 200 I). The same 
week as the hee-haw incident, in a Sports Illustrated interview, Bredesen characterized Vanderbilt 
University as indifferent to the local community. Moreover, he did not apologize for his statement, which 
displeased leading Vanderbilt alumni on which Bredesen depended politically. 
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9. AIRLINE DEREGULATION, URBAN COMPETITION, AND BUILDING A
NEW AIRPORT
If image is an abstract representation of cities, airport development is a concrete task 
preoccupying the city's leadership. Airports and air service have emerged as 
entrepreneurial tools for cities remaking themselves with intent on moving up the urban 
hierarchy. This possibility opened up with deregulation of the airline industry; the 
network structure was reorganized and new cities had the opportunity to become hubs. 
Deregulation was enacted under the same market-based premises as the banking industry 
discussed earlier. However, the implications for power and strategy formation on the 
local level are quite different. While banking deregulation played a role in the 
transformation of local business institutions in Nashville, airline deregulation often 
produces public-private partnerships and entrepreneurial behavior on part of the local 
government to generate economic growth. 
9.1 Deregulation, hubs, and the mid-size city 
In the literature covering the new inter-city competitiveness and entrepreneurial style of 
government, there are, on one hand, broad macro-economic explanations often grounded 
in the Marxian tradition, while other scholars have pursued empirical investigations on 
comparative urban strategies. A neglected focus is the national legislative trends that 
force cities to expand their competitive behavior. The most important trend is the push 
towards deregulation of a handful of important industries of increasing maturity. 
Telecommunication, trucking and railways, and most recently, the utility industry are 
moving towards free competition on a national level, setting their own rates liberated 
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from spatial monopolies (Nelson & Johansson, 2000, October). All of these industries 
exhibit new geographical patterns with implications for cities and regions. Perhaps most 
important for intra-urban competition is the development in the airline industry, which 
has presented a series of challenges for both the business elite and government in 
Nashville. Unlike the banking industry (see Chapter 7), airline operations are dependent 
on substantial public infrastructural investment. The opportunity is, therefore, greater for 
local decision-makers to use public policy as a tool for economic growth. Because flying 
is positively related to wealth, both on an individual and regional level (Graham, 1995), it 
is a mode of transportation that has benefits for corporations and the affluent segment of 
the population. Thus, growing cities like Nashville must keep up with demand and invest 
in better airport facilities as well as position themselves for future urban growth. 
The growth of the airline industry has greatly reduced travel time, thus improving 
the possibilities of economic interaction between cities and regions. The fundamental 
geographical concept of accessibility explains why it is important for a city not only to 
have an airport, but also to make it a priority in urban development. Relative location 
with respect to infrastructural networks determines the accessibility of a particular city. A 
fundamental role of cities has always been as meeting points and transportation nodes, 
and if, as it has been argued, society is a network characterized by an informational 
economy and a "space of flows" (Castells, 1989). the nodal function is still vital. It 
should be noted, however, that transportation infrastructure is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for economic growth. 
In some ways, the inter-urban struggle over position in the airline network is 
analogous to the railroads more than a century ago. Much like the railroads were 
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responsible for structuring the spaces of industrialism, the airline network is the leading 
mode of transportation in the postindustrial service-economy. There is, however, one 
significant difference between the historical function of railroads and airlines from an 
urban entrepreneurial perspective. The airline network is made up of discrete points with 
no connecting infrastructure in between. The implication is that such a network is fluid 
and susceptible to constant change. Thus, cities are subjected to a high level of 
uncertainty, but at the same time have some room to maneuver to improve their position 
in the network and in the urban hierarchy. 
Deregulation of air transportation introduced a reorganization in the accessibility 
of cities. Where earlier government regulations provided the stability for the network 
system (that existed, for example, in the railroad network), the investment decisions made 
by airlines are now the dominant force shaping the network. Deregulation in the airline 
industry was enacted by the federal government as early as 1978, placing the industry at 
the forefront of a political shifting tide with roots in the economic crisis of the 1970s. The 
neo-liberal architects behind the policy shift argued that government regulations in place 
since the 1930s, which decided pricing, entry and exit of competition, and the level of 
service to various places, were outmoded and inefficient. Consumer advocates also 
argued that the federal regulators were mostly catering to the concerns of the industry 
they were to supervise (Sinha, 1999). Deregulated airlines should now be allowed to 
make market-based investments, which would, in accordance with traditional economic 
theory, drive down the price of air service. But to reap the efficiency benefits of the free 
market, capitalism must reign freely to produce its own space. The strategy employed by 
airlines has been the development of hub cities (Figure 9 .1 ), instead of a point-to-point 
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Figure 9.1 Airline hubs in the United States as defined by FAA. Source: Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (2000). 
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pattern, through which most of their flights are routed41 • Fewer direct flights increase the 
average flight occupancy level--the load factor---thus making the system more cost­
efficient. But travelers are also inconvenienced by longer routes, delays at crowded hub
airports, and declining in-cabin service and comfort.
The evolving network of airports and the airlines' "hub-and-spoke" system have 
been investigated by transportation geographers (Shaw, 1993; Shaw & Ivy, 1994; 
Reynolds-Feighan, 1998). The dispersed geography of the United States encouraged the 
development of multiple hubs for individual airlines, and the emergence of smaller hubs 
allowed the concept to creep down the urban hierarchy. After an initial wave of new 
entries in the market, a period of bankruptcies, mergers, and reorganization occurred 
during the mid-1980s leading to a reconcentration of the industry in the 1990s ( and yet 
another recent crisis that is largely beyond the temporal scope of this dissertation). 
Deregulation results in fewer airlines through industry consolidation, and generally, 
emerging control centers (i.e., hub cities) have benefited through more flights, higher 
employment and lower fares, except in hub cities dominated by a single carrier, where 
prices have increased (Goetz & Sutton, 1997). A problem with hub routing is that it does 
not necessarily reflect the needs of local communities in which they are situated, but 
rather the needs of the airlines and their national network. Barriers to entry have been 
larger than economists predicted, and the benefits from competition are not as strong as 
41 Two competing views exist on what constitutes a hub. First, the Federal Aviation Administration defines 
a hub simply based on the total number of flights to and from a metropolitan region. All commercial 
airports are classified as large, medium, small, or non-hubs. From an airline network perspective, the FAA 
definition is inadequate. It is more common to think of a hub as the locus of a particular airline's hub-and­
spoke system. Henceforth, I will follow Button et al. (1999) and define a hub as one of the nation's 75 
largest airports where at least 60 percent of the flights are operated by one airline, and/or 85 percent 
operated by two airlines. 
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expected. The problems of competition and pricing at the hubs and abandonment at the 
periphery have produced considerable political debate on deregulation and possible 
adjustments of the regulatory system. 
Compared to the attention paid to the network itself, there have been fewer studies 
from the perspective of cities. However, these findings generally support the notion that 
airports are quite important for the local economy. Irwin and Kasadra ( 1991) find that 
improved airline centrality of a city has a positive effect on employment. In a similar 
study, Goetz (1992) also finds support for the idea that growth in air passenger 
transportation is positively related to population growth, although the effect appears to 
diminish over time. Especially employment in producer services tends to increase if a city 
is well positioned in the airline network. Good airline connections are good for travel­
intensive service industries and manufacturing, which emphasize just-in-time and high 
value goods. High tech employment is positively correlated to the existence of a hub 
airport (Button et al., 1999). These findings are significant even if controlled for 
causation, i.e. airport connections bring employment. Debbage ( 1999) takes this 
argument to its logical conclusion: changes in the airline network can drastically affect 
the competitive advantage of places. Acquiring hub status can then be an effective way to 
improve a city's position in the national urban hierarchy, and if the local economy has 
strong global connections, a gateway status with international flights can be equally 
beneficial. It should also be noted that urban competition not only occurs in the 
nationwide hub-and-spoke system, but also between airports in proximity of each other 
(Graham, 1995). 
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Although the inter-urban perspective on the airline industry has been covered in 
previous research, urban case studies are almost non-existent. One exception is 
Whitelegg (2000), who describes the integral part airline transportation has had for the 
growth of Atlanta. An effort by the city's political establishment backed by the financial 
resources of the local banks ensured expanded airport infrastructure, which was also tied 
to expanding high-tech defense economy and the desire to be the progressive capital of 
the South. The goal of becoming a city of international standing started with service to 
London in the late 1970s, which "put the city on the world map," according to the 
boosters at the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. Delta Airlines, as an integrated part of the 
corporate elite in Atlanta, dominated local airport politics and expansions took place so as 
to benefit Delta's operations. Its "fortress hub" in Atlanta could emerge because of the 
company's power in local politics. 
Not all cities are equally positioned to use the deregulated network as an 
entrepreneurial tool to promote local growth. Location, historic ties to particular airlines, 
and the strategies and competition among airlines and their networks all affect cities' 
possibilities of gaining a hub (Shaw, 1993). There are several factors that affect an 
airline's choice of hub city (Graham, 1995): first, it must be located so as to serve a 
sizable passenger market. Important here are two locational attributes-centrality and 
intermediacy (geographical "inbetweenness")--that suggest which places are 
strategically located to occupy a prominent position in the airline network (Fleming & 
Hayuth, 1994 ). Second, as all private enterprises, an airline is striving for monopoly 
status; a potential hub can offer protection against competition, thereby potentially 
increasing the profit margin. As seen in the Atlanta case, political power can translate to 
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monopoly power. Third, airport facilities must be adequate, as expanding infrastructure is 
costly and time consuming. It is especially in this last area where a city can be active. 
With these requirements in mind, deregulation can benefit mid-sized cities the 
most. The argument is simple and straightforward: the system under federal regulation 
was relatively static where cities had their place in the airline network hierarchy. In the 
long run, major cities can lose centrality in the system and move down in the urban 
hierarchy, but a large city will always have good connections simply on the basis of its 
population size. This critical mass offers a multitude of choices for all travelers going to 
or from a major city. Conversely, a small city is unlikely to attract a hub or significant 
passenger traffic that goes far beyond its peripheral location in the urban hierarchy. 
However, if a mid-size city manages to attract an airline hub, its accessibility and 
centrality can increase significantly42 • From the perspective of cities, a window of 
opportunity has, therefore, opened with deregulation. As suggested above, an airline can
be persuaded to locate a hub locally if facilities are improved and expanded. As
overcrowding in airports has been a concern in the deregulated period, an ideal airport is
one that is expanding and not already used to its limits by competitors. A place where the
future design and expansion can be shaped by the interests of the hub carrier is also ideal.
On the other hand, if neighborhood and local environmental concerns are perceived as
obstacles to growth, development could be discouraged.
42 Even if the logic behind mid-size city competition with airports is reasonable, and there is no doubt that 
some cities have behaved entrepreneurially, the question is how the air transportation system actually has 
developed since deregulation from an urban hierarchical perspective. A quantitative analysis is presented in 
Appendix 2. The result is mixed, but provide some empirical evidence that mid-size cities can be either 
winners or losers in the deregulated system. 
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9.2 Airport governance in Nashville 
The remainder of the chapter is concerned with the Nashville experience of building a 
new airport and gaining and losing hub status. First, however, an overview of the political 
system that governs airport policy in Nashville is in order. The airport in Nashville is 
operated by a quasi-governmental agency-the Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority 
(MNAA). Although affiliated with Metro government, it is not financed by city taxes; 
instead, it generates its own income. MNAA is controlled by a board that sets policy and 
appoints an executive president who then independently staffs the authority. The idea was 
conceived and developed in 1969 by a local business group with Watauga ties led by 
John Tune, a Vanderbilt-educated attorney, president of the Chamber of Commerce 
during its pre-reform days, and a General in the Air National Guard. It drafted legislation 
to establish an airport authority separate from Metro Government. And even if the idea 
did not originate in Metro Government, then-Mayor Beverly Briley helped to lobby the 
state legislature to pass legislation that would enable the formation of airport authorities 
in the state (Mathews, 2001 ). The Metro Council passed a resolution creating the 
Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority the following year. 
The motivation for direct involvement of the business elite was "taking the airport 
out of politics." MNAA today feels it operates without the constraints of bureaucracy, 
without the "good ol' boy" syndrome (Willis, 2000) that is implicitly associated with 
local political culture. What Metro government lost in political control it gained in 
financial flexibility. This structure enables the authority to operate in a flexible manner 
and bypass some layers of political approval. Yet the airport is publicly owned, as are 
virtually all airports in the United States. This independent structure is increasingly 
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common, but there are still many directly city-owned and operated airports. Both FAA 
and cities have resisted outright privatization, but several forms of partnerships have 
emerged where everything from concessions to airport management itself is in private 
hands, while the public realm retains ownership control (Truitt & Esler, 1996). Many 
operate on a leasing-basis by private company, but because of airports' importance for 
regional economic development it is considered inappropriate for them to be judged by 
their immediate profitability alone. The public good function that airports perform makes 
them different than private companies. Yet MNAA, in its informational material, strongly 
stresses that the airport is "run like a business." 
The new airport authority was allowed to raise bonds to purchase the airport from 
the city. MNAA now owns the facilities and is solely responsible for the airport's 
operation, which is funded by airline and concession fees, federal and state grants, and 
passenger charges. Revenues from concessions and others renting space in the airport 
terminal make up a significant share of the total revenue: 45 percent in 1992. MNAA also 
has a passenger facility charge, an additional funding source enacted in 1996 despite 
opposition from the airlines, that pay such a tax and pass it on to passengers, at least 
partially. On the other hand, this allows MNAA to maintain an unusually low landing fee. 
The airlines have some power over airport decision-making. In exchange for fees 
paid to the airport authority, the airlines have veto power over the budget presented by 
the airport authority. The airport in practice operates as a partnership between the airlines 
and the authority. Nine so-called signatory carriers participate in the partnership with 
American Airlines as the main financial contributor (and power-player). American has 
occasionally used its veto power to control investments at the Nashville airport (DuBose, 
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1995, January 5). American is tied to the Nashville airport through a contract in which it 
has to pay gate fees ( or as it is now, sublease many of its gates to other airlines) until 
2017. 
This structure does not mean that MNAA is entirely independent from Metro 
government. First, the mayor appoints the board, and appointees must be approved by 
city council. MNAA has a ten-member board, which by law is comprised of people 
representing different interests: three business and finance representatives, two pilot 
representatives, two neighborhood representatives, one engineering representative, one 
legal representative, and the mayor. The original charter called for each member to be 
appointed to a seven-year term. The mayor can potentially influence his appointees, but 
the long tenure is designed to discourage informal political control. The MNAA charter 
was written and conceived to have a structure that would not be influenced politically. 
Since the late 1980s, the mayor has held an official seat on the board. With 
political contacts in the state legislature, then-Mayor Bill Boner was able to add this 
amendment to the governance structure. MNAA at the time was rising in political 
prominence in Nashville with airport expansions and subsequent conflicts between 
neighborhoods and the airport, so this was an attempt to reassert more political control 
over decision-making in airport policy. Boner attended board meetings for a period of 
time, but the practice has not been continued since. Most agreed it was a bad idea to have 
the individual who appointed the board members as a member himself. Bredesen, for 
example, never attended meetings, but instead had a non-voting observer on the board in 
his place. Bredesen had a good relationship with the board leadership and certainly 
wielded considerable influence during some time periods, such as the London route 
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considerations, but he did not intervene in day-to-day operations. This fits Bredesen' s 
modus operandi-active intervention in selected policy issues deemed to be of highest 
importance for the city's overall development. The level of political control exercised 
then is dynamic and depends on actions taken by the mayor and his relationship with 
MNAA. The second power tool that the city can exercise is as the regulator of local land 
use, as the airport is located in Davidson County. In the case of an expansion or changes 
in the physical structure of the airport, this regulatory influence can be significant. 
MNAA Board Chairman John Tune's strategy to create an independent airport 
authority was well-received from the beginning among the business elite, and he 
recruited those who believed that good air service would have an impact on the city. 
Since the founding of MNAA, the board has been dominated by business interests under 
any of the legally required categories. As an example, the current chairman, Fred 
Dettwiller, president of a company called DET Distributors and a political campaign 
contributor to Bredesen, was originally appointed to the board on the pilot's seat. The 
MNAA board has been called "'the elite board," and serving on it is "one of the plum 
unpaid assignments in town" (Newman, 1994). David K. Wilson, banker and long-time 
chairman of the board at Vanderbilt University, was one of the founding members of the 
MNAA board. So was Franklin Jawman, head of local manufacturing giant Genesco. 
Tune himself was MNAA chairman during the first decade. 
Later, Tune suggested his friend, real estate developer Robert Mathews, as a 
board member, and since Mathews had the ear of the mayor this proved easy to 
accomplish. Mathews remained active in airport issues and became MNAA chairman and 
the main representative of business interests throughout the 1980s and 1990s. David K. 
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Wilson and Robert Mathews were acquainted with General William Moore, a former Air 
Force general who worked in the private aviation industry. They approached Moore to be 
the airport's chief executive officer in 1984, a position he held until 2001. The main 
reason for hiring Moore was his political connections at the Federal Aviation 
Administration from his background in the Air Force43• 
9.3 Airport expansion in Nashville 
Nashville is not in the immediate traffic shadow of a larger city, which creates room to 
develop airport growth strategies. The airport is seen as the key component of Nashville's 
role as a transportation center in the mid-South region 44. With deregulation just 
implemented and projections of increased traffic in Nashville and nationwide, MNAA 
began planning for a new terminal in 1980. The existing airport was built by the Work 
Progress Administration during the New Deal and opened in its present location in 
eastern Davidson County in 193 7, but became increasingly inadequate for a growing city. 
Reaching the maximum capacity of the old terminal, 1.3 million passengers annually, 
was imminent. MNAA and the airlines agreed it was time to build a new terminal. The 
original plan was a modest proposal in comparison with the final result, but enough to 
accommodate a feeder, or a mini hub (Brayton, 1987, September 14). Then, in 1985, 
American Airlines called an informal meeting with the heavyweights at MNAA-Moore, 
43 "We walked down the halls off AA and half the people saluted [Moore] and the other half said, 'Hi Bill.' 
Having been in the system up there, he knew most everybody. He was a very knowledgeable individual of 
how the system worked" (Mathews, 200 I). 
44 This role is, in fact, relatively modest. At 7 percent, Nashville has the third lowest employment in the 
transportation sector of the 11 peer cities. The city that stands out as a transportation center is Memphis, 
with 12.9 percent of the workforce employed in the transportation sector (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1997). 
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Mathews, and Wilson-to inform them that Nashville had been selected as the planned 
new hub. American had initially considered Denver, but that city's inability to build a 
new airport in an acceptable timeframe had the airline redirecting its focus to the eastern 
United States as part of an expansive growth plan. The saturation of major hubs led to an 
airline focus on second tier hubs. Nineteen other cities, including Birmingham and 
Louisville, were reportedly considered as well, but Nashville would be the hub if their 
airport expansion could be refitted to suit American's plans (Ibid.). Nashville was 
positioned to serve as a central point in American's cross-pattern network as an 
intermediate stop between Florida and the Midwest, and the Northeast and Texas (Reed, 
1993). 
At that time, MNAA's plans were still in progress so the negotiations were timely 
and could influence the infrastructural investments. The addition of a third runway was 
crucial. MNAA pursued a fast track construction schedule to comply with the wishes of 
American, which expressed confidence in MNAA and General Moore's ability to deliver. 
Additional bonds were issued to cover the new American concourse and runway. 
American's involvement in planning the new terminal was significant. For the first time 
in Nashville, one airline became almost an equal partner to MNAA in the airport. 
Financially, it was responsible for all the amenities in the new C and D concourses. 
Because of American's hub decision, the Nashville airport plan expanded from a 30-gate 
to a 46-gate terminal when it opened in October 1987. Additional construction of 
runways and runway extensions continued until 1994. The bond financed expansion and 
continuous improvements have cost $300 million. 
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The Nashville airport is only eight miles from downtown Nashville. Long before 
an expansion proposal was concrete and before suburbanization had surrounded the site 
in eastern Davidson County, the city purchased large swaths of land to eliminate barriers 
to future expansion. This strategy has enabled the airport to expand contiguously from the 
original WP A airport of a modest 340 acres to 4,460 acres today. At one point, a 
consultant suggested that a new airport should be built in an adjoining county, but Tune 
and the board pursued expansion at the old location (Mathews, 2001). MNAA was not 
willing to give up its central location, forego the opportunity of future industrial and 
commercial real estate around it, and abandon Davidson County for a suburban 
municipality as the board largely represented local Nashville rather than regional 
interests. 
Predictably, despite land use suggestions in the long-term master plan, additional 
residential real estate developments had occurred in the vicinity of the airport. A 
hypothetical runway location was specified, but as master plans and reality are often two 
very different things, lax planning allowed residential development south of the new 
runway. Because of the intervention of American Airlines, the runway was fast-tracked, 
surprising the residents surrounding the airport, who wanted to stop the entire project. 
American Airlines put pressure on officials by declaring that no runway meant no hub, a 
move that was front-page news in 1987. Noise pollution became a thorn in the side of 
MNAA and has been since then; this issue also included a major controversy surrounding 
construction of a fourth runway after 1989. Homes in subdivisions immediately south of 
the airport had to be purchased in 1986. 
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The Donelson area to the north was also affected, but a buy-out was not feasible 
because the land could not be integrated into the commercial districts surrounding the 
airport. Representing several hundred households in Donelson, an organization called 
Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Environment (NOISE) became the major 
opponent of airport expansion. These homes were virtually unsellable on the market. 
Through various legal means, NOISE tried to stop both the terminal and the runway, but 
MNAA eventually won the lawsuit against NOISE to continue construction. The third 
runway opened in November 1989 after several years of neighborhood protest. But the 
noise problem had to be addressed as the houses in question were in the approach of the 
runway (Figure 9.2). A plan for noise abatement was developed with the aid of 
Congressman Bob Clement where MNAA could issue bonds instead of applying and 
waiting for federal money to proceed with an incremental noise abatement program, as 
_..,. 
Figure 9.2 Noise exposure map 1988. Source: MNAA. Used by permission. 
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had been customary nationwide until then. Installation of thicker windows, doors, and 
attic insulation during the five-year program included 2,400 homes at a cost of $95 
million (Willis, 2000). MNAA was first in using the program that Clement introduced. 
Another political concession was made to expand the MNAA board to include a 
neighborhood representative, a person living within a five-mile radius of the airport. 
MNAA had political support from the city. Active help came from the Metro 
Government and an airport expansion task force to coordinate local issues. Then-Mayor 
Richard Fulton (2000) thinks that MNAA treated the residents fairly, making funds 
available to reduce the noise, but admits that the long-term planning and land use process 
had broken down allowing development in the first place. However, there have been 
claims that MNAA board appointments represent political opportunities for mayors to 
build a group of like-minded people in those positions, resulting in a systematic lack of 
critical neighborhood advocates (Newman, 1994). Despite the history of councilmanic 
courtesy in Nashville, councilmen representing neighborhoods around the airport could 
not mount a political challenge and forge a citywide opposition. Neither could they 
secure solid support from the next mayor, Bill Boner, who was ambivalent on airport 
expansion vs. neighborhood concerns and the conflict between pro-growth and anti­
growth forces. Since then, the issue has not been as politically potent as it was in the 
1980s and early 1990s. It was even hoped that Nashville's airport would be among the 
world's largest by 2005 (Moore, 1989, November 10). A plan for a fifth runway existed, 
but it was contingent on an expected doubling on the American hub, which never 
materialized. A large piece of land has instead been offered through a land lease from 
257 
MNAA to Dell Computers which, as documented earlier, has located a manufacturing 
unit close to airport. 
9.4 The rise and demise of the American Airlines hub 
The major renovation of the airport was ready in September 1987. The number of flights 
almost doubled in a year with the American Airlines hub in place (Figure 9.3). By 1993, 
American had 70 percent of the Nashville market, a relatively normal market dominance 
for a mid-size hub city (Goetz & Sutton, 1997). The investment appeared to have paid 
off: between 1985-1988, $200 million worth of bonds were issued, while multiplier 
effects from more business, investments, employment (the Saturn location decision was 
influenced by the new airport), and visitors reaching the local economy were predicted 
at$500 million by MNAA and the Chamber of Commerce (Nashville Magazine, 1987; 
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Figure 9.3 Passenger traffic at the Nashville airport 1979-1999. Source: MNAA, various 
years. 
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Young, 1988, January 24). In 1990, the expansion was considered the shining beacon in 
an otherwise slumping local economy. Fleet maintenance of American's commuter 
subsidiary, American Eagle, added new jobs. The airport area became the hottest 
submarket in real estate, but like elsewhere in the city at the time, the area was affected 
by overbuilding; it had a 25 percent vacancy rate by I 990 (Saponar et al., 1990, August 
27). One of the few negatives was a downgraded bond rating because of the increasing 
reliance on American Airlines (Doganis, 1992). 
9.4.1 American Airlines reorganizes 
Unfortunately, post-deregulation volatility in the industry meant that change was 
imminent. American Airlines opened four hubs in two years, more than any other airline 
in the country, and already had main hubs at Dallas and Chicago. In addition to 
American's presence in Washington D.C. serving international traffic, American Airlines 
opened hubs in San Jose, Nashville, Raleigh-Durham, and San Juan from 1985-1987 
(Figure 9.4). 
However, another airline shake-up had a considerable impact on American's 
strategy. As part of the industry's restructuring, Eastern Airlines filed for bankruptcy. 
American immediately moved into Miami, filling the void Eastern left in order to open 
up a South American corridor with Miami as a central connector. American's focus 
shifted greatly, and flights were cancelled at Nashville and Raleigh-Durham. With Miami 
in the network, American had overextended its capacity for north-south routing along the 
east coast, and as a result decommissioned the Raleigh-Durham hub. It took the Raleigh­
Durham airport until I 999 to supercede the number of flights it had during the early 
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Figure 9.4 The American Airlines network in the early 1990s. (Reprinted from Journal of 
Transport Geography, Vol. 1, S-L. Shaw, Hub structures of major US passenger airlines, 
Pages 47-58, 1993, with permission from Elsevier.) 
1990s peak (Debbage, 1999). But American Airlines was still spread too thin and 
suffered a loss of $22 million in 1992 and $7 million in 1993. It closed San Jose while 
scaling down in Nashville. At the end of 1995, American announced what was already 
apparent: Nashville was no longer a hub. 
American Airlines peaked in Nashville in 1992 and began a gradual pull-out of 
flights in 1993. At the same time, total passengers '�enplaned" and "deplaned"-which 
includes through traffic that merely changes flights in Nashville-saw a downward trend. 
Nashville's total passenger traffic peaked at 10.3 million in 1992 and dropped to 7 
million in 1996 before the trend was reversed (Figure 9.5). At its peak, American 
Airlines operated 280 daily flights from Nashville, which was cut to 52 in 1996. Overall, 
average daily flight service reached 652 in September 1993, but dropped to 392 by 
February 1996 (Bolick, 1996, February 26). 
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Figure 9 .5 Passenger traffic by airline 1979-1999. Source: MN AA, various years. 
However, American Airlines did not depart from Nashville entirely. The scaling down 
was gradual, which allowed Nashville to form a crisis response. After all, "the hub has 
been the single biggest factor in the growth and success of the local economy" (Joe 
Rodgers, quoted in DuBose, 1995, January 5, p. 18). The reason why American did not 
leave Nashville entirely had to do with their financial arrangements in Nashville 
compared to Raleigh-Durham and other airports. In Nashville, American Airlines was, 
and still remains, a signatory carrier that acts as a guarantor of the airport's debt and is 
responsible for long-term lease agreements at concourses C and D. As of fall 2000, 
American still had 17 departures a day, mostly to other hub cities. 
9.4.2 Southwest Airlines and post-hub development 
Even before the new terminal was completed, Southwest Airlines was on the way to the 
MNAA board to make Nashville not a hub, but a "focus city." In fact, when Bob 
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Crandall, American Airlines CEO, announced that Nashville was going to be an 
American hub, he beat Southwest by only days (Willis, 2000). That limited Southwest's 
Nash ville operations, but it remained eager to expand45 • When American searched for a 
hub replacement but none was forthcoming, MNAA spoke to other carriers immediately
about expansion. Southwest seized the opportunity. and with the new gates could expand
from the previous 18 to over 100 flights a day. Practically every other carrier in Nashville
also added service, either through higher frequency or establishing new flights (Figure
9.5). Nashville was still attractive with a new terminal facility that ranked very high in
travelers' surveys (Davis, 1998, February 17), a reputation as one of the most efficiently
run airports in the country (Velocci, 1997, June 16), a good location, few weather delays,
and a favorable signatory carrier package.
Despite other airlines moving in to fill the void, the reality was that airport 
suffered a tremendous setback in the number of flights leaving and arriving at Nashville. 
However, MNAA portrays the loss of the hub as a blessing in disguise. First, American 
Airlines exit has enabled more airlines to operate out of Nashville, and, indeed, the 
airport has experienced a proliferation of operations (Bolick, 1996, February 26). 
Disruption was minimized; in some cases, Nashville did not miss one day of service to 
certain destinations, as those routes were instantly absorbed by other airlines (Willis, 
2000). Second, hub cities often suffer from monopolistic pricing. Greater choices have 
benefited consumers; budget airline Southwest is now the major airline, pressing down 
the average ticket price in the Nashville market. The downside is that Southwest is rarely 
45 Herbert Kelleher, the CEO of Southwest, decided that Nashville was a good market to move into after 
visiting his daughter, who was attending Vanderbilt University (Petzinger, 1995). 
262 
the first choice for business travelers. Especially the headquarters and the large 
corporations that are financially important for the airport have less to gain from the new 
structure. Businesspeople who prefer comfort and scheduling flexibility are unlikely 
Southwest customers, as they are less sensitive to price than other travelers. Instead, they 
favor a high level of service including high frequency flight schedule, frequent flyer 
miles, and airport �ounge facilities (Button, et al. 1999). All of the�e things can be best 
provided by a hub and airlines that compete with differentiation rath�r than price. 
Furthermore, hubs are more likely to provide direct, less time-consuming flights, same 
day return, and more international connections. 
The second reason MNAA is touting the development of the last six years as a 
success is the improvement in origin and destination (O&D) numbers (Figure 9.6). The 
total number of travelers using the Nash ville airport has decreased after the departure of 
Origin and destination traffic at Nashville airport 1990-1999 
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Figure 9.6 Passenger traffic at the Nashville airport, total and local origin & destination. 
Source: MNAA, various years. 
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the American Airlines hub; however, there are more passengers ending or beginning their 
journeys in Nashville. Basically, the O&D traffic is reflective of a successful local 
economy and an extensive service area46• No multiplier effects are extended to car rentals 
and hotel stays with non-O&D passengers. The number of O&D passengers at the 
Nashville airport was 3.2 million in 1993, and has risen consistently in the 1990s (Bolick, 
1996, Februray 26; Parker, 1997, August 11). In 1999, the total number of passengers 
was 8.5 million, of which 6.2 million was O&D travel, which is crucial in recruiting non­
hub air service. 
9.5 Local policy and the airport as a growth engine 
The marketing arrangement of air traffic is a complex interrelationship between airlines, 
airport authorities, and government or corporate city boosters. The airlines are 
responsible for their own general corporate promotion, but as all flights are local, place­
based marketing for specific flights and airports is also necessary. Promoting the airport·· 
itself, and implicitly the city, has become the domain of airport authorities. Airlines are 
benefiting from this necessity, and sometimes they have power to influence expenditures. 
In Nashville, the signatory carriers approve the airport's budget. The airport authority, in 
tum, realizes that airport marketing is inseparable from city marketing in general, and it 
forms partnerships with other organizations. Partnership 2000 was formed in 1990 when 
American's hub was still developing; air service became one of its first leading priorities. 
46 The hinterland of the Nashville airport includes 79 counties within a 100-mile radius of Nashville and a 
population of nearly 3 million. The basic tools in determining service areas are parking lot and baggage 
claim surveys (Willis, 2000). 
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One quasi-governmental entity is financially intertwined with another, as marketing 
expenses are shared between MNAA and Partnership 2000. 
The new American Airlines hub was used in Partnership 2000 advertisements in 
business press to market the airport and its facilities in connection with the city's quality 
of life and business opportunities. Advertising was paid for by Partnership 2000, but 
MNAA was a lead investor in Partnership 2000. The marketing plan experienced 
problems from the beginning. As ads were running in Fortune in 1991, American 
Airlines' internal problems-a pilot strike-and cutbacks affecting Nashville made the 
bright aviation future alluded to in the advertisements highly improbable. Partnership 
2000 and MNAA debated whether or not to withdraw the ads, but the promotional 
message of Nashville as a good transportation location remained important. The main 
purpose of the ad "is to raise CEO awareness of Nashville as a business address, with 
good air transportation alternatives" (Sherrard, quoted in Hobbs, 1991, January 14 ). 
Further marketing programs to sell Nashville's airline hub, along with the city as 
a tourist destination, began in 1991 and were directed by American Airlines with support 
from government tourism offices, the Chamber, and other corporate sponsors (Hobbs, 
1 992, April 1 ). One strategy was to target audiences in 19 cities connected with the 
Nashville hub with ads placed in the various market newspapers and radio stations. A 
1993 campaign included infomercials on cable stations and free advertising on CMT 
Europe (courtesy of its owner Gaylord Entertainment), as a new London route would 
hopefully revitalize Nashville travel. In fact, American was the beneficiary of millions of 
dollars worth of in-kind contributions to promote Nashville as a tourist destination and 
American Airlines as the way to get there. These included the broadcast time donated 
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from Gaylord, and direct financial assistance from Partnership 2000. Market research 
suggested that passenger increases during the fall of 1 993 were the result of Partnership 
2000's promotion of American Airlines and the Nashville hub (Hall, 1993, November 
22). Local traffic continued to increase 13 percent in 1994, possibly influenced by the 
advertising (DuBose, 1995, January 5). The fact that the Chamber of Commerce, through 
Partnership 2000, spent their own money to support one particular corporation was not 
received well among the other airlines, which called the Chamber's policy favoritism and 
anti-free market (DuBose, 1993, October 14). 
The support from Partnership 2000 was matched by enthusiasm from local 
government. A next step where the city could potentially have some clout was the 
development of international travel. MNAA entered into lengthy negotiations with 
American Airlines to acquire an international route47• MNAA had been assured by 
consultants that Nashville could sustain international flights, who suggested London, 
Paris, or Frankfurt. A flight route in 1990 to Toronto had already made the airport 
"international" (Keel, 1990, November 8). MNAA focused on a London route, which in 
the case of most American cities is the number-one flight to Europe (unless a city 
operates under a specific international gateway arrangement, such as Northwest's 
Memphis-Amsterdam). This thrust coincided with Partnership 2000 efforts to increase 
country music tourism from Britain. American Airlines, rethinking their Nashville hub at 
47 The international aviation system is complex and regulated; usually, bilateral agreements between 
countries determine the level of flight service, and ownership restrictions have limited globalization in the 
industry. International airline alliances are the industry's response to bypass such regulations, but a 
liberalized market with "open skies agreements" is growing (U.S. Department ofTransportation, 1999). As 
of 2000, there was no open skies agreement with the UK; instead, United States has a bilateral agreement 
determining the number of flights. 
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this time, was less enthusiastic than MNAA, and instead MNAA had discussions with 
Mayor Bredesen to circumvent American Airlines; the idea of a city-owned route was 
tloated48 • Bredesen, having lived in London before moving to Nashville, undoubtedly 
favored that destination. Moreover, Nashville's business and tourist connections with
Britain were stronger that with any European country, hence a flight to London was
sensible. The logic for the city to buy a route is compelling: if the city ( or a quasi­
governmental airport authority) is investing in building an international terminal
including customs facilities (which were completed in June 1994), maybe cities can own
that route instead of the airline. Moreover, the city and the region benefit perhaps even
more than the carrier through multiplier effects. In the volatile American Airlines era, the
idea had obvious appeal from the city's perspective.
An opportunity appeared with the merger between British Airways and US 
Airways, which created a new airline--USAir-with superfluous flights to Britain, and 
existing routes from Charlotte and Baltimore were cancelled. In an unusual move, 
Nashville Metro government agreed with USAir to purchase one of the airline's London 
routes for $5.5 million (Hobbs, 1993, June 14). It was unclear where that money should 
come from. Mathews (2001) recalls: "Bredesen said .. .ifl can't get it in the city's budget, 
I' 11 put up the money personally, because I think it's worth more than five million 
dollars." Any international air route changes have to be approved by the U.S. Department 
48 Exactly whose idea it was to pursue the strategy is not clear. It was reported that Mayor Bredesen 
suggested the idea to Gen. William Moore, president ofthe Airport Authority (Hobbs, 1993, June 14), but 
today Bredesen says he cannot recall if he personally developed the concept of buying the London route for 
the city (200 I). 
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of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Authority. A local government purchase of an 
international route had never been suggested before. It not only confronted regulators 
with a new question, but it was intriguing to all players in the airline industry-airlines, 
airports and cities-and generated much national press (Busche, April 27, 1993; Cooper 
& Pearl, September 21, 1993; Schmit, October 18, 1993). But USDOT was concerned 
about future precedent-setting implications, and did not award Nashville Metro the 
route49. Instead, American Airlines was awarded the two open London routes, one from 
Nashville and one from Raleigh-Durham. 
Even if the new route was not city-owned, civic boosters were elated over the 
London connection. Not only was it seen as a sign of continuous prosperity-"the next 
leap on Nashvi11e's road to economic greatness"-(DuBose & Dobie, 1994, April 7), but 
it could also enhance American's desire to stay in Nashville as a hub carrier. The route 
was inaugurated in May 1994 with four consecutive flights carrying, on special 
invitation, practically everybody in Nashville's political and economic establishment. 
Initially, the route was a success. Load factors were high the first months, about 
80 percent, due to the novelty value and strong tourism traffic at the time (McCampbell, 
1994, June 18), but American Airlines operated Nashville-London for only 15 months 
before shutting it down. The route had an average 70 percent load factor during those 15 
months (Willis, 2000). American said it was not enough to make a profit, while MNAA 
still believes that the development of the route indicated long-term sustainability. The 
49 USDOT argued that it was "not prepared to endorse an auction process that could rapidly come to 
represent a widespread mechanism for reallocating these national assets on the basis of the deepest civic 
pockets" (the USDOT order that clarified that cities cannot purchase airline routes, quoted in O'Brian, 
November 8, 1993). 
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disagreement stems from the fact that American Airlines was dismantling its Nashville 
hub ( although the route was cancelled before the hub was officially gone), and without it 
they could not sustain an international flight. MNAA is currently still searching for 
airlines and charter arrangements to rebuild international connections, especially with 
Britain. 
American's cuts in the flight schedule occurred at the same time Nashville was 
actively promoting the hub. "There was a lot of talk about what we should do. What kind 
of incentives can we give them to stay" (Willis, 2000). Both local government and 
business acted on behalf of American Airlines to make their operations more profitable. 
American Airlines CEO Crandall met with the mayor and Nashville business leaders in 
1993, and said that 300,000 new passengers a year, or eight per flight, was needed to 
make the hub profitable. The prosperity of airline operations are dependent on long-term 
changes in local business and population growth, but in the short run, there are a few 
things that the city can do. A convention center, for example, automatically generates 
more air passenger traffic. Bredesen made the explicit connection between supporting 
Opryland's expansion and securing the airline hub. When American announced that it 
needed eight more passengers per airplane, the Opryland expansion could provide four of 
them (Hobbs, 1993, June 14). The tax-subsidized expansion increased Nashville's 
convention capacity dramatically, even though it could not make a difference regarding 
the hub. 
American Airlines was favored in public policy in other ways as well. In 1994, 
the Tennessee legislature granted a jet fuel tax exemption specifically aimed at American. 
The deal was broadened to benefit Memphis-based FedEx to satisfy West Tennessee 
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representatives as well. American even leaned on Metro government to help them make 
their routes more profitable by, for example, flying first class, but such flagrant disregard 
of lowest-cost purchasing procedures could not be accommodated by the city (Bredesen, 
2001). 
Moreover, American Airlines wanted the city's business elite to commit to 
keeping the hub. As part of a "Fly American" campaign, Partnership 2000 focused on 
increasing local business traffic on American. A calling effort targeted 180 local 
companies with the largest travel budgets to persuade them to use American. Robert 
Mathews, both as a Chamber activist and MNAA board member, coordinated the effort 
on behalf of Partnership 2000 to draw together 60 to 70 executives who "did the door 
knocking and arm twisting" which led to "mildly positive results" (Foster, 1994, May 
16). As mentioned earlier, the Chamber and Gaylord Entertainment also entered a joint 
marketing agreement with American to increase incoming tourist traffic. 
Nashville did respond with support for the airline, "but in the end American didn't 
support the community. There was some bitterness in the community regarding 
American" (Willis, 2000). Mayor Bredesen, the city, and the local business elite feel they 
put their prestige on the line, as well as hundreds of thousands of dollars, to promote the 
American hub. "We tried to oblige them for a while, but I have very ill feelings about that 
whole thing. I don't think their management at the time, and one of the few businesses 
I've dealt with, were shooting straight." (Bredesen, 2001). American Airlines' corporate 
culture under hard-nosed CEO Bob Crandall left little room for compromises between 
theairline and localities. Since 1996, Southwest Airlines has instead been the partner in 
Nashville advertising (Figure 9.7). Recent campaigns have involved cooperation between 
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Figure 9. 7 A wall mural in central Nash ville at the corner of Fifth A venue South and 
Franklin Street celebrating Southwest Airlines' presence. Photo: Author. 
Southwest, the Convention and Visitors Bureau, and the state (Wibking, 1998, October 
13). Partnership 2000 and the Nashville business elite have been less active in airport 
promotion and policy. 
9.6 Air traffic and the entrepreneurial city: Some concluding thoughts 
Deregulation not only changed how airlines operate, but also how airports operate. So 
long as the government had a strong hand in determining where airlines could fly, little 
incentive existed for an airport to market itself. The possibility of influencing future route 
development was limited to political connections. Current airport strategy testifies to the 
fact that airports are very competitive in marketing themselves to the airlines. Under 
deregulation, the attention of airport authorities has shifted from government regulators to 
airlines as their powers have increased. "It's our job to educate the airlines about what the 
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market wants" says MNAA (Willis, 2000), which put together promotional packages 
presented to targeted airlines whose geographic strategies would work well in Nashville. 
Such packages include market potential, general regional economic data, growth 
projections, livability, and the like (see, for example, Metropolitan Nashville Airport 
Authority, 2000, November). The time from the sales pitch to a successful deal with new 
air service usual! y takes from six months to two years. 
Business interests can also influence the network arrangement. When American 
Airlines planned to cancel its routes to Los Angeles, Music Row threatened to 
collectively instruct their travel agents not to use American Airlines. American responded 
by scheduling two more flights to the West Coast (Mathews, 2001 ). After the demise of 
the American hub, MNAA has worked closely with the Chamber of Commerce and 
Partnership 2000 investigating the needs of the business community, which warrants 
special attention. The business community was the most disrupted by the American 
Airlines move; their bets had been placed with American, and air service was taking a no­
frills tum in Nashville. Based on the Chamber's wishes, MNAA analyzed market 
deficiencies and competed for flight routes that can be supported. The Chamber surveys 
their members annually on travel behavior, ensuring that travel-intensive industries such 
as health care (in one year, HCA booked over 42,000 flights out of Nashville) can specify 
where they need to get to in the morning and come back at night (Willis, 2000). Such 
scheduling is also available to Detroit for the automotive industry (Davis, 2000, June 18). 
Here, airport authorities are caught in the dilemma of trying to serve the public at lowest 
possible cost and accommodating business by obtaining and maintaining a hub. In its 
marketing plan for 1998-2002, Partnership 2000 worries that Nashville is facing strong 
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competition from cities with better air service. Such internal documents suggest that 
MNAA is incorrect, at least from business' perspective, when suggesting that the city is 
better off with improving O&D data instead of a hub. 
The loss of the American Airlines hub indicates that airlines are important 
players, but do not necessarily develop local ties. As users of an airport facility they 
remain for the most part non-local entities. Cities may try to create stronger place­
dependencies for airlines through signatory carrier agreements, but in this case, those 
efforts could not overcome the volatility of the market. The qualitative strength of 
coalitions between cities and airlines is a factor that can impact the air network. In this 
case, American Airlines was perceived as "not shooting straight," not being a team 
player. It was not only Nashville that was uncomfortable with American Airlines. The 
company's aggressive corporate style had earned them the nickname "Arrogant Airlines" 
among the regulators at USDOT in Washington (Reed, 1993). Airports around the 
country are vulnerable to the geographic demands of the airline industry, but the question 
remains open whether the outcome would have been different if some other airline had 
established a hub in Nashville. 
The local response of this dependency situation was Bredesen's attempt at buying 
the London route, a good example at innovative policy conceived at the local level from 
local experiences in an era when federal urban policy has modest aspirations. In the end, 
national regulators turned down Nashville's request, but there is no obvious reason why 
the outcome could not have been different. The city was confronted by a situation where 
an argument could be made that the city itself should reap the benefits of having a route. 
If federal authorities had accepted Nashville's argument, the implications would be 
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profound, as costly inter-city competition could erupt when desirable international flights 
are available. If city-owned, a Nashville-London route would most likely still exist today; 
perhaps with low profitability, but presumably with other regional economic benefits. 
Interestingly, the MNAA structure was intended to shelter airport operations from 
political action. This progressive notion should be reexamined with respect to Bredesen's 
involvement in airport business-active engagement in recruiting an international route 
and changing the time frame which board members serve from seven- to four-year terms. 
Nobody has raised a concern or called his actions inappropriate, even if the city buying a 
route would be the ultimate political involvement. This reveals that the idea of undue 
politicization is viewed selectively. Politics is something that gets in the way of the 
business of running an enterprise, even if it is quasi-governmental. Because of these 
tendencies, the Nashville business elite is pleased with the arrangement of a public, but 
flexible airport authority. It is popular in business circles to serve on the MNAA board 
(Willis, 2000), which is considered a powerful entity. The regional benefits and the 
public good function are so strong that the privatization issue has not been raised. In 
some places, support for privatization has gained strength, but in Nashville, the 
government and the MNAA have a businesslike arrangement, representing amicable local 
capital-state relations in the post-Fordist era. 
Currently, the Nashville airport as an object of public policy has faded from 
public concern. Fewer passengers, smaller planes, and cancelled routes have led to a 
decline of traffic at the Nashville airport (Bernard, 2002, December 22), and airlines are 
not in an expansive mood; reorganization of the network is not imminent. The airport has 
moved from being a growth engine in its own right to being a reflection of Nashville's 
274 
general growth. Located between hubs in Memphis, Atlanta, Charlotte, and Cincinnati, 
Nashville's airport cannot currently expand traffic beyond what the local market can 
support. It is now facing local competition in the mid-South rather than national 
competition in the hub network system (Davis, 2000, June 18). As a policy tool, the 
airport is dormant and has re-entered a managerial rather than an entrepreneurial mode. 
The Nashville business elite has been less actively involved since the loss of American 
Airlines hub. What can be interpreted as a window of opportunity that was opened by 
deregulation is now again shut for mid-size cities (at least as long as the future 
arrangement of the airline network is undetermined as the industry is suffering from 
prolonged crisis). For Nashville, the experience included both successes and failures, but 
the question is if airports as a locus for local entrepreneurialism has been an illusion; this 
is a question that perhaps other case studies can answer. 
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10. BUSINESS ENGAGEMENT IN LOCAL EDUCATION: EMERGING
SOCIAL REGULATION
"As a businessperson you get involved in all these things that you 
think are good for the city, and you get to know what makes it tick. 
You get to know the political and non-profit entities, find out what 
helps build strength. Education is the big issue right now" 
(Nashville real estate developer Robert Mathews, 2001 ). 
10.1 Reproducing the labor force and building civic capacity 
Public education is held in low esteem by many, and education is high on the reform 
agenda in cities around the country. Not only is public education seen as incapable of 
providing individual students the necessary skills, but also as limiting future economic 
progress and prosperity. Business is generally as negative towards the performance of 
schools as the general public; however, it tends to be more positive about reform 
possibilities, viewing schools as an enterprise in need of better management. Local 
business interests have become one of the leading forces of education reform, a marked 
shift from the recent past and an important example of changing social regulation on the 
local level. 
Many people, both in Nashville and nationwide, trace the current reform 
movement to a 1983 federal study, A Nation at Risk, which warned against "the rising 
tide of mediocrity" (p. 5) in the American educational system. The report outlined a 
broad reform agenda, but what is particularly interesting is the rationale behind the call 
for educational improvement, and to whom it was implicitly directed. A Nation at Risk is 
a Reagan-era document where fear of losing the competitive edge is evident as economic 
globalization was taking off and the F ordist system was crumbling. In the eyes of 
business and many policymakers� apart from an outmoded industrial organization, a 
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fundamental problem was the inability to e�ucate a productive workforce. Employers 
complained they had to absorb costs that ought to be a public responsibility. Poorly 
educated workers had to learn on the job what they should have been taught in school. 
European apprentice programs and Japanese study ethics and test scores were much 
envied. The report continues: "Our once unchallenged preeminence in commerce, 
industry, science, and technological inno\'ation is being overtaken by competitors 
throughout the world ... we live among determined, well educated, and strongly motivated 
competitors. We compete with them for international standing and markets, not only with 
products but with the ideas" (p. 5). Because education "undergirds American prosperity," 
A Nation at Risk makes the case for recasting education in the light of economic 
competitiveness. The time has come, it is argued, when the abundance of resources is not 
enough, but learning and skills are the determinants of success. Therein lay the main 
obstacle; achievement levels had suffered a long-term decline, a disturbing break with the 
notion of progress so dominant in modem thought. The problem had deep roots beyond 
the school walls: there is a "shoddiness in many walks of American life ... This 
shoddiness is too often reflected in our schools" (p. 6). The U.S. economy, indeed the 
entire nation, had lost its edge, lulled into a leisurely state. It received a stern warning in 
the report: "history is not kind to idlers" (p. 6). The document was taken as a call to 
business interests. American capitalism had not only lost sight of its core 
characteristic-unbridled competition-but business interests must shape human capital 
formation in a more active manner. 
Education improvement is a difficult, long-term solution to sustaining economic 
growth; and as I will argue here, it is an emerging part of the general regulation of post-
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Fordism. The business interest in education has shifted from the initial incentive of 
raising productivity through a better-educated labor force to a broader agenda of social 
reform. Education has always has been a local concern, of course, but education reform 
pushed by local regimes with a broad coalition base, including business, indicates a 
stronger focus on active social policy formation on the local level. Local educational 
policy and reform can be situated within contemporary anti-federalist and devolutionary 
thought and is, at least ideally, a way to come to terms with the problems in post-
F ordism. 
On the local level, business-friendly policies, especially the general emphasis on 
low taxes, suffer from a contradiction with regards to public investment in human capital. 
As labor mobility remains much lower than capital, local skill level is one factor that 
limits economic development. Because of the high level of variability in education, not 
only between regions, but also between urban, suburban, and rural districts, a good public 
school system is important. Knowledge-intensive economic activity increasingly 
demands a good educational infrastructure. From a political economy perspective, 
education can be viewed as the crucial component in the reproduction of the labor 
force-together with broader labor relations, education constitutes a local mode of 
regulation. The local governance structure of education, as we will explore in this 
chapter, includes actors such as city government, the school board, the state, business and 
labor organizations, labor practices and conventions, race, ideology, and the historical 
path dependency of place. With some variation between cities, these actors have created 
local capacities and institutions that can address the education problem. A key point here 
is that new forms of training and education are taking place in local places to produce a 
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work force that may be, more than anything, designed to be competitive vis-a-vis other 
places (Painter, 1995). 
Much of what is known about current urban school reform in United States, and 
the local political environment in which it operates, comes from a large comparative 
study of 11 cities entitled Civic Capacity and Urban Education with political scientist 
Clarence Stone as the principal investigator (Jones et al., 1997; Stone, 1998; Portz et al., 
1999; Stone et al., 2001; Stone, 2001 ). Following Stone et al. (2001 ), success or failure in 
the education arena is dependent on what they call local civic capacity, which arises from 
the collective action of important local stakeholders. 
There are several factors that may influence the level of civic capacity in a 
particular place. Coalitions that do emerge, according to Stone et al. (2001 ), can be 
assessed along three dimensions: breadth- the level of participation among divergent 
interest groups; cohesion-the level of consensus among these interests regarding the 
reform path; and durability-the temporal strength of these coalitions and emerging 
institutions. Cities with a low socioeconomic level, very fragmented political interests, or 
a history of federal oversight have a harder time developing civic capacity. In all cases, 
historically contingent factors are strongly influential. 
The desirable outcome of local civic capacity building is effective school reform. 
Different types of institutional changes have been proposed and implemented to various 
degrees. Decentralization within the existing organization of school bureaucracies is 
popular, usually so called site-based management, as are calls for "accountability," the 
idea that individual schools should be evaluated by performance through quantitative 
measurement, usually test scores. More drastic is the implementation of school 
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competition. The voucher system allows students to leave poorly performing public 
schools. The philosophical underpinning of the voucher system and its potential benefits 
suggests that only substantive alternatives to public monopoly on education can improve 
student learning, at least if microeconomic principles are the best tools to understand and 
approach the problem. The establishment of charter schools reflects privatization and 
deregulation, as they are managed independently on a non-profit or commercial basis by 
Education Management Organizations (EM Os) for the public school system. This 
movement is currently in doubt as EMOs have shown little progress in delivering 
education at a lower cost and improving test scores compared to traditional arrangements 
(Fitz & Beers, 2002). A partial solution to make some public schools more attractive is 
the creation of magnet schools where only gifted students are admitted. The classroom 
approach, changing the learning process, also remains a major component of reform. 
Various curriculum and pedagogical innovations have been implemented locally. Recent 
federal legislation also calls for national standards to guard against local failure. Other 
issues that perhaps should not be included in a list of reform options, but nevertheless 
play important roles locally, are the questions of funding levels and the districting and 
selection of students-who goes where. Finally, the relationship between schools and 
local community and the institutional framework that must be in place to effectively 
accommodate communication between the two is essential in civic capacity formation 
and school reform. 
Most cities have pursued reform with some force. All 11 case cities in the Civic 
Capacity and Urban Education project have taken education seriously, but with modest 
success in improvements. Stone et al. (2001) attribute this to the lack oflong-term 
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commitment from the community at-large and the problem of converting "short-term 
alliances into institutionalized relationships" (p. 2). Most places are suffering from 
superintendents with short tenure, the pursuit of the latest pedagogical or organizational 
trend, and business interests whose overriding concern is to make schools cost-efficient 
rather than good performers. Moreover, schools do not only serve as education 
institutions, but especially in the middle-class African American community, their role as 
a provider of employment has become so pervasive that other concerns have in effect 
become politically secondary. Orr ( 1998), for example, contends that "race, jobs, and 
politics" are the main obstacles to reform in Baltimore. 
Even in the best of circumstances where various interests agree on the importance 
of schools for the future well-being of the community, the plurality of school politics 
makes coordinated efforts and tangible improvements hard to achieve. Neither is civic 
capacity automatically transferable from one arena to another. While Atlanta has been 
successful in other aspects of economic development, its capacity to effectively coalesce 
around school reform has been largely unsuccessful; it ranks at the bottom of the cities 
studied in the Civic Capacity and Urban Education project (Stone, 2001 ). No biracial 
coalition has been built; instead, racialized discourses, distrust, and fragmented interests 
have characterized Atlanta school politics. Both in Houston and Atlanta, business 
communities have been active in school reform but have tended to emphasize efficiency 
and spending limitations rather than applying a broader approach (Stone, 1998). 
Similarly, the high profile of desegregation in the local community, overwhelming black 
dominance of the public student body, and rigid bureaucracy marginalized business 
interests in school reform in St. Louis (Jones et al., 1997). 
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On the other hand, cities with enduring institutions dedicated to school 
improvement with extra-local support has continued to progress, such as in El Paso 
(Stone, 2001 ). Pittsburgh also benefits from long-standing cooperative arrangements 
between local government and business, and such a consensus has produced business 
involvement in education that goes back for several decades, a more extensive 
partnership than in most cities. In Boston, The Vault, an organization similar to the 
Watauga Group, initiated a public-private partnership called Boston Compact focusing on 
education starting in the early 1980s. Business leaders have had significant impact on 
reform by threatening to withhold support unless the appropriate reforms, such as site­
based management, are implemented. However, federal oversight and racial tension has 
limited business' consensus-building agenda in Boston. Even if the general conclusion is 
that a school system under federal court supervision is not likely to find a strong local 
support through civic capacity, the need for progress can lead to "court-induced 
consensus," like in San Francisco (Fraga et al., 1998). 
Even if no clear trend of improvement emerges from the 11 cities, all of them 
have witnessed a business community playing a stronger role than in the past. Business 
interests are even perceived as the most influential actor in school decision-making, 
ahead of the school board, teachers, the mayor, and others (Stone et al. 2001). Business 
may or may not have been successful in exercising power, promoting its agenda, or 
producing tangible results, but in all cases it has tried. Stone views business engagement 
as a positive, even necessary, ingredient in school reform, creating the necessary breadth 
in formulating a local agenda. Others take a more critical view of school-business 
partnerships in particular, calling them a threat to democratic participation (Taylor, 
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2000). However, business hegemony in education policy is unlikely in most places. With 
increasing levels of citizen involvement in education as well as other local issues. 
business taking a seat at the table is reasonable. 
The strengths and the drawbacks of the civic capacity studies are the same as 
those found in urban regime theory: the importance of the locality and possible synergy 
between various interest groups that can advance a community's capacity to approach 
challenges are thoroughly explored, while the connections with broader political and 
economic forces beyond the city limits are scarcely addressed. It is assumed that 
globalization has somehow activated corporate interests, but this research does not further 
address the logic behind that assessment. It is, therefore, necessary to connect the insights 
from regime building in the education arena with ideas on the growing importance of 
social regulation on the local level. To explore this connection, I will return to Nashville 
and investigate how its business elite has pursued education reform. 
10.2 A struggling education system under federal supervision 
History is an inescapable part of understanding educational policy in any city. Nashville's 
school system was under federal oversight for decades, and no major initiative has been 
implemented without an eye to how it will affect desegregation. As elsewhere in the 
South, white Nashville engaged in resistance to school integration. The city's most 
notorious event was the 1956 bombing of the Hattie Cotton Elementary School in East 
Nashville. This incident came in the wake of the 1955 Kelley v. The Board of Education 
that challenged the slow integration of Nashville high schools. Before unification, 
Davidson County had a fragmented, quadruple school system based on both geography 
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(city and county) and race (black and white}--separate and unequal. Kelley v. The Board 
of Education was not ultimately resolved until 1971, when a federal court handed the 
school system a desegregation order. In a fragmented political system and strong home 
rule sentiment, desegregation is unlikely to succeed; but when geography is conducive to 
reform, as in a county-wide educational system like Nashville's, desegregation is more 
likely to be more effective (McDermott, 1998). A redrawing of Nashville school districts 
created more integrated schools to reach the mandated goal of25-30 percent minority 
representation in each school, reflecting the overall racial make-up in the school system. 
The additional solution to the combination of persistent residential segregation 
and school desegregation was busing. Predictably, the plan resulted in a surge of white 
children enrolling in private schools. Approximately 8,600 white students left the public 
school system the year following the implementation of the busing order. Census data 
shows that the school-age population in Davidson County attending private schools 
jumped from 8.7 percent in 1970 to 15.9 percent in 1980. This was an unprecedented 
increase, as private school enrollment had been stagnant or even declining during the 
1960s. Undoubtedly, busing was the most emotionally charged local political issue at the 
time. The response to busing was unanimously negative among whites and while mixed 
feelings persisted among blacks, many accepted it at first as a necessary means to achieve 
equality. Pride and Woodard ( 1985) conclude that busing partially achieved its goals. 
Contrary to public opinion, busing improved race relations in general and pupil 
performance was not negatively affected; in fact, black scores increased somewhat. The 
problem was that public confidence in public schools was shattered by busing and did not 
recover for decades, especially among the group that must be its greatest supporter-the 
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white middle class. Sitting Mayor Beverly Briley was challenged, but eventually survived 
a 1970 mayoral campaign facing a councilman named Casey Jenkins who ran on a one­
issue platform of resistance to busing. Relying on his general popularity, Briley could 
deflect populist anti-busing opposition, which could have thrown Nashville into a 
quagmire of racial politics. The 1971 busing plan was in place until 1980 when local 
judge Tom Wiseman ruled that busing was no longer necessary. This decision was 
overruled by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which created a complex system of 
busing based on age cohorts, where black and white children would alternate in being 
bused to schools in other parts of the city. Since 1980, white flight has for the most part 
been stemmed and private school attendance has increased at a slow pace, from 15. 9 
percent of all school age children in 1980 to 17.5 in 2000. 
The tendency of the Nashville elite to send their children to private schools has 
traditionally made them indifferent to public schools. This can decrease the tendency for 
political mobilization on behalf of public schools among the elite as well as the middle­
class. The individual logic is compelling: as changes in a school system are long-term, 
few individuals are willing to commit to the local public school system, either by sending 
their children to a public school or by expending social capital on its improvement. 
Instead, it is only as a collective entity that business can address the issue. The overall 
demographic structure may also work against urban school districts if younger families 
suburbanize and reside outside the jurisdiction of the central city, which makes the 
natural supporting group of school involvement smaller. Stone et al. (2001) suggest that 
the propensity for urban school districts to have fewer white children than overall racial 
population data indicate is equally attributable to age structure-white families with 
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school age children are underrepresented-and private school flight. Figure 10.1 shows a 
higher than average private school attendance in Nashville compared to peer cities, 
although well below Louisville and New Orleans. It should be noted, though, that the 
local structure of school systems, e.g. county-wide v. fragmented systems, create 
different incentives for public school abandonment. 
Perhaps the closest parallel to Nash ville in terms of county size, racial 
composition, and a county-wide system is Charlotte, North Carolina. If one views 
enrollment in private schools as triggered by changes in the public school system, again 
Nashville compares poorly. As evident in Figure 10.1, the 1970s were a crisis period 
where private schooling increased rapidly in most cities. Only Memphis exhibited a more 
drastic pattern of public school flight than Nashville, although Charlotte and Jacksonville 
largely mirrored the trend as well. While private schooling appears, to various degrees, 
35 
30 
25 
<I) 
<I) 
·c
.5 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Figure 10.1 Percent school age population enrolled in private schools (grades 1-12) in 
Nashville and peer cities. For a relevant comparison, the geographic unit used is the 
entire central county of each city. Source: US Bureau of the Census, various years. 
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to have lost its appeal during the 1980s, a small increase is again detected during the last 
decade. 
Unfortunately, desegregation and busing in Nashville did little to diminish the 
racial achievement gap. Some blacks even perceived it as harmful to black identity and 
community institution building, as blacks bore the burden of busing (Pride & Woodard, 
1985). As busing was never viewed by anyone involved as a satisfactory solution, the 
search for other mechanisms to satisfy the desegregation requirements led to the 
establishment of magnet schools in the mid-1980s. The ultimate goal was not to better 
serve gifted children, but rather to achieve mandated racial balance within the school 
system. A court-ordered quota system where, in practice, all qualified black students are 
admitted and white students are selected randomly has produced the wanted results. 
Currently, the school system is 44 percent white and 48 percent black, and the prescribed 
racial ratio of each magnet school is 60 percent white and 40 black with a 10 percent 
margin. This has been achieved, as magnet schools have a black student body of 30-35 
percent (Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, 2001b). Even with an expansion-the 
number of magnet schools increased from three in 1992 to eight in 1998-the program 
has not progressed as fast as anticipated. The major reason is that most interested and 
qualified minority students have been absorbed by magnet schools and further expansions 
would most likely lower the share of blacks overall in magnet schools, which has also 
been acknowledged by internal memos in the school system (Phillips & Read, 1995, 
September 28). There have been reports of empty seats reserved for black students while 
a long waiting list for whites exists, as well as problems with the random selection 
process. The public dissatisfaction with what was supposed to be the jewel in the system 
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was especially voiced in the mid- l 990s by outspoken school board member Murray 
Phillip (whose son was not selected for a magnet school), who opposed the quota system. 
The inherent problem with magnet schools also became apparent: instead of a 
racially based segregation pattern, strong class segregation has emerged. Because 
selection was based on voluntary, unsolicited applications and no transportation was 
provided, students from affluent families have been overrepresented. As noted in a 
Vanderbilt study, the class effect was especially strong in Nashville, with its county-wide 
and socio-economically diverse student population, compared to other cities in the study 
(Phillips & Read, 1995, September 28). 
Most agree that the long-standing court order has affected the school system 
negatively. With white flight and busing, a large segment of the population became 
disillusioned with the public schools. The prevailing attitude was that the public schools 
did not have the children's best interests at heart, an attitude rooted in the fact that the 
school system is restricted to operate within a framework imposed from above: all major 
changes within the school system must take place with court approval. Even if the 
purpose is laudable, it limits the avenues of action for the school administration. This was 
the state of things for almost 30 years. Nashville had a whole generation of affluent and 
middle-class people who never considered public schools as an option (Knestrick, 2001 ). 
In no small part, the negative perception of the public school system was related 
to relatively low levels of funding. Overall taxation in Nashville is strongly affected by 
the level of taxation in Tennessee, which was 49th in per capita taxation among U.S. 
states in 1998; also, the taxation structure is regressive in nature with a strong 
dependency on sales tax (Sharp, 2000, April 26). Because of that, Nashville recently had 
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the sixth overall lowest tax burden among the nation's largest metropolitan areas. 
Compared to peer cities, Nashville's average family tax burden was reported as 66 
percent of that in Birmingham, 5 8 percent of that in Charlotte, and 51 percent of that in 
Louisville (Graham, 1996, August 12). This revenue limitation naturally affects school 
spending. As in most places, education spending is the biggest item in the local budget. 
Any given year, the school system consumes about 40 percent of Nashville's budget. 
(The school district's operational budget is funded one-third from state sales tax and two­
thirds from local property and sales taxes.) However, of the 48 largest school systems in 
the country, Nashville was ranked 46th with $4,112 per pupil annual spending compared 
to the average $5,643 in the mid- l 990s (Holladay, 1996, July 18). But with recent tax 
increases, Nashville's school expenditure has gained on the national average. It is 
currently $7,038 compared to $7,436 nationally (while the Tennessee average is only 
$6,055). Teachers' salaries in Nashville are also very near the national average 
(Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, 2000). This has been possible because the low 
level of state support is offset by high city taxation. Per capita city taxation in Nashville 
is $1,349, while peer cities range from $373 in Memphis to $839 in Birmingham (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 2000b ). As a consolidated city-county government, this 
comparison probably overestimates relative taxation in Nashville where no separate 
county tax exists, although it should be noted that consolidated Jacksonville and 
Indianapolis have lower local taxes than Nashville. 
One way of reforming the educational system is simply by increasing the funding 
level. The recession during Boner's mayoral period of 1987-1991 induced a fiscal crisis, 
and the Metro government was forced to cut the funding for local schools as a result of 
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budget shortfalls. According to a study conducted by the Nashville Chamber, $3,553 was 
spent on each student in metropolitan Nashville during the 1988-89 school year. In 
Louisville, $3,335 was spent per student, while Cincinnati and Indianapolis spent $5,538 
and $4,417 respectively (Kennedy, 1990, July 23). The city itself appeared incapable of 
dealing with its troubled school system. The natural supporting group of public 
schools-the parents-found an ally in a coalition of civic groups with ties to leading 
business interests. For the first time, their interests were merging with that of the business 
community. The ad-hoc organization Parents for Public Education was started in 1987 
by parents in middle class West Nashville, which evolved into a political pressure group 
that advocated more school funding (Ashford, 1990a). It put a 50-cent property tax 
increase earmarked for the school system on the political agenda. This was another 
indication of the political shift in Nashville--direct public involvement of grassroots 
middle class in politics. The alternative weekly newspaper Nashville Scene sardonically 
noted that "most politically involved people are not sheriffs deputies but West Nashville 
mothers concerned about educating their children ... 1 t' s a lot to absorb" (Dobie, 1990c, p. 
4). Combined with a re-thinking in the business establishment-the first time ever the 
Chamber called for a tax increase!-power was wrestled away from a withering machine. 
The response from the business community and other civic groups was to form 
the umbrella organization Coalition/or Public Education (CPE), which included the 
Chamber of Commerce, Nashville Board of Realtors, Junior League, League of Women 
Voters, and Fraternal Order of Police. The goal was to promote the tax increase 
referendum to create resources for public education and to increase awareness of the 
importance of supporting public education (Rogers, 1990b ). Monetary investment does 
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not automatically produce a better result, but is a necessary step towards educational 
improvement. The Chamber had concluded that the school system was understaffed and 
lacking in technology, therefore allowing business to suggest a tax increase (Knestrick, 
2001). A referendum cannot be scheduled directly by a citizen's initiative, but CPE had 
the capacity through a public relations, lobbying, and fund-raising campaign to 
successfully convince the school board to ask for a referendum (Dobie, 1990c ). 
Explaining the economic rationale behind the tax increase, CPE said a no vote would be 
"costly to the Nashville economy," hurting company recruiting and competitiveness. The 
chairman called support for education and a yes vote "the most important things that will 
happen to Nashville this year for economic development" (Kennedy, 1990, July 23). The 
referendum came after three consecutive years of school budget trimmings: $9 million, 
$18 million, and $13 million respectively (Ashford, 1991, June 13). The proposition was 
voted down on August 2, 1990. Although a crushing defeat, the 2-1 margin was a better 
result for education proponents than a similar 1981 referendum that was turned down by 
a 5-1 margin during a time period when court-ordered desegregation and busing stirred 
public sentiment. 
t 0.3 Education as economic development 
Although business interests over time came to endorse broad changes in the education 
system, their initial and immediate concern was labor supply. Unemployment remained 
low throughout the 1 990s; in fact, it was a continuation of a trend stretching from the 
mid-1 980s. Even during the recession, Davidson County unemployment peaked at a 
modest 5.8 percent in June 1991 and since then fluctuated, for the most part, from 2.5 to 
292 
4 percent (Center for Business and Economic Research, 2001 b ). Full employment in 
many job categories led to a problem of finding qualified labor, a condition not specific 
to Nashville. In fact, the city ranked only 45th in a 1998 survey of tight labor markets 
around the country (Nashville Business Journal, 1998, June 12). Nevertheless, the local 
business press reported repeatedly about corporate inability to fill its vacant positions. 
Business has approached the problem in various ways. A part of the Chamber initiative 
has been lobbying to encourage low-paid, but productive Mexican immigration, and help 
the immigrants with housing, language courses, and driver's licenses. More importantly 
here, a shortage of skilled workers above entry-level service jobs led to a push from 
business to have more input in the skills students acquire in school. Especially the 
curriculum of vocational training has been targeted. Here, local business interests have 
been aided by the state, which has used literacy programs to raise the minimum skill level 
in the state's workforce and expanded community colleges and vocational schools. An 
additional solution is a growth in corporate apprenticeship programs. A driving force 
behind the interest in schools and apprenticeship programs was an early Partnership 2000 
study of strengths and weaknesses of the Nashville area as a competitive region. One of 
the weaknesses pointed out was an underqualified labor force (Murray, 1995, January 2). 
Current census data support this conclusion, showing that of the ten peer cities, only three 
(Birmingham, Memphis, and New Orleans) had a higher share of the workforce without a 
high school diploma than Nashville in 2000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000a), which is 
peculiar considering the city's overall economic success. Implicit in the early findings of 
Partnership 2000 was that knowledge upgrading is also strategically important for 
economic development. The Chamber was acutely aware that one of the first questions 
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asked by a potential corporate relocator is about the quality of the local school system 
(Hunt, 2000). It is not unusual that companies indicate that the education factor is one of 
the deciding factors against moving to Nashville. To potential business recruits, the 
quality of Nashville's public schools is indicative of how the city at large is run and how 
the community sets priorities (Kennedy, 1990, July 23 ). Mayor Bredesen (200 I), aware 
of this duality, says that "aside from the moral requirement that we operate a good public 
school system, that it's essential to our economic success ... Our economic progress is 
being limited in some ways by the availability of people (for) skilled, technical jobs." 
This is especially important in the context of Davidson County, which has no significant 
population growth in the foreseeable future: a limited labor supply is a bottleneck for the 
local economy. At the same time, Bredesen admits that eight years of education reform 
has done little to actually affect the competitiveness of Nashville. 
The emphasis on filling skilled technical jobs below the four-year college 
education level is a testimony to the need for reskilling. In the opinion of the Chamber, 
this is where high schools have failed. The Chamber's employer surveys indicate that 
high school graduates lack basic skills in reading and math, as well as social skills and a 
professional attitude toward work. "We've gotten to a point in the nation where we have 
people with college degrees doing work that could be done by high schoolers" 
(Knestrick, 2001 ). Geared at sending the good students to college, high school education 
is not only lacking technical and vocational aspects, but the socialization process has also 
broken down. When the Chamber is pointing out that prison builders look at high school 
graduation scores to estimate future need for prison space, the economic goals of business 
interests have then inevitably led them into a path of social reform as well. 
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Immediately after the 1990 recession, Nashville's fast-paced economy relied on 
labor migration, but by 1997, the nation's economy was catching up and non-local 
competition for labor was stronger. With approximately 48,000 college students in the 
MSA and 28,000 in Davidson County (Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce, 2000a), 
Nashville is reasonably well situated to find white-collar workers50. The major deficiency 
is the lack of a premier technical university that can fuel a high-tech economy. For 
engineering skills, Nashville is dependent on recruitment from outside universities and 
the inflow of qualified labor has improved. One corporate recruiter says that the interest 
level in Nashville jobs around college campuses is higher than in the past, attributed to 
increased exposure Nashville is receiving in media as an entertainment center and the 
impression of a vibrant downtown area (Nashville Business Journal, 1998, June 12). 
There are, however, limits to attracting a high-tech work force. The Chamber, as the chief 
promoter, places ads in college newspapers, especially if the school is strong in fields 
such as computer science and engineering. While Atlanta, for example, advertises in 
Boston, the Bay Area, and other high-tech areas, competing with big city amenities and 
competitive real wages, Nashville's geographical recruiting range is more modest. "Being 
Music City, we don't do our prospecting in Boston. We think our best bet is universities 
within 300-400 miles, including the University of Tennessee and smaller denominational 
schools" (Harris, 2000). Graduates of University of Tennessee recently viewed Nashville 
as the best location to start their careers (Partnership 2000, 1999). 
50 Here, the relative education level is better compared with the situation for the lower skilled workforce 
discussed earlier. Nashville ranks number fourth of the eleven cities in the peer group in terms of percent of 
the population with at least a bachelor's degree (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000a). 
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With the failed referendum fresh in mind and a clear economic development 
agenda after the organization's reinvention process, the Chamber has developed an 
educational platform guiding initiatives for public education. In the Chamber's strategic 
vision, which emphasizes economic development, education falls under "improving the 
product." The money financing the Chamber's education program comes from 
Partnership 2000. Although the Chamber's ambition is to be a regional force, the 
immediate focus is Davidson County schools and bringing "accountability and higher 
standards" to the school district (Knestrick, 2001 ). The Chamber views its initiative as 
part of a national trend. Following the conclusions of A Nation at Risk, the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce recognized that American schools were falling behind the rest of the world. 
Locally, it was the Boner crisis that finally activated business interests in education as 
well. "After the economy turned bad, everything was cut in Nashville, including school 
budgets. The city fell on hard times, businesses fell on hard times. When things are bad, 
you start to look for short-term and long-term solutions. That's when business became 
interested in our schools" (Knestrick, 2001 ). The concern in the early 1990s grew to 
active involvement encouraging education reform in the mid-1990s as the city itself was 
contemplating education overhaul. Education and workforce issues became one of five 
target areas for the Chamber after the election of Vanderbilt Chancellor Joe Wyatt as 
chairman of the organization in 1995. For example, a School-to-Career program starting 
in 1996 jointly organized by the Chamber of Commerce and Nashville's public school 
system emphasized work-based experiences to improve reading and writing skills while 
increasing productivity through training (Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce, 2002). 
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This type of activism was new to the Chamber. In 1981, another round of court­
ordered desegregation was going into effect with new school zones, closings of old 
schools, and a new busing system. Members of the school board were being elected for 
the first time (previously, they had been appointed), and the governance of the schools 
was laden with uncertainty. Support for public education was at its lowest point before or 
since. Public schools, suffering from underfunding, lack of interest, and court-ordered 
constraints, were interested in support wherever they could find it and solicited financial 
aid from the Chamber, among others. The attitude of the Chamber board at the time can 
be summed up as "our business is business, not schools" (Knestrick, 2001). However, the 
school system and superintendent Charles Frazier managed to forge relationships with 
individuals in leadership positions who, even if they did not endorse direct Chamber 
involvement, acknowledged the needs of the school system. The Metro school system 
was treated as a needy, charitable organization worthy of paternalistic support. The 
channel through which support could be offered was the PENCIL Foundation (Public 
Education Nashville Citizens Involved in Leadership). Women's organizations such as 
the Girl Scouts, Junior League, and the League of Women Voters fronted a support effort 
for local schools, and developed a plan for a non-profit organization that became the 
PENCIL Foundation. "Several business leaders, including Ed Nelson of Commerce 
Union Bank and Bronson Ingram of Ingram Industries, helped bring the goals of PENCIL 
to the business community and gain private-sector commitments of financial support" 
(PENCIL Foundation, 2002). To be more precise, the start of the PENCIL Foundation as 
one of many elite civic projects was steered by the Watauga Group, and, as it turned out, 
became its last effort (see Chapter 7). Private schools saw robust growth, while the public 
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system floundered economically and suffered from lack of community support, which 
triggered this modest response from the business community. The PENCIL Foundation, 
still in existence, was established in 1982 as a non-profit organization with support from 
various business, community and education leaders to administer support programs. 
Private businesses provide the majority of the funding to PENCIL, which for the 2000 
fiscal year is $1.5 million (Guidestar, 2000). The 36 founding corporate members have 
increased to 288 recently with the goal of making business more "community conscious" 
(Zepp, 1992, March 23). 
Of the PENCIL programs, Adopt-A-School is the most dominant. In Adopt-A­
School, companies are pared with schools to offer various types of support. As the word 
"adopt" implies, this is less of a partnership, and more a program where business views 
itself as a benefactor of local schools. Other programs include job training for post-school 
young adults, school-to-work transition programs for high school seniors, teacher awards, 
student competitions, and dropout prevention. As with most programs, the emphasis was 
placed on improving basic skills. Although the embryo to structural change in the school 
system existed in the PENCIL programs through the introduction of decentralized site­
based decision-making, the current leadership of business education initiatives dismiss 
the early PENCIL work as lacking in substance: "They were fluffy, 'feel good' type of 
partnerships. Give old office furniture to the teacher's lounge, that sort of thing. It was 
not a partnership aimed at bettering schools or getting better results. The whole idea of 
adopt-a-school treated the schools as poor stepchildren" (Knestrick, 2001 ). Although the 
Chamber has become a partner in some of the programs initiated by PENCIL, like the 
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School-to-Career program, the Chamber has moved on to become a political player with 
an agenda of its own to the full extent allowed as a non-profit. 
The Chamber's new strategy of activism includes efforts to shape public policy by 
recruiting reform-minded school board members, creating a Political Action Committee, 
lobbying state and local government, monitoring achievement and evaluating the school 
system, and influencing attitudes toward taxation and school improvement among the 
public and its own constituency. The Chamber's policy is governed by an education 
committee complemented by ad hoc task forces. It currently has a full-time administrator 
for educational affairs, who is also a registered lobbyist with a background in Republican 
politics and, ironically, with experience in educational policy from the Boner 
administration. The Chamber takes positions on state and local legislation and is probably 
the most important outside opinion-maker after the teachers' union. 
The tool for the Chamber to influence school board elections is a political action 
committee-SuccessP AC. In the spirit of progressivism, the original Metro charter called 
for a school board of professional staff members appointed by the mayor and confirmed 
by the council, the normal procedure under a strong mayor system. But in 1982, the city 
was embroiled in another round of busing and desegregation lawsuits that closed several 
neighborhood schools in order to gerrymander school boundaries. As a result, the charter 
was amended under pressure from parental groups, led by residents from affluent 
suburban Bellevue, who felt that an appointed board was unresponsive to their concerns. 
(The elected school board was equally unsuccessful in circumventing federal court 
rulings, of course.) The current nine-member board of education is a semi-independent, 
elected body led by an appointed full-time director. The school board sets the budget, 
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which the council must reject or approve. Judging from the poor public perception of the 
school board during the 1990s, the electoral changes have done little to satisfy students 
and parents, and the relationship between the city and federal courts remained in stasis 
until 1998. The Chamber supported the move to an elected school board, although in 
retrospect, it appreciates some of the advantages of an appointed board ( at least when the 
person with the appointment power is dependably pro-business like Phil Bredesen). With 
no option but to work with an elected board, the favored tactic is to engage in and 
influence individual elections. In 1997, the Chamber charter was changed to allow a PAC 
solely to influence school elections (Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce, 1998a). 
SuccessP AC raises money under guidance of a 12-person board, and during the last two 
election cycles SuccessP AC has funded like-minded candidates and their campaigns. The 
Chamber has a solid record in the elections it has engaged in: all the board members 
supported have won. In the six seats up for election in 2000, all are now occupied by 
candidates endorsed by SuccessPAC (Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce, 2000b). It 
should be noted, however, that the seats of two candidates were uncontested and in one 
additional race, SuccessP AC endorsed both candidates. In any case, the result is a school 
board that largely works for the same goals as the Chamber, which is drastically different 
from school board politics 10 years ago when business was marginally involved and 
without a strategic agenda. As late as the mid-1990s, the school board had a reputation as 
a political backwater where few serious community activists bothered to be on the ballot 
(Dobie, 1996, May 23). To select potential board members, the Chamber works with 
civic groups that tend to be ideologically like-minded, with a membership base that draws 
from the business community (Rotary, Kiwanians, etc.). Two board members have 
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previously been members of the citizens' panel that produces the Chamber's annual 
Progress Report on Metro Schools (which is discussed subsequently in section 10.5). The 
Chamber stresses to its members that serving on the school board is an important form of 
civic involvement. Especially people with expertise in business management, public 
relations, and finance are solicited, while "retired coaches and those married to current 
teachers" are avoided (Knestrick, 2001). The Chamber, with a staff dedicated to 
educational issues, functions in effect as policy experts to "their" elected candidates. 
On the other hand, the teachers have the politically active Metropolitan Nashville 
Education Association (MNEA}-the teachers' union. MNEA is a considerable force in 
policymaking and represents about 80 percent of the city's teachers. The PAC of the 
teachers' union can rival the Chamber's SuccessP AC financially. It is actively engaged in 
supporting not only candidates for the school board, but also candidates for city council. 
The Chamber views MNEA as a defender of the status quo in the educational system, and 
the two groups often take opposing views on reform issues. 
Business operates under the guidance of enlightened self-interest, assuming its 
involvement is a "win-win" situation for local society. Obviously, the benefits of 
improved schools are indisputable: the local economy will remain strong and an overall 
improved quality of life will be achieved. Business interests view themselves as neutral, 
progressive proponents of good schools: "It's not politically feasible to push too hard on 
student achievement and accountability, because you want the support of the teachers' 
union. But we push it, and business organizations all across the nation push for it. If we 
don't ... it will never happen" (Knestrick, 2001). Business interests position themselves as 
agents of change, moving the inherently conservative school board forward. 
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t 0.4 Educational reform policies 
On the political side, Mayor Bredesen's business culture approach to governance has, at 
times, placed him in an antagonistic relationship with both civil service employees and 
political entities such as the school board (which Bredesen, at separate occasions, has 
called "monolithic" and "dysfunctional" [Garrigan, 1998, February 26]). As typical for 
arrangements where one side controls finances (the mayor and the council) and one 
ostensibly sets policy (the school board), the exact nature of the power division depends 
on the agents involved. Bredesen engaged significantly in educational issues and 
exercised power to influence policy. A mayor with strong interests in the school system 
must "meddle" in the business of the school board, because he has little nominal power 
over educational policy. Bredesen has, for example, used the tactic of outspoken criticism 
to influence the public perception of how the school system is governed. The school 
board, if not directly responsible to the mayor, is subject to public opinion as an elected 
body as well as financial approval from the city council, over which Bredesen wielded 
considerable power. The response was mixed from entrenched agents-the school board, 
school administration, and teachers. Some were protective of their power, while others 
viewed Bredesen as someone who could rally support for schools, including more money, 
from business interests and the community at large. 
Phil Bredesen made it clear from the beginning that he considered education a key 
component to his vision for a future Nashville. His first "State of the Metro" address 
strongly emphasized education and opened the possibility for various reform options, 
although it was not until his second term that education reform saw significant forward 
movement. His rhetoric was a blend between economic necessity and moral imperative. 
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The economic rationale was directly influenced by Partnership 2000, which is an 
example of the organization's ability to give its agenda top priority in local politics. 
Bredesen's educational policy was inspired by Partnership 2000's analysis of labor force 
deficiencies (Murray, 1995, January 2), but also was colored by his experience as a 
business executive in Nashville; the trouble recruiting workers because of concern about 
the local educational system was "issue one, two, three, four and five" (Bredesen quoted 
in Ashford, 1991, June 13). The property tax was raised on three occasions during eight 
years mainly to finance Nashville's grand development projects and the school system 
(Figure 10.2). The first 1993 tax increase primarily financed the downtown arena, but 
$100 million was also allocated to the Metro school system. The second in 1997 raised 
salaries for city employees, financed the downtown arena, and a much discussed school 
reform, while the 1998 tax increase was entirely tied to the school reform projects. 
Although the property tax rate was lower when Bredesen left office compared to 1991, 
the city raises much more taxes now due to drastic appreciation of property values (the 
city is obligated to lower the tax rate at property reassessment time to keep the tax 
collection the same, as can be seen in Figure 10.2, although it is customarily followed 
immediately by a tax increase). 
As attitudes toward school funding among many Nashvillians, including the 
business elite, were slowly changing, the prospect of addressing the educational process 
took a step forward in 1988 as local school systems were allowed to ask federal courts to 
end oversight. The u.s.·supreme Court, increasingly adopting the philosophy of 
localism, has encouraged the end of federal involvement. During the period Nashville has 
been under a desegregation court order, the legal system has been less and less willing to 
303 
Property Tax Rate 
(Urban Service 
District) 
$4.81 
1991 
$4.50 
$ 3 .. 73 (reassessment) 
1993 
$4.24 
$4.12 
$ 3.58 (reassessment) 
1997 1998 
Figure 10.2 The property tax rate in Nashville 1991-1999. Tax increases in 1993 ($.77), 
1997 ($.54), 1998 ($.12). Compiled from various sources. 
approve of affirmative action and racial diversity as dominant criteria in determining 
school district boundaries and ways to combat segregation. Of particular importance is 
the Missouri v. Jenkins case in 1995, where the Supreme Court narrowly disapproved (5-
4) of federal oversight of a school system in Kansas City. Some of the court's
determining factors were devolutionary-"restore state and local authorities to the control 
of the school system"-while also rejecting integration as a necessary, over-arching goal; 
"courts are [too] willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be 
inferior" (The Legal Information Institute, 2003 ). The Nashville desegregation order was 
increasingly viewed as irrelevant by all parties, even by those whose interests it was 
intended to protect. Black children had to be bused the longest distances and many high 
schools in black areas have closed, which is detrimental to community building efforts. 
The school board, on the other hand, is naturally interested in local autonomy, and other 
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reformers, such as the business community, perceived the layer of non-local control as 
merely an unnecessary obstacle. 
Bredesen and a new active school director in Nashville, Richard Benjamin, 
appointed a committee to study the possibility of ending federal oversight as well as 
implementing broader school reform. This required consent from a range of actors: the 
plaintiff in the case, who was a lawyer with ties to the original civil rights lawsuit; federal 
courts; the Nashville school board; the mayor; and the city council, which must approve 
and finance a new plan. Such a plan must still promote desegregation and satisfy the 
plaintiffs, but without overwhelming use of racial criteria, which would likely invoke a 
new opposing lawsuit. It must also create neighborhood schools and abolish the 
ubiquitously disliked busing system while maintaining a racial balance. Finally, it must 
implement education reform that would convince the public and various interests groups 
that it could foster better schools and results worth the investment of significant 
resources. To create such a new balance is costly. The committee appointed by Benjamin 
drafted a plan during a two-year period, dubbed Commitment to the Future. The cost of 
implementing the plan was initially estimated at $310 million, which added about $100 
million to capital improvement costs and operating costs at $80 million on top of the 
annual school budget of $350 million (Lawson, 1996, November 18). 
A Chamber committee was one of the institutions that reviewed Commitment. As 
part of its mandate from the Chamber, the committee was asked to rate the importance of 
the program to the Chamber. The overall plan garnered an "important" rating from the 
committee, and especially pupil-to-teacher ratio was considered "very important" 
(Lawson, 1996, November 18). However, the Chamber's leading concern was 
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measurable goals. The Chamber's progress report called Commitment a "wish list," rather 
than a strategic plan, focusing too much on increased funding rather than reform. Its 
contribution was the formation of a concrete implementation schedule-a "business 
plan." The mayor also issued criticism that mirrored the opinion of the Chamber. In this 
contested environment, a newly-elected critical voice on the school board, Murray 
Phillip, also became an outspoken critic of the plan, various educational issues, and the 
teachers' union throughout the late l 990s51 • 
If the old system is dismantled, it has to be replaced with a new model that can 
provide a framework of equality and standards superimposed on neighborhood schools. 
The solution was found in a pedagogical innovation called Core Curriculum combined 
with the desegregation plan. Before Christmas 1996, Murray Phillip presented Mayor 
Bredesen with a copy of education scholar E.D. Hirsch's book The Schools We Need and 
Why We Don't Have Them. It is a more direct prescription for education reform based on 
the philosophy developed in Hirsch's 1987 book, Cultural Literacy. Bredesen reportedly 
was so impressed that he circulated copies among friends and policy makers (Garrigan, 
1997, March 20). The book, which has received national attention, basically argues that 
the basis for a successful citizen is an understanding of core knowledge and values 
common to the populace at large. Hirsch's (1987) idea is that everybody should share a 
common body of knowledge in order to be able to communicate with each other fully 
participate in society, laying the foundation for a more equitable and economically 
effective society. The way to achieve that is not only by establishing a comprehensive 
51 Murray Phillip even ran for mayor in 1999 as a general nay-sayer with fiscal conservatism as his main 
theme. 
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curriculum, but also by returning to more traditional pedagogical methods: facts, 
memorization, testing. Knowledge itself, at least in a K-12 setting, is more important than 
acquiring skills and tools to facilitate future learning (Hirsch, 1996). A new school 
curriculum has emerged based on the ideas developed in the book, usually referred to as 
Core (Knowledge) Curriculum. It has been implemented in several hundred schools in 
the country. The pedagogy appeals to different sides of Phil Bredesen, the artist's patron 
and the businessman with a propensity for applied skills and science. 
Not long after Bredesen read the Hirsch book, he returned with a restructured 
school reform proposal, now rechristened Commitment to Excellence, adopting parts the 
original plan, while adding his own touches centered on Core Curriculum. This was an 
unusually long budget debate where Bredesen made his priorities public at an early stage 
in order to build support (Garrigan, 1998, February 26). The proposal, a 249-page 
document, was presented as a competing plan to the initial Commitment. Means to find a 
solution to the problem went beyond the ordinary, such as a retreat with a majority of 
council and school board members. Core Curriculum was well received by interests 
usually antagonistic, the teachers' union and the Chamber's education experts. Core 
Curriculum spells out in some detail what should be learned every year, satisfying the 
Chamber's idea of measurable goals. Even if most business leaders voiced general 
support for the plan, endorsements were tentative to make it clear that money should be 
accompanied by reform that was viewed as business-friendly--Core Curriculum, smaller 
class sizes, accountability, and choice. Also, some fiscal conservatives objected. Small 
businesses' main representative, Charles Fentress, a state director of National Federation 
of Independent Business and a city councilman, said his constituency was not in favor 
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(Rutledge, 1997, April 14). The school board was only moderately enthusiastic, perhaps 
because the plan originated within the mayor's office, but eventually endorsed it. With a 
new school director, Bill Wise, Bredesen faced a school board that was willing to 
compromise and less attached to the earlier plan developed by the previous director. 
Politically, the tactic paid off, but only after Vice-Mayor Jay West, as the "speaker" of 
the council, cast a tie-breaking vote that allowed for a 20-cent tax increase that earmarked 
$200 million to the revised plan. The city council approved a budget and a tax increase 
that was not as large as the mayor and the school board wanted (20 cents for the school 
system instead of the 30 cents asked for), yet big enough to implement much of the plan, 
including Core Curriculum. One primary theme is a coordinated, simultaneous 
curriculum throughout the school system. Initially greeted with enthusiasm, there has 
been a more recent debate whether Core Curriculum is effective, but no conclusive 
consensus has emerged. The tax increase funded a reduction in class size and the hiring 
of new teachers, including more music and art teachers, to implement Core Curriculum 
ideas52• 
The issue of desegregation was left to be finalized by the school board. The board 
came to an agreement with the plaintiffs, and the court order was eventually lifted in 
September 1998 (Pride, 2001). Funding for a School Improvement Plan that addressed 
the desegregation issue was approved by council with a 12-cent tax increase. It was 
estimated that the plan would cost $250 million to implement. As the projected costs 
were higher than could be financed within the budget, an agreement was also reached to 
52 The latest superintendent, Pedro Garcia, has changed the curriculum to match the state's achievement 
tests to improve scores, and by doing so, partially dismantled Core Curriculum (Pulle, 2002, December 26). 
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solicit private sector money to finance certain operational components of the plan 
( Garrigan, 1998, January 22). 
The new system has been in operation since 1999. The goals of the plan are 
complicated and, in part, contradictory. The past system to achieve racial balance was to 
bus black children, mainly from the inner city to the suburbs, from grades 1 to 4, while 
white children were bused from grades 5 to 8. In high school, a mixed busing system was 
used. The new plan would put children closer to home and create new community 
schools that would satisfy the court order, while minimizing busing. The five-year plan, 
finalized in 2003, of rebuilding, reorganizing, and restructuring, entails the following: 
• The school has moved to a three-tier system (instead of four) so students would
only have to attend three different schools through high school. 
• Students should attend integrated schools, so race will continue to be a factor in
school districting. There is a legal precedent to allow prescribed ratios based on 
race that emanate from the 1971 Supreme Court ruling Swann v. Charlotte­
Mecklenburg Board of Education. The Nashville plan is deemed legal as it is 
broader in its scope than just racial quotas. 
• Students are to attend schools closer to home, which would closer approximate
the ideal of neighborhood schools. This is still a compromise, as integration 
continues to be a part of the plan. New school zoning meant that some older 
schools were to be replaced with new schools located elsewhere, and some 
students actually have to attend schools farther from home. 
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• Up to 12 new magnet schools should be built, acceptance methods revised, and
all students would be guaranteed transportation to create not only racial but also 
socio-economic class balance. 
• Merit-based pay for teachers is encouraged, but placed low on the agenda to
ensure the support of the teachers' union. 
10.5 Business as the education watchdog 
The idea of evaluating and measuring the achievements of the school system originated 
within the business community and became a component of the larger reform plan. One 
of the first steps taken by the Chamber was to initiate a series of school evaluations in 
order to identify where the problems were. Led by banker Robert Mc Neilly, the 
framework for an annual school evaluation was developed, and the first Progress Report 
on Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools was published in 1993. It was inspired by 
national calls (the so-called "America 2000 Goals") which encouraged local communities 
to develop such evaluation statements of school performance. The Chamber stresses that 
the reports are produced by a citizens' panel, hence they are community reports rather 
than Chamber reports per se. Although many interests are represented in the staff that 
operates the evaluation program-the latest 200 I report was issued by an 18-member 
panel representing business, educational, and civic interests-the report is under the 
guidance of the Chamber. The panel rates Nashville schools in five categories: 
communications, efficiency, equity, learning, and security (Nashvil1e Area Chamber of 
Commerce, 1997a; 1998b; 1999; 2000c; 2001 ). 
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A brief analysis of the assessments indicate that school reform has, at least 
partially, progressed over time and met with approval of business interests. In 1994, the 
overall grade of the school system was C for critical, and the following year, the 
Chamber progress report stated that the school district and board did not do their jobs. 
The report stated that the schools needed measurable goals, which became a condition for 
support and more money from business interests. "After that, they set some goals. Really 
a pretty controversial environment that year," says the Chamber's education expert 
(Knestrick, 2001 ). However, the 1997 Progress Report points out that data from the 
school system is too inconsistent and incomplete to comprehensively evaluate progress 
and measurability, and goal-setting must improve. Moreover, the Progress Reports appear 
to be gaining strength in influence. As a "voice of the customer," they have been 
institutionalized and widely distributed among school officials and politicians in 
Nashville. In 1998, the tone is increasingly positive and optimistic as several important 
reforms had been implemented, which should lead to improvement. Goal adoption, Core 
Curriculum, and the lifting of federal oversight are parts of a "turning point" for the 
school system. Use of funds appears to be efficient too, the 1998 report states. The school 
board was judged to be more collaborative and communicative than in the past. The 
value-added measurement provided by the state suggested that "dramatic increases" in 
learning are taking place, even if the absolute achievement still fell below desirable 
levels. On the critical side, the report scolds the teacher's union for only engaging salary 
disputes and not educational reform. The report also presented a "customer satisfaction 
survey" for the first time in 1998 where interviewed residents gave the school system a C 
grade. 
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In 1999, the school improvement plan had progressed on time and within budget, 
according to the report. Parents are generally satisfied and teacher's salaries are well 
above the average for the Southeast. The best grade so far from the panel was awarded, a 
8-, because the school system has started to display a ''culture of high expectations." The 
report notes, however, that the public continues to mistrust the efficiency of local 
government in general, including the school system. Moreover, sales tax collection 
fluctuates, which led to funding problems for schools in some years. A serious problem is 
also that stakeholders in the community do not agree on what needs to be done, and there 
is little financial support from non-governmental sources. According to the report, some 
community members appear to regard Metro schools as a welfare or charity program for 
those who cannot afford private schools, instead of recognizing that public education is a 
viable institution that can improve the quality of life in Nashville. There is a "disconnect" 
between support for schools and community expectations, according to the report. 
Despite reform efforts, the 2000 report starts to exhibit impatience with the lack 
of academic improvement in the school system, downgrading it to a C. Nashville is stuck 
with "just average" compared to other urban districts, something with which it should not 
be satisfied. Public perception was again showing a downward trend, and more 
respondents actually believed the schools were worse than they had been five years 
earlier. As this attitude is considered somewhat unfair by the report, it suggests that better 
public relations efforts must be undertaken by school-supporting institutions. The new 
mayor, Bill Purcell, and the school board receive good marks for their focus and 
commitment. Only two of the nine board members have more than two years experience 
on the board, which makes them "less entrenched" in their thinking. The mayor's 
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performance audit was good53, as was the monetary contribution from the Frist 
Foundation to allow for a thorough nationwide search for a new director of the school 
system. 
The call for community support is slowly gaining ground, according to the 2001 
report. The school improvement plan continued on schedule and an International 
Baccalaureate program was established54 • In the end, however, the report is pessimistic 
and ponders the effectiveness of the reform work, as achievement levels actually
decreased. Demographic trends showing more socio-economically disadvantaged
children are also worrisome; more students have subsidized school lunch, and more
money has to be spent on programs for non-native English speakers. The school board
and the new director Pedro Garcia are rated high in leadership. Garcia's criticism of
MNEA has endeared him with the business community, as has him emphasis on the
basics (Pulle, 2002, December 26). Garcia was also voted Nashvillian of the Year in 2002
by readers of the Nashville Scene. Community support finally achieved a satisfactory
grade by the report, while the schools themselves only got a U for "unacceptable" and
"unfinished." Garcia has also changed the curriculum to match the state's achievement
tests to improve scores, and by doing so, largely dismantled Bredesen' s Core Curriculum.
53 To assess the efficiency of school operations, a performance audit was ordered, which was performed by 
a consulting firm (MGT of America). The audit's main conclusion is that the system is adequately funded 
and managed reasonably well. One criticism levied at the audit was its limited scope. The report did not 
evaluate the education process itself and how to improve learning (Barry, 2001, February 15). 
54 The International Baccalaureate program is based on an internationally recognized high school 
curriculum. The goal is to capture international capital flows and attract FDI. A German chemical company 
reportedly declined Nashville in favor of Charlotte because the city did not have an International 
Baccalaureate program where German employees felt comfortable placing their children. "Hopefully our 
lobbying paid off a little bit,'' says the Chamber (Knestrick, 2001 ). 
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Some reforms have indeed been implemented, but it might be just as illuminating 
to consider what has not been achieved in terms of reform. One such instance is the 
charter school idea, where each school develops their own curriculum, budget, and 
employee relations. Charter schools are in line with neoliberal ideology; they create 
competition and one can subject them to "accountability" on academic achievement and 
financial management. Two Nashville entrepreneurs with a for-profit company called 
Alternative Public Schools proposed on two different occasions in the early 1990s to take 
over the management of a magnet school and an underperforming school. The proposal 
was turned down once by the state and a second time when it was narrowly voted down 
5-4 by the school board, even if the mayor and the director of Metro schools had voiced
support of the idea. The opposition from the teachers' union was considered crucial 
(Dobie, 1995, September 21 ). Local independence on labor relations was especially 
problematic, as was the proposal's lack of specifics and a proven track record. The 
Vanderbilt-educated businessmen leading the company had a history of community 
involvement, including Leadership Nashville and other non-profits, but no training in 
education. In 1998, the state pushed for charter schools again. Federal support made the 
case strong from a financial standpoint. But Mayor Bredesen had reversed his position on 
charter schools as a Democratic gubernatorial candidate in search of labor support, 
maintaining that competition exists through private schools and magnet schools, and the 
root of the problem is not lack of competition. Instead, Bredesen said, what is needed is 
consensus on rethinking education, preferably around his Core Curriculum initiative. In 
1998, the Chamber voiced official support for charter schools. Eventually, it only 
supported the principle, but did not back the legislation. One reason was that it felt that 
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private management firms should be able to operate charter schools, which the legislation 
would not have allowed; the legislature and the school board have been reluctant to go 
that far (Knestrick, 200 I). 
So, after a lot of work, has student performance actually improved? To answer 
that, we can turn to two sources: Metro schools accountability reports and the value 
added performance scores from the State of Tennessee. These reports satisfy the 
accountability concerns of the Chamber, which has assumed the leading watchdog 
function in this area. The idea of measurable goals filtered into the school system from 
the outside, which led to the issuing of goals and annual assessments published annually 
by the school system. This idea, originating from the Chamber and its citizen's panel, 
was adopted in I 999. The goal is to have comprehensive data readily available, which 
was not the case before the reports were instituted. 
The accountability reports offers mixed results, with no clear indication that 
scores show a general upward trend. Assessments are available for individual schools as 
well as composite results for elementary, middle school, and high schools, taking into 
account various measurements on reading, writing, national test scores, dropout rates, etc. 
The conclusion must be that learning has not improved; gains one year are negated the 
next and no particular trend is discemable (Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, 
2001a). 
The state also grades the school district based on performance. The School 
Improvement Act of I 992 was designed to encourage reform and comprehensive 
measurements of performance. Nashville scores below average, which has earned it C 
and D scores from the state in 2000-2001. Value-added learning (defined as "the 
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minimum standard or expectation is that students will gain a year's average growth, 
compared to the national norm, for a year's instruction in each subject area") show 
reasonable, but uneven results; generally a B grade for the Nashville system 
(Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, 2001 b ). 
As evident in the progress reports, business takes the contradictory position of a 
booster and a critic. It promotes the school system and presents its achievements. "The 
school system itself is not always capable of telling its own story. The Chamber tried to 
step up and ... help with factual information about the progress schools are making," says 
business activist Keel Hunt (2000). Recent journalistic accounts have also concluded that 
student scores in the Nashville school system are lower than the state average and most 
surrounding counties, but above average when socio-eonomically adjusted (Ashford, 
1998, July 23). While business stresses that schools are performing reasonably weJl and 
that money is not wasted in bureaucracy, it also threatens to withhold monetary support if 
structural reform is slow as it seeks change in education system. The conflicting position 
is a result of the marketing role that the Chamber and business interests perform. They 
are eager to show that Nashville schools are at least as good as comparable systems 
around the country, and have the capacity to satisfactorily educate motivated middle-class 
students. Their agenda, although not always in the details of reform, has often placed 
them on same side as the Bredesen administration. 
Currently, the school system is better positioned than in the past to deal with its 
problems. In the 1999 election, both for council and mayor, education had finally 
achieved the high profile status it had not have since the contentious busing days, and 
now for a positive reason. Current Mayor Bill Purcell has continued with increased 
316 
funding, mainly for capital improvement projects, promoting smaller classrooms and 
even considering bypassing the state legislature on charter schools. Political cooperation 
in educational issues is far greater than in the past. It was customary, until recently, that 
school board and council did not communicate at all beyond budget negotiations. During 
Purcell's tenure a closer relationship is reported (Pride, 200 I). A wide range of public 
and private educational support groups has also emerged the last few years. Project 
STARFISH arranges summer program for at-risk students in grades K-3 (privately 
funded), Project GRAD encourages an improved high school graduation rate among 
inner-city youth (a Metro schools and Vanderbilt University joint program), and the 
Center for Basic Skills focus on teachers' education (a Tennessee State University 
program). However, there is a distinct feeling of disappointment among various interests 
that reforms have not paid off immediately in improved test scores. There is an increasing 
awareness that there are no easy solutions to the educational problem. Nevertheless, 
Nashville may be found in the middle of the civic capacity schema developed by Stone et 
al. (200 I), and the role of business in education policy is rising and increasingly 
institutionalized. 
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11. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As cities and regions are more and more interdependent, the coherence and dominance of 
traditional political and economic urban elites is challenged. As one observer noted 
regarding the economic boom of the 1990s: the good times are killing off the local elites 
(Lemann, 2000). But as this research suggests, recent trends reflect an elite 
reorganization as much as an absolute decline of local power. The influx of new capital 
and industries offers an imperative of how local business interests should be organized to 
maximize their efficiency. Nashville's experience indicates that the city has moved from 
a political system characterized by the dominance of a closed, exclusive power group to 
broader, inclusive (although still-elite dominated) institutions with greater concern for 
strategic planning and long-term growth. A distinct social and cultural change within the 
business elite has enabled it to mobilize internal resources through collective 
coordination and action, in contrast to older, more laissez-faire attitudes toward 
governance. The restructuring of local business institutions has also facilitated a 
rethinking of the proper relationship between business, the local state, and local civic 
society. New forms of local cooperation are developing-a "local mode of 
regulation"-in conjunction with the narrowing scope of the federal government. An 
emphasis on entrepreneurialism ( e.g. private/public partnerships, city marketing, airport 
development) in urban economic development has been broadened to incorporate extra­
economic concerns ( e.g. education). 
Local development can then be included in the theories of post-Fordism as an 
integral part of a broader regime. Some national trends have acted as forces of 
convergence on urban regulation: the decline of national redistributive programs; 
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increasing spatial competition, which limits the options of local policymaking; and urban 
marketing, which results from cities' need to distinguish themselves in this environment. 
At the same time, these trends are contradictory; they have also created a system with 
possibilities of pursuing divergent strategies locally. The devolution of regulation has led 
to increasing emphasis on local solutions, some of which aim to address growth concerns, 
while others address social issues that normally are perceived as neglected under post­
Fordism. This often requires, as evident in Nashville, a change in the urban regime. 
Despite "peripheral Fordism" with industrialization characterized by branch 
plants and significant outside control, as well as government expansion from the New 
Deal and onward, Southern cities remained in the hands of local oligarchies for a long 
time (although in Nashville, the economic elite had to coexist with a non-business 
dominated political machine). This arrangement worked well for Nashville when it was a 
"subregional nodal center" filling mostly a distributive function (Stanback & Noyelle, 
1982). Today, the city's service and manufacturing exports are broader in scope. For 
example, the auto industry and the health care sector produce for national markets, 
diminishing the connection and dependency on the local hinterland (which is probably 
true for most cities). It is possible to establish national economic networks using 
contemporary communication technologies, but companies are now also allowed to 
compete nationally to a greater extent than in the past through deregulation. 
These economic forces increasingly posed a threat to the oligopolist local regime 
and the old downtown business community. A regime shift was evident in Nashville in 
the 1990s, but it did not emerge suddenly and without warning. As a Sunbelt city, 
Nashville was less affected by the structural economic crisis of the 1970s. Nashville did 
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not experience post-Fordist deindustrialization with widespread unemployment and 
population losses. In fact, the 1970s and 1980s were periods of economic growth 
accompanied with an influx of new residents. With increased mobility of capital and 
people came new growth industries, new economic elites, and a regionalization of the 
local economy. Various accounts from the research document a pervasive feeling of 
social change in Nashville at this time, permeating virtually all social classes in local 
society. From an elite perspective, the inflow of more affluent people increased the 
demand for new elite neighborhoods, networks, and institutions, challenging "old 
money" Belle Meade interests. 
However, it is usually in a time of crisis when new policies and governance 
systems are formed. Even if many of the underlying structures were changing over 
time-a perception of a power vacuum instead of the traditional bank and insurance CEO 
dominance was emerging in Nashville-local configurations of power and governance 
did not undergo a drastic alteration until circa 1990. Compared to the restructuring of the 
industrial regions in the United States, the end of the real estate-dominated business cycle 
may seem moderate, but it had, using the terminology from Chapter I, catalytic qualities 
that resulted in a "delayed" post-Fordist transformation of governance. Instead of 
freewheeling growth, there was a need for sustainable economic perf onnance55
demanding a stronger collective action approach from the business elite, which was 
foremost expressed in the creation of Partnership 2000, the reform of the Nashville 
Chamber of Commerce and their post-1990 activities. This represents the institutional 
55 For example, Richard Fulton (2000) says the most important oversight of his 1975-1987 mayoral period 
was the lack of attention paid to long-range thinking and planning. 
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parallel to an economic restructuring process, the local realignment to a new economic 
paradigm. These institutions, in effect, dismantled the old power structure. '�What came 
out of the ashes of the old structure was a very capable, enlightened and empowered 
group of new leaders," says former newspaper publisher and business oligarch Irby 
Simpkins (2000). Decisions taken within Partnership 2000 have repercussions on the 
whole city. This reflects a political structure where private-public partnerships (with the 
emphasis on private) take on strategic planning decisions. Certainly there have been other 
forces, such as a growing grassroots movement that includes environmental groups, anti­
airport groups, parental groups, anti-development NIMBY groups, and so on. City 
planning through the institution of subarea planning has also codified citizen input in the 
planning process. But without a strong tradition of community participation, unionism, or 
other institutional arrangements that can offer an alternative regime, the business elite is 
still most influential in local governance. However-and I believe this is symptomatic of 
contemporary urban regimes-because the scope of business has been broadened beyond 
core economic concerns, it is operating in policy areas that it cannot dominate and must 
therefore seek out cooperation and compromises with other sectors of local society. 
To draw out some further implications of the regime shift, we need to return to 
past governance. The previous regime relied on informal networks of powerful business 
people, the Watauga Group being the most obvious example of such an arrangement. 
This is not to say, however, that the Nashville business elite necessarily acted in a 
coherent and decisive manner or managed to make a strong imprint on the path of 
development the city has taken. Instead, power was informal, ad-hoc, and without long­
term agendas. It is quite legitimate today among the Nashville business elite to criticize 
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its own history, and most individuals will freely do so, limited only by lingering 
allegiances on a personal level. Here, business exhibits a certain level of reflexivity. This 
frankness indicates self-awareness of an internal paradigm shift and a distancing from the 
old regime. Business can do so because it disassociates itself from the old regime and 
views contemporary structure as more enlightened, democratic, and efficient. 
Representatives from the current business community also willingly frame the nature of 
past governance in terms of gender, race. and power. But, interestingly, its members may 
also stress the appropriateness of past ways. "The city did well from the 1960s up to the 
1980s operating with a small group of white males who congregated around the banks," 
says Fred Harris (2000) of the Chamber of Commerce. Regarding the subsequent 
reformation of the Chamber: "that response was just as realistic for that day in time as the 
one by the Watauga Group for their day and time," continues long-time business activist 
Keel Hunt (2000). To create a dynamic city, diversification of power is preferable, 
according to powerful banker Dennis Bottorff (2001) who, along with others, suggests 
that institutions like Watauga were reflective of a smaller community with a 
concentration of power. Changes in governance, however, cannot simply be explained by 
the fact that a city is growing larger. Other cities have experienced similar power 
divergence even if they, at the time of oligarchal dominance, were larger than Nashville 
is today. Instead, the cultural and economic forces of inter-urban competition, and the 
expanding geographical scope of capital has made such narrow localism of the past 
illogical or impossible. In Nashville, financial deregulation was also instrumental in 
dismantling the old local regime and the loss of locally owned banks broke the 
interpersonal banker-developer connection. In some ways, however, size and spatial form 
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may indeed influence power arrangements. Whereas financial institutions tend to cluster 
(generally downtown), sprawling, multi-nodal suburban cities are not as conducive to 
coherent social interactions among the elite as in the past. This forces business elites to 
organize themselves in a different manner. Spatial growth, economic diversity, and 
governance change may then have affected each other in a dialectical way. 
When power is dissipating from existing institutions, the power of business is not 
automatically given. In a governance system characterized by openness and 
indeterminacy, local capital acted in their common interests to develop a new relationship 
with the city56• To assert power today, local elites in Nashville (and elsewhere perhaps as 
well) have moved away from a traditional arrangement based on individual informal 
power and towards place-based groups where power lies in collective action that can 
reproduce itself beyond the individual level. This is a necessity in an environment where 
both capital and personal mobility is high. The importance placed on such institutions 
means that the economy is dependent on mechanisms that lie outside the market. This 
includes various forms of public goods, the social creation of knowledge and skills, the 
reproduction of labor, and so on. Taking such factors into account, the competitive nature 
of capitalism is limited, and cooperation may be an equally important feature. Market 
forces alone are generally too focused on short-term decisions to be optimal from the 
perspective of a city. It is precisely such cooperative, collective behavior that has been 
documented in the previous chapters. From business' perspective, it is no longer enough 
56 Some fundamental factors underlying the relationship between capital and localities remain the same, 
however. Not all capital is footloose, including real estate and other forms of sunk investment; there are 
exit costs; and capital (and capitalists) does not come detached from social and cultural considerations. 
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to demand special interest favors from the city's politicians. Instead, business interests 
must act collectively to create the resources that move the city in a desirable (to them) 
direction. As Nashville's growth is not the result of one dominant industry and the 
decision-makers within it, the emphasis must then be placed on the collective strategies 
coming out of the local elite. This type of regime might be particularly associated with 
cities with a diverse economic base. 
The developments within the business elite may not have been possible without 
corresponding changes in the political arena. The withering machine drastically altered 
the political landscape of Nashville, and the city moved from a populist image of former 
Mayor Bill Boner to an entrepreneurial municipal government. The relationship between 
business and government did not necessarily get closer, but instead more transparent, 
formalized, and openly active. This pro-business attitude of city government is often 
associated with a new type of mayors ( of which Bredesen is clearly an example) whose 
policies are a response to state devolution and have received national attention in the 
l 990s57 • Because of some parallels with the pre-Fordist era, these urban policies have
sometimes been described as neo-progressive. Different, however, from the progressive 
notion of keeping political actors away from areas that ought to be handled by 
professionals, the new urban mayor is a "meddler" and activist. For example, bringing 
57 Bredesen has a very firm grip of these changes and the implications for cities: "I was in college in the 
1960s and I think the advanced majority of students saw the federal government as the solution to most of 
the nation's problems. I would have taken that as an article of faith, an axiom ... The people who occupied 
the local political offices, the corruption that went on in the major cites, were not people that could give 
comfort that they were vehicles to serve the public needs instead of enrich someone, financially or 
otherwise, locally. Today when I look at federal government in many policy areas, it is almost incidental or 
in the way. The really interesting things going on across the country seem to happen in state and local 
government. Exciting policy comes from the localities because it is grounded in real people and real 
problems. That directness is more pertinent to solving problems, finding out what works and what doesn't. 
That kind of vigor is showing itself across the country and has for the last 20 years" (Bredesen, 2001 ). 
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politics back into the governance system of education is part of a new reform movement, 
and the opposite of the traditional notion of urban reform where professionalism and 
detachment from political influence was heralded as the solution to urban problems. 
Another case is Nashville airport politics, where business progressivism is expressed in 
the structure of an independent airport authority. Here as well, the wall between 
professional independence and the political sphere is challenged, but under the right 
circumstances, welcomed by the business elite. 
The self-image of the business elite is that of a reformed, energized, active group 
working for the public good. However, its aim goes beyond enhancing cohesiveness and 
capacity to address civic issues within the business community. Efforts are also made to 
mobilize other groups in local society to work for the same general goal. A discourse of 
local cooperation is formulated though what can be dubbed the community agenda. 
Those in powerful positions tend to view a place as one "community" more than the 
populace at large does. They do so because it is in their interest to promote amicable local 
social relations, to create community building and "civic pride" instead of fragmentation 
and discord that discourages new investment and complicates the capacity to address 
policy problems. The community agenda must de-emphasize or ignore plurality of 
interests locally and instead stress shared values, mutual understanding, public 
responsibility, cooperative agreement, and collective action. It is not surprising that many 
of these formulations on community are conceived foremost by business interests. 
Business wants to rebuild society using its own blueprint, but when it ventures beyond 
activities in the economic sphere, compromises must be reached with other interests. The 
outcome of this process is always unwritten. 
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Business pursues this strategy in both substantive, material ways, as in the case of 
education-and in immaterial, symbolic ways, as in image-building initiatives. As 
Eisenschitz and Gough (1998) point out, business "is increasingly involved in local 
policy, motivated by the ... concern for the effects of social division. Capital gains 
legitimacy in promising to enhance a locality's competitive edge by introducing business 
values and, often, by raising its profile through support to showpiece projects" (p. 762). 
The Chamber's view of education reform, for example, is one of measurability and 
accountability ("business values") that has permeated the discourse, even if such notions 
are often hard to implement in an educational setting. They have, however, succeeded in 
promoting a higher degree of transparency in the system through comprehensive school 
evaluations. Symbolically, positive imagery is used to create this civic pride. Much of 
Partnership 2000's activities are concerned with inward directed image-making. More 
effective, probably, have been the sports strategy and downtown development as 
"showpieces" that act as community identity builders. 
I interpret the business elite's involvement in education as an expression of a 
deepening engagement with civic society. New types of local cooperation would logically 
involve the traditional triad of business, labor, and government, but the countervailing 
forces to business have been re-centered from the workplace to neighborhoods, ethnicity 
and issue-oriented civic groups. Now, business is primarily contending with a civic­
minded middle-class rather than labor. The regulatory push then involves local education, 
or from the broader perspective of business, the reproduction of the labor force and 
socialization of the citizenry. In contrast with the old elite who engaged in paternalistic 
philanthropy towards public schools, business has become a legitimate and important 
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player in education policy. Particularly the Chamber's community report projects the 
view of the business community. The selection of report panelist ensures conclusions 
consistent with business' position, but the report is also influential in the general public 
debate on education and, moreover, its conclusions provide feedback and influence the 
views of the local business community. Especially educating the non-college bound 
workforce is a leading concern for business in Nash ville, as those are the students that 
benefit the most from improved education. Supply of highly skilled labor, on the other 
hand, must be solved through immigration, the mobility of the college educated, and the 
attractiveness of Nashville as a quality of life residential location, issues that business 
addresses through marketing more than education reform. 
Business involvement in education represents something more profound than a 
response to outside forces-those that see business interests reacting to competitive 
pressures. Neither is it merely a coalition of interests-the localists' focus on urban 
regimes. While the federal state, through deregulation and contraction, has disengaged 
from more direct forms of social regulation, there is still a need for such activities to take 
place. Therefore, I suggest that business activism in local social policy is a logical 
outcome of the geographical transformation of regulation. Instead of being simple local 
reflections of national neoconservatism, local political arrangements should be treated as 
a dialectic response to that ideology. With the need for compromise, the outcome is often 
politically moderate. As Eisenschitz and Gough ( 1998) point out, local politics do not 
exhibit the same characteristics and emphasis on laissez faire economics, because it is 
operating on a different spatial scale. This is not a contradiction, but rather the opposite: a 
transformation of regulation from one level to another, from the national to the local. The 
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national level shies away from inclusive collaboration of major societal interests as was 
common in the F ordist system, while the local does not. The role of local capital, from 
this perspective, is to provide a counterweight against the tendencies of capital at large. 
The involvement of business appears to have a distinct temporal logic. The 
education system is semi-autonomous most of the time, operating only with input from 
those directly affected: the school board, the school administration, the teacher's union, 
etc. On occasion the existing order is disrupted and a period of challenges to the 
established system sets in. The late 1990s has been a time period with an abundance of 
local school reform initiatives. This is influenced by local factors, such as the conclusion 
of federal oversight and Bredesen' s focus on reform towards the end of his mayoral 
tenure. More importantly though, the Jong trends of economic change, as well as the 
business cycle itself, appear to influence policy. Normally, it is a period of crisis that 
creates systemic efforts of collective action within the local business community. The 
case of education, however, operates in a different manner as the problem is not tied 
directly to capital accumulation. Social reproduction strategies have, if successful, broad 
benefits for business, but corporate recruiting, infrastructure investment, and physical 
redevelopment projects are more directly correlated with profitability for local business 
interests. Education demands a deeper engagement from business interests. In Nashville, 
school reform has been on the agenda during a period of prosperity and growth rather 
than crisis and uncertainty. Involvement in social reproduction has followed the push for 
more traditional economic development strategies. I see this as an extension and 
deepening of the efforts of business interests and a reformulation of the post-Fordist 
paradigm. The first response was to pursue strict entrepreneurial policies, but over time, 
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this approach has been moderated. The first stage is unabashedly market-oriented-the 
accumulation stage-while social considerations are addressed later. (Interestingly, local 
policy areas characterized by aggressive entrepreneurialism, such as airport development, 
have now entered a more modest managerial mode.) 
It would be wrong, however, to assume that this development is automatic, 
predestined and emerges without contest. Business interests are not united in their 
approach to an issue such as public education. Three different attitudes exist: old­
fashioned paternalistic conservatism, the view of education in neoliberal market terms, 
and the desire to seek larger coalitions in the community to spearhead a reform agenda. 
The first is increasingly viewed as outmoded and inadequate to solve contemporary 
problems. A combination of the other two is gaining strength. They are not mutually 
exclusive unless the market approach is pursued too single-mindedly and in adverse 
relationship with the other groups in the local community. The community approach has 
been the preferred strategy for the Chamber's education policy, perhaps not only to meet 
the social regulation goal, but also because the organization is not in a strong enough 
position to dominate the reform agenda. The aim is to institutionalize a system (higher 
levels of financing, evaluation and monitoring mechanisms that are stable over time) that 
insulates against waning interest among their own rank-and-file as well as in the 
community at large. 
One drawback for the Nashville business elite in its interaction with civic 
society-in education or elsewhere-is the lack of well established non-profits with a 
substantial commitment to reform the city (not counting inst�tutions such as hospitals and 
universities here). An increasing share of the U.S. economy is non-profit based as the 
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decline in government activities creates a need for social investment from other segments 
of society. Non-profit funding often originates from within the business elite, which 
institutes guidelines for non-profit activities to move local society in a desirable direction. 
Most Nashville's foundations, for example, are relatively new and their impact has been 
modest ( although increasing). One simple explanation for this situation, which at first 
appears peculiar because Nashville is endowed with an economic elite quite willing to 
give substantial amounts of money, is the dominance of Vanderbilt University and its 
fund-raising capacity. Vanderbilt has rendered remaining non-profit Nashville rather 
barren, and the city has only received a modest local engagement from the university. 
Another problem is that an elevated level of civic involvement does not 
automatically produce the desired effect, such as better schools. Nashville cannot escape 
the challenges that all urban school systems face. The Chamber admits that the local K-
12 system is still not very good and that its decade-long effort has not been as fruitful as 
hoped, but only resulted in marginal learning improvements. Structural socio-economic 
factors, which will take on a new dimension in the future with Latino immigration, are 
necessarily underplayed by business in favor of accountability and competition. The 
Chamber is ideologically predisposed to search for solutions that are inspired by market 
thinking, but there is a contradiction between school privatiz.ation and community 
ideology that even reflects the core contradiction of capitalism between the dynamism of 
laissez-faire and the stability of social equity enhancing policies. This dilemma is not lost 
on business, and therefore a moderate compromise position has usually been reached. 
The conclusion that can be drawn is that regulation operates differently at 
different levels of government, and that a certain degree of complementarity exists. The 
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federal government abandoned the activist state model and liberal welfare policies in 
response to global competition and instead emphasizes corporate profitability. This 
leaves cities unaccompanied in their attempts to become successful places, and they must 
also address issues social regulation themselves. To do so, cities develop the type of 
urban regimes that they have the capacity to form, which often grow out of their 
historical circumstances. The strategy of regime building becomes localized, but within 
the framework of post-Fordist capitalism of mobility. This emerging localism is tied to 
market-based philosophy in a basic, entrepreneurial way, as capitalism is in essence a 
decentralized system (Peck, 1995). But, as we have seen, locally devised development 
also entails collective endeavors. Places are made up of citizens, and community 
empowerment is implicit in the very notion of local communities. To remain powerful 
and relevant, elites have moved towards a certain level of inclusiveness, oxymoron as it 
may be, foremost within their own ranks; but also encompassing broader segments of 
local society when necessary. In Nashville's political sphere, however, one can conclude 
that the working class and minorities have been net losers in electoral politics. This is 
also the case in economic development stressing competitiveness and quality of life that 
mostly reflects compromises between an increasingly active middle class and the elite. 
The notions of community can probably be both real and illusory; but to be 
optimistic, a system beyond the zero-sum game of narrow inter-urban competition is 
possible with the mobilization of resources as an outcome of civic engagement. However, 
partnerships and civic consensus must be developed regarding jobs, development 
projects, education, citizen input, and so on. Local places, such as Nashville, can benefit 
from developing capacities beyond business organizations for balanced local regimes to 
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emerge. Places without a tradition of civic activism and neighborhood involvement may 
be at a disadvantage. However, many cities that fit such a characterization, Nashville 
among them, are generally seeing more of such engagements. 
The flaw of decentralized regulation may be that the capacity to achieve the 
consensus necessary and to finance these regulatory mechanisms locally may not 
materialize� at least not in all places. The insights of civic involvement are not always 
forthcoming from local business interests either. Investment in human capital might be 
discouraged on the basis that it requires a higher level of taxation; and if traditional, 
conservative views prevail, no engagement in school reform or other forms of social 
regulation can be expected. Even if a well-balanced power structure exists, there is also 
the possibility of a breakdown in consensus, much like the demise of Fordist regulation. 
Geographical differentiation regarding regimes, policies, spending and social 
reproduction will therefore be significant even as restrictions are imposed on all localities 
by globalizing forces. 
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APPENDIX 1: Evaluating the Nashville image 
One question not addressed in Chapter 8 is to what extent Nashville's promotional efforts 
can be considered successful. Here, I will assess Nashville's image aspirations in three 
ways. First, one long-standing and closely watched ranking is Fortune magazine's annual 
"The Best Cities for Business," which includes some variation on the theme and criteria 
for selection (i.e., each year the concept may be changed slightly: "The Best Cities for 
Headquarters," "The Best Cities for Knowledge Workers," and so on). This provides an 
outside business view of Nashville's position compared to other cities. Secondly, based 
on internal Partnership 2000 material, I will summarize the development of Nashville's 
specific image among business leaders. Thirdly, assuming that media shapes the image of 
cities, I have conducted an analysis of articles in national newspapers and magazines on 
Nashville during the 1990s that can capture general perceptions beyond the corporate 
world. 
A survey of Fortune's "best cities for business" rankings58 from 1990-2000 shows 
that Nashville was ranked twice: as number five in 1991, and fifteen in 1996. The good 
1991 ranking that surveyed "Best Value for Business" was due to a pro-business attitude, 
an airline hub, proximity to markets, and quality labor (Huey, 1991 ). In 1 996, when the 
ranking focus was a balance between work and family life, Nashville has "come a long 
way" and was "joining the ranks of Atlanta wannabes" with a diversified economy, 
according to the article (Precourt & Faircloth, 1996). Good rankings can possibly be 
achieved with effective public relations campaigns. The first chairman of Partnership 
58 The rankings are generally based on a mix between hard economic data and qualitative impressions 
derived from surveys of business executives. 
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2000 says: "You can use the word propaganda, but we were selling ourselves to Forbes 
and Fortune. In the 1980s, when nothing like that was done, it is easy to understand that 
Nashville would not appear on any list because nobody was blowing Nashville's horn. 
We discovered we had a lot of things to crow about. It was easy to sell Nashville" 
(Sherrard, 2000). 
In the years when Nashville did not make the list, several positive and negative 
aspects of the city were mentioned. On the positive side, Nashville has been cited as 
having a low cost of living (Sellers, 1990), a pro-business attitude (Saporito, 1992; 
Labish, 1993), good race relations (Saporito, 1992), good labor-management relations 
(Saporito, 1992), and efforts to develop vocational training (Saporito, 1992). Negative 
aspects of Nashville in the eyes of Fortune include a tight labor market (Sellers, 1990) 
and a lack of international flight service (Saporito, 1992). In the late 1990s, Nashville 
was not ranked in lists surveying most improved cities (Faircloth, 1997), wealth creating 
boomtowns (Fortune, 1998), hottest corporate location (Fisher, 1999), and corporate 
headquarters cities (Borden, 2000). Neither was it mentioned anywhere in the ranking 
considerations, which may be a reflection of diminishing space the survey has received in 
the magazine. However, Partnership 2000 has acknowledged Nashville's general absence 
in city ranking recently, which may indicate that the city has not been able to find 
exciting image themes that capture the national imagination in the late 1990s. Of 
Nashville's peer cities, Raleigh-Durham is the only one that consistently ranks high on 
the lists, including a 1993 ranking at number one as the best place for knowledge workers 
(Labish, 1993). 
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One of the first actions of Partnership 2000 was to conduct an image survey of 
business executives around the country in 1990 comparing Nashville with other 
southeastern cities. Repeating the study in 1992 after two years of advertising and other 
types of promotion, Partnership 2000 "found that Nashville had made significant gain in 
awareness, image, and likelihood to be considered as a potential site" (Partnership 2000, 
1996b ). A third study in 1996 (based on interviews with 290 executives and 18 relocation 
consultants) revealed that Nashville's position as a potential expansion site was 
unchanged (number four out of eight southeastern cities), but the region as a whole was 
less likely to be considered for expansion than in 1992. In terms of Nashville's broader 
image, country music is still the dominant theme, but the perception of a good business 
climate is almost as prevalent among the executives. Because of the success of Music 
Row in the mid- l 990s, Nashville was, in fact, increasingly seen as a city dominated by 
country music. No significant gain in the perceptions of Nashville as an economically 
dynamic place was made from 1992-1996; however, the city is perceived less as an 
insular, Southern place that outsiders want to avoid (Table A-1). Nashville's performance 
rating in Figure A-1 indicates a positive development on perceptions on economic vitality 
and financial resources, but a decline in labor quality, education and air transportation; 
this set the stage for further Chamber activity (see Chapters 9 and 10). Overall, education 
appears to be the weakest component for economic development in Nashville, which, of 
course, goes beyond image creation. It can also be concluded that few image gains had 
been made in 1996 compared to the 1990-1992 period. No comparable data after 1996 is 
available. 
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Table A-1 Summary of perceptions of Nashville from Partnership 2000 image surveys. 
Place dominated by country music people 
Broad-based economy 
Place people from outside 
the South wouldn't want to live 
One of top ten places for entrepreneurs 
Little to do other than listen to 
country music 
One of top places for college 
grads to get white-collar jobs 
An economic backwater 
Source: Partnership 2000 (1996b). 
Percent agreeing 
with statement 
Percent disagreeing 
with statement 
1990 1 992 1996 I 990 1992 1 996 
36 49 45 31 24 27 
NA NA 33 NA NA 11 
30 31 26 33 35 37 
NA NA 23 NA NA 16 
14 20 18 57 49 52 
NA NA 17 NA NA 21 
12 IO 8 45 39 40 
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Figure A-1 Percent executives who rated Nashville excellent or good in perception 
surveys 1990, 1992, and 1996. Source: Partnership 2000 (1996b). Used by permission. 
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A final way of assessing the image of Nashville is to analyze what has been 
written about Nashville in national media during the 1990s. Using a database search, I 
have categorized articles on Nashville using selected publications59• Based on the 
content of the article, three basic categories have been used: music, business, and city. 
The music industry warrants a category in itself based on its prevalence and high-profile 
status. All other articles on industry, commerce, and economic development are classified 
under the business label. The final category, city, is more heterogeneous but dominated 
by various political themes. In addition, I have classified each article as portraying 
Nashville in a favorable light or not. Each article therefore has a positive, negative, or 
neutral designation. The result is displayed in Figure A-2. 
The overall attention paid to Nashville in national media appears to have been 
cyclical. The peak is at mid-decade with 50 articles in 1995, increasing from a low of 22 
at the beginning of the decade. Although a decline is noted in the late 1990s, it remains at 
a higher level than in 1990. The development of the music industry is the most dominant 
element. The years 1992-1995 were a time when national media flocked to Nashville 
with the primary motive of praising country music and, to some extent, its positive 
59 The database tool utilized is the on line Dow Jones Index (accessed in January 2002). The selection of 
publications is New York Times, USA Today, Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Forbes, Fortune, 
Newsweek, and Times from 1990 through 1999. The selection represents the most widely read news outlets 
in the country with an additional emphasis on the business press. The search word "Nashville" yielded 
3,536 "hits" from 1990 through 1999. From that extensive source material I used the following criteria to 
omit substantial amounts of data deemed irrelevant. First, any material meeting the relevance criteria must 
be substantial. Only article-length material has been included. The overwhelming majority of the initially 
selected material was short briefs that could be discarded. Second, articles must be relevant by reflecting on 
Nashville as a city. This would, for example, disqualify most articles discussing a particular company, the 
performance of a sport team, etc. located in Nashville. Only if the theme of such an article emphasized the 
place ties of an entity or an event has it been included. In addition, articles discussing an industry closely 
associated with Nashville (e.g. the music industry, the health care industry) have been included. 
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Figure A-2 Portrayal of Nashville in selected national media 1990-1999. 
impact on Nash ville. This attention wanes later during the decade and so does the 
unabashedly positive view of the industry. Occasionally, the music industry is portrayed 
as conservative and religious, which is tolerable from the Chamber's booster perspective 
so long as it is not too associated with non-mainstream fundamentalism. 
After 1990, when the Nashville economy was still in the doldrums, the city has 
seen more positive than negative business press; this tendency may be more pronounced 
over time. New investments and relocations generated mostly positive accounts, as did 
some reporting on innovative business strategies, mostly in the health care field. Banking 
and health care (especially HCA's legal problems) contributed to the business-negative 
category during various parts of the period. 
The city category also shows more attention over time. Much of it was generated 
by the city's attempts, reported both in a positive and negative light, to attract 
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professional sports. Particularly the Houston Oilers' move to Nashville is an important 
factor in the high level of media attention in 1995 (and also heavily reported in 1996). 
Probably to the dismay of the local boosters, Nashville was sometimes portrayed as "too 
eager" to attract sports teams. Negative financial aspects of attracting sports teams and 
publicly subsidizing the arena and the stadium also pulled down the overall impression. 
A second theme with relatively high levels of attention is the airline industry. 
Several articles appeared in 1993 (one of the media attention peak years) as Nashville 
competed for the London route. Much like in sports, Nashville appeared ambitious and 
entrepreneurial; however, the media "spin" in this case was generally positive. Also the 
loss of American Airlines, and later the growth of Southwest Airlines, was frequently 
reported for several years. Mayor Bredesen received a moderate level of personal 
attention in the articles, especially from 1993-1995, both on the sports issue as well as the 
suggested municipal air route purchase. Bredesen was sometimes linked to other 
successful, "nee-progressive" mayors who were treated favorably by the media, as 
central cities took a significant part of the economic growth of the nation as a whole for 
the first time in decades. During the last few years of the 1990s, more articles were 
treating Nashville as any other city, sometimes even stressing its normal, mainstream 
character. This is reflected in the increase of the city-positive category, which should be 
pleasing to the image-makers and their more-to-Nashville-than-country agenda. Wealthy 
and growing, politically connected, money-giving and entrepreneurial are some of the 
descriptive themes highlighted in the articles. 
In summary, the data indicate some image-making success, from direct 
advertising and some possible effects on industrial recruiting, to changing broader 
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perceptions of Nashville. These changes are moderate as indicated both by the Chamber's 
own material and national media trends. Media attention has been both positive and 
negative as best exemplified by the major league sports issue. However, the short-term 
media backlash that occurred is most likely countered by the long-term exposure that 
such investments bring. A handful of individual themes (sports, airlines) made an impact 
on the overall level of media attention from year to year. This represents the public policy 
aspect of image-making, which is slowly altering the general perception of Nashville; 
however, the city's image still exhibits strong path dependency mostly associated with 
the music industry. 
383 
APPENDIX 2: The air transportation system and the urban hierarchy 
The objective of Appendix 2 is to investigate how the air transportation system has 
developed since deregulation from an urban hierarchy perspective. The changes in the 
U.S. airport system are presented in Figure A-3 for three time periods: 1980, 1990, and 
2000. As deregulation was passed in 1978, 1980 represents the old regulated system 
(negligible changes are assumed from 1978-1980). The 95 largest airport markets as 
reported by the FAA are displayed for all three periods60• A rank correlation between 
population rank (i.e. the largest city, New York City, is found in the lower left comer)
and air passenger rank reveals a tendency toward stronger c�rrelation over time. The
correlation coefficient has changed from 0.795 in 1980, to 0.866 in 1990, and 0.902 in
2000. Hence, the size of any given city's airport is more and more likely to correspond to
its place in the urban hierarchy. Therefore, deregulation appears, at least at first glance, to
limit cities' possibility of using airports as a competitive tool as hypothesized.
However, a major part of this trend affects smaller cities. The visual impression of 
Figure A-3 is a "tightening up" lower in the urban hierarchy. With flights determined by 
market forces rather than being assigned by regulators, the effect is a closer 
correspondence between urban rank and passenger traffic. To investigate differences 
between cities of different size categories, I have divided the cities into four quartiles 
(Category 1 includes the largest cities, and Category 4 consists of the smallest). Of 
particular interest is Category 2, which corresponds approximately to the term 
60 Some cities move in and out of the data set as their urban rank changes. Both passenger data and 
population are measured by MSA, which I deemed the appropriate geographical unit as airports serve 
regional markets. In some cases, passenger data from more than one airport have been combined ( e.g. 
LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark for New York City). 
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Figure A-3 Airports and the U.S. urban system. Correlation MSA population rank and 
MSA air passenger rank, 1980 (top), 1990 (middle), and 2000 (bottom). 
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"mid-size city" used earlier. Nashville is included in Category 2 for all three time 
periods. 
First, to investigate the "contribution" of each category to changes in correlation, 
the deviation from the regression line for each data point has been calculated and 
summed in the four categories (Table A-2). As is natural in a rank correlation, deviations 
are more noticeable lower in the urban hierarchy where small absolute differences can 
manifest themselves in significant rank changes; however, the significance of the 
measurement lies in the temporal analysis. Category 3 (MSAs ranging from approximate 
1 million to 400,000 during various periods) contributed 40.8 percent to the deviation in 
1980, but only 30.4 percent in 2000. Thus, these are cities that have experienced a 
movement towards the mean and overwhelmingly contribute to the increasing correlation 
between city rank and passenger traffic rank. On the other hand," Category 2 cities (MSAs 
Table A-2 Statistical summary of air passenger ranks. 
1980 1990 
Rank Deviation Rank Deviation 
Category I -1.54 11.1% -1.92 12.4% 
Category 2 -7.50 18.5% -6.53 24.7% 
Category 3 -7.46 40.8% 0.88 31.8% 
Category 4 -1.56 29.5% -0.09 31.2% 
1980 1990 
Rank correlation 0.795 0.866 
Absolute numbers correlation 0.828 0.838 
Best performers in air passenger rank in Category 2: 
1980: New Orleans, Salt Lake City, Memphis, Hartford, Orlando 
1990: Orlando, Charlotte, Salt Lake City, Memphis, Nashville 
2000 
Rank 
-1.67
-1.25
-4.42
7.65
2000 
0.902 
0.827 
2000: Orlando, Las Vegas, Charlotte, Salt Lake City, Raleigh-Durham, Memphis 
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Deviation 
13.8% 
26.4% 
30.4% 
29.4% 
from 1.8 million to 700,000) are exhibiting more internal differentiation over time. Their 
share of the total deviation rose from 18.5 percent in 1980 to 26.4 percent in �000. 
Hence, cities in Nashville's size category have experienced some divergence in the 
development of their airports as measured by passenger traffic rank. 
Second, the statistical deviations from the regression line as reported here do not 
indicate whether a category's passenger rank is better or worse than expected based on 
population rank. To investigate that, I have calculated the difference between population 
and passenger rank for each city. The mean for passenger rank in Category 2 cities has 
changed from 7 .50 rank points below their population rank in 1980 to 1.25 rank points 
below in 2000. Although ranked slightly lower in passenger traffic than "expected," this 
represents a clear improvement in passenger traffic rank over time for Category 2 cities, 
which indicate growing airports (with increasing variability within the category as 
indicated earlier). Although the trend is not straightforward, cities in Category 3 and 4 
also exhibit rank improvements, especially Category 4 during the 1990s (which suggests 
that the rank losers in passenger traffic are small-town airports not included here). 
If Category 2 cities in general have been relatively successful in airport traffic 
growth, which cities are the best performers? In Figure A-3, cities with a passenger rank 
strongly above the expected (statistically, cities with a positive deviation in excess of the 
average deviation for Category 2) are marked in green. Nashville is part of that group in 
1990 but is marked in red for clarity during all three time periods. 
Three Category 2 cities appear in the best performer group during all three time 
periods: Orlando (tourism economy), Salt Lake City (with an exceptionally large 
hinterland), and Memphis (hub city). Of Nashville's other designated peer cities, New 
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Orleans, Charlotte, and Raleigh-Durham are included in the best performer group at one 
or two occasions. Nashville was included in 1990; not surprisingly, this was during the 
period when American Airlines had a hub in the city. 
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